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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the Dodd–Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank).1 The   statute’s   preamble  
states that one of Dodd–Frank’s  purposes  is  “to  protect  consumers  from  abusive  financial  
services   practices.”2 When President Obama signed Dodd–Frank into law, he declared
that  the  statute  would  create  “the  strongest  consumer  financial  protections  in  history.” 3
In order to implement and enforce Dodd–Frank’s   new   protections   for   consumers,  
Congress created the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (CFPB) as an
“independent   bureau”   within   the   Federal   Reserve   System (Fed).4 President Obama
explained   that   CFPB   will   operate   as   “a   new   consumer   watchdog   with   just   one   job:  
looking out for people—not big banks, not lenders, not investment houses—looking out
for  people  as  they  interact   with  the  financial  system.” 5 Similarly, the Senate committee
report on Dodd–Frank  explained  that  CFPB’s  mission  is  to  “help  protect  consumers  from  
unfair, deceptive, and abusive acts that so often trap them in unaffordable financial
products.”6
*Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. I am grateful to Michael Campbell, Kathleen
Engel, Kathleen Keest, Kim Krawiec, Adam Levitin, Patricia McCoy, Alan Morrison, Elizabeth Renuart,
Lauren Saunders, Heidi Schooner, Catherine Sharkey and Cynthia Williams for helpful comments and
conversations. Unless otherwise indicated, this article includes developments through April 12, 2010.
1. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376
(2010).
2. Id. at Preamble (describing the purposes of Dodd–Frank).
3. President Barack H. Obama, Remarks on Signing the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (July 21, 2010), available at http://whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-signingDodd–Frank-wall-street-reform-and-consumer-protection-act [hereinafter Presidential Dodd–Frank Signing
Statement].
4. Dodd–Frank § 1011(a), see also H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 874 (2010) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2010
U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 730.
5. Presidential Dodd–Frank Signing Statement, supra note 3.
6. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 11 (2010).
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Thus,  Congress  gave  CFPB  “the  Herculean  task  of regulating the financial services
industry   to   protect   consumers.”7 Congress   sought   to   increase   CFPB’s   “accountability”  
for that mission by delegating to CFPB the combined authority of seven federal agencies
that were previously responsible for protecting consumers of financial services.8
Congress determined that a single federal authority dedicated to protecting consumers of
financial   services   was   needed   in   light   of   “the   spectacular   failure   of   the   [federal]  
prudential regulators to protect average American homeowners  from  risky,  unaffordable”  
mortgages during the housing boom that led to the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009. 9 As
stated in the Senate report, and as further explained in Part II of this Article, federal
banking  agencies  “routinely  sacrificed  consumer  protection”  while  adopting  policies  that  
promoted   the   “short-term   profitability”   of   large   banks,   nonbank   mortgage   lenders   and  
Wall Street securities firms.10 The   Senate   report   concluded   that   “the   failure   by   the  
prudential regulators to give sufficient consideration to consumer protection . . . helped
bring  the  financial  system  down.” 11
To provide additional safeguards to consumers, Dodd–Frank enables the states to
supplement CFPB’s   rulemaking   and   enforcement   efforts.   Congress   realized   that   many  
states attempted to stop abusive mortgage lending practices during the housing boom by
adopting and enforcing state laws. 12 However,   “rather   than   supporting   these   antipredatory  lending  laws,  federal  regulators  preempted  them.” 13 As explained in the Senate
report and as further discussed in Part II.E of this Article, two federal banking agencies—
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the Office of Thrift Supervision
(OTS)—“actively created an environment where abusive mortgage lending could flourish
without  State  control.”14
To correct the problems created by federal preemption, Dodd–Frank enlarges both
the lawmaking and law enforcement functions of the states in the area of consumer
financial protection. As described in Part III of this article, Title X of Dodd–Frank
empowers   CFPB   to   issue   regulations   that   establish   a   federal   “floor”   of   consumer  
protection and authorizes the states to adopt additional substantive rules that provide
greater safeguards to consumers. Dodd–Frank also allows state officials to enforce the
statutory  provisions  of  Title  X  as  well  as  CFPB’s  regulations  and  applicable  state  laws.
The Senate report endorsed these grants of enhanced authority to the states, noting that
“States   are   much   closer   to   [financial]   abuses   and   are   able to move more quickly when
necessary  to  address  them.”15
Moreover, Dodd–Frank abolishes the OTS, limits the preemptive authority of the
OCC,   and   clarifies   the   states’   authority   to   apply   and   enforce   their   consumer   financial  
protection laws against national banks and federally-chartered savings associations
7. Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L.
REV. 15, 18 (2010).
8. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 11 (2010).
9. Id. at 15.
10. Id. (quoting congressional testimony of Patricia McCoy on Mar. 3, 2009).
11. Id. at 166.
12. Id. at 16; see also infra Part II.E.1 (describing passage of anti-predatory lending laws by 30 states and
the District of Columbia).
13. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 16 (2010).
14. Id. at 17.
15. Id. at 174.
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(federal thrifts). Under the new preemption standards established by Title X of Dodd–
Frank, (i) state consumer financial laws will apply to national banks and federal thrifts
unless they prevent or significantly interfere with the exercise of national bank powers;
(ii) the OCC will have authority to preempt state laws only on a case-by-case basis and
only if its preemption determinations are supported by substantial evidence; (iii) state
laws will generally apply to the subsidiaries, affiliates and agents of national banks and
federal thrifts; and (iv) state attorneys general will have authority to enforce applicable
laws—including non-preempted   state   laws   and   CFPB’s   regulations—against national
banks and federal thrifts through judicial enforcement proceedings.
Part IV of this Article situates Title X of Dodd–Frank within contemporary debates
about the proper role of state lawmaking and state enforcement in the area of consumer
protection. By enabling states to construct additional safety measures on top of the
federal   “floor”   of   consumer   financial   protections,   Title   X   of   Dodd–Frank affirms the
longstanding  role  of  states  as  “laboratories  of  regulatory  experimentation”  in  identifying  
emerging threats to consumer welfare and designing new legal rules to counteract those
threats.16 In addition, the supplemental enforcement powers granted to states under Title
X   enables   state   officials   to   act   as   “normative   entrepreneurs”   in   protecting   their   citizens  
from unfair, deceptive, or abusive financial practices in circumstances where CFPB or
other federal agencies might fail to act.17 Finally, the independent lawmaking and law
enforcement roles delegated to the states by Title X provide important safeguards against
the potential   risk   that   CFPB   could   be   “captured”   over   time   by   the   financial   services  
industry.18
II. FEDERAL BANKING AGENCIES FAILED TO PROTECT CONSUMERS DURING THE HOUSING
BOOM AND PREVENTED THE STATES FROM DOING SO
Regulatory inaction and preemption by federal banking agencies played a significant
role in allowing abusive nonprime lending to grow and spread during the past decade.
Nonprime lenders originated almost 10 million subprime and Alt-A mortgage loans
between 2003 and 2007, and by 2008 about $2 trillion of such loans were outstanding.19
16. Barkow, supra note 7, at 75–76; see also William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk,
Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1554–56, 1586–89 (2007) (explaining
the   advantages   of   federal   statutory   schemes   that   establish   a   “floor”   of   minimum   federal   standards   but   allow  
individual states to experiment by adopting more protective measures); S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 174–75   (“If  
States were not allowed to take the initiative to enact laws providing greater protection for consumers, the
Federal Government would lose an important source of information and reason to adjust [federal] standards
over time.”).  Cf. New  State  Ice  Co.  v.  Liebman,  285  U.S.  262,  311  (1932)  (Brandeis,  J.,  dissenting)  (“It  is  one  
of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a
laboratory; and try novel social and  economic  experiments  without  risk  to  the  rest  of  the  country.”).
17. See Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 YALE J. ON REG.
143, 199–200 (2009) (describing political motivations that cause state officials to act   as   “normative  
entrepreneurs”  in  adopting  new  policies  to  protect  consumers).  
18. Barkow, supra note 7, at 53–57, 75–76; see also Buzbee, supra note 16, at 1609–11 (describing risks
of regulatory capture); Levitin, supra note 17, at 199–206 (explaining why state enforcement of consumer
protection laws could help to prevent regulatory capture).
19. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the
Origins of the Subprime Lending Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963, 1015–17, 1027 (2009). The term "nonprime
mortgages"  includes  “subprime”  and  “Alt-A”  mortgages.  Subprime  mortgages  were  marketed  to  borrowers  who  
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Unfortunately, the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) failed to exercise its authority under the
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) 20 to prevent unfair and deceptive
acts and practices in residential mortgage lending. The FRB also failed to stop abusive
lending practices by nonbank mortgage lenders that were subsidiaries of bank holding
companies.21
In contrast, the states did try to stop predatory lending. As discussed below, 30 states
and the District of Columbia adopted anti-predatory lending (APL) laws between 1999
and 2007.22 However, the OCC and the OTS issued regulations that preempted state APL
laws. Those rules barred states from applying their APL laws to national banks and
federal thrifts, as well as their mortgage lending subsidiaries and agents. In addition, the
OCC and the OTS failed to take effective action to stop abusive nonprime lending
practices by national banks, federal thrifts, and affiliated entities.
Federal regulatory inaction and federal preemption encouraged federally-chartered
depository institutions and their affiliates to become leading participants in nonprime
mortgage lending. Ultimately, the regulatory failures of the FRB, the OCC, and the OTS
contributed to defaults and foreclosures on millions of nonprime loans. By December
2010, lenders had foreclosed on about 5 million homes, and 4 million additional
foreclosures were expected to occur in 2011 and 2012.23 In addition, reckless lending by
federally-chartered depository institutions and their affiliates led to the failures or
government bailouts of several of the largest national banks and federal thrifts, including
Citigroup, Wachovia, Washington Mutual, National City and IndyMac.
A. The FRB Failed to Exercise Its Authority under HOEPA to Stop Predatory Lending
In 1994, Congress passed HOEPA to prevent abusive lending practices in certain
segments of the residential mortgage market. 24 Most   of   HOEPA’s   requirements   are  
directed   at   “high-cost”   mortgage   refinancing   loans; accordingly, those requirements do
not apply to purchase mortgages, reverse mortgages, and home equity lines of credit. 25
However, one section of HOEPA authorizes the FRB to issue regulations and orders to
“prohibit  acts  or  practices  in  connection  with . . . mortgage loans that the [FRB] finds to
be   unfair,   deceptive,   or   designed   to   evade   the   provisions   of   this   section.” 26 Under that
provision, HOEPA gives the FRB broad authority to stop unfair and deceptive lending
practices by all types of federally-chartered and state-chartered lenders with respect to all
types of mortgages.27
had poor credit histories (including low credit scores and/or recent bankruptcies) as well as inadequate savings
to make substantial down payments. In contrast, Alt-A loans were typically made to borrowers who had less
serious credit problems or who were unable or unwilling to provide full documentation of their income or
assets. Id. at 1015–16, 1016 n.256.
20. Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 103-325, §§ 151–58, 108 Stat. 2190, 2190–
98 (1994) (codified as amended at various provisions of 15 U.S.C.).
21. See infra Parts  II.A,  II.B  (describing  the  FRB’s  regulatory  shortcomings)
22. See infra notes 112–16 and accompanying text (discussing state APL laws).
23. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, DECEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: A REVIEW OF TREASURY’S
FORECLOSURE PREVENTION PROGRAMS 10 (Dec. 14, 2010).
24. KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS 194–95 (2011).
25. Id.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(l)(2) (1980).
27. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 195; Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer,
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As required by HOEPA, the FRB held a series of public hearings on predatory
lending between 1997 and 2000.28 Following  those  hearings,  members  of  the  FRB’s  staff  
proposed that the FRB adopt new rules under HOEPA.29 The proposed rules would have
prohibited all lenders from making mortgage loans based solely on the value of the
collateral  and  without  properly  documenting  the  borrowers’  ability  to  repay  the  loans. 30
However, FRB Chairman Alan Greenspan and other members   of   the   FRB’s   Board   of  
Governors rejected the staff proposals.31 Instead, the FRB adopted a regulation that
slightly  expanded  the  definition  of  “high-cost”  loans  and  thereby  modestly  enlarged  the  
scope   of   HOEPA’s   regulatory   regime   for   mortgage   refinancing loans.32 As a practical
matter,  the   FRB’s  2001  regulation  covered  “only  about  1%  of  subprime  loans”  because  
subprime  lenders  changed  the  terms  of  their  loans  to  avoid  the  FRB’s  revised  definition  
for application of HOEPA. 33
The FRB did not adopt another regulation under HOEPA until July 2008, when it
issued comprehensive rules to ban unfair and deceptive practices with respect to a much
broader  category  of  “higher-priced  mortgage  loans.”34 However,  the  Fed’s  2008  rules—
which finally required lenders to verify  borrowers’  ability  to  repay  higher-priced loans—
were  issued  “a  year  after  the  subprime  market  had  shut  down.” 35 Accordingly, the 2008
rules  were  “too  little  and  too  late”  to  play  any  role  in  preventing  the  predatory  nonprime  
lending that led to the financial crisis.36
At a hearing held by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) in September
2010,   Commissioner   John   Thompson   asked   FDIC   Chairman   Sheila   Bair,   “[I]f   you   had  
one bullet that you could fire as a regulator that would have mitigated or . . . prevented
this   financial   calamity,   what   would   that   have   been?”37 Chairman   Bair   replied:   “I  
absolutely would have been over at the [FRB] writing rules, prescribing mortgage
lending standards across the board for everybody, bank and nonbank, that you cannot
make a mortgage unless you have documented income that the borrower can repay the

157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 89 (2008).
28. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 76–77, 93 (2011) [hereinafter
FCIC REPORT], available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/ecic/fcic.pdf.
29. Id. at 93.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 93–94.
32. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 195.
33. FCIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 94; see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 195 (describing very
limited  impact  of  the  FRB’s  2001 regulation).
34. Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522 (July 30, 2008).
35. FCIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 22, 95; see also S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 16 (2010) (stating that the
Fed’s  2008  rules  were  issued  “long  after  the  marketplace had shut down the availability of subprime and exotic
mortgage  credit”).
36. Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk Through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and
Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1327, 1347 (2009); see also Sudeep Reddy, Currents: Fed Faces
Grilling on Consumer-Protection Lapses, WALL ST. J.,  Dec.  2,  2009,  at  A22  (reporting  that  “many  lawmakers  
and   consumer   advocates”   viewed   the   Fed’s   2008   rules   as   “too   little   too   late”   because   the   Fed’s   “ban   on  
deceptive subprime-mortgage practices, came only after the financial crisis exposed vast regulatory holes and a
sea  of  loans  to  homeowners  who  can’t  meet  their  payments”).
37. Too Big to Fail: Expectations and Impact of Extraordinary Government Intervention and the Role of
Systemic  Risk  in  the  Financial  Crisis:  Hearing  Before  Fin.  Crisis  Inquiry  Comm’n, 112th Cong. 190–91 (2010),
available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-0902-transcript.pdf.
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loan.”38 Chairman   Bair’s   reply   highlighted   the   significance   of   the   FRB’s   failure   to  
exercise its authority to stop predatory lending under HOEPA.
B. The FRB Failed to Regulate Nonprime Lenders That Were Subsidiaries of Bank
Holding Companies
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHC Act) empowers the FRB to regulate
nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies (BHCs). 39 Nevertheless, the FRB chose
not to exercise its authority to regulate nonbank mortgage lending subsidiaries of BHCs
between 1998 and 2007. As a result, the FRB failed to stop lending abuses by several
major nonprime lenders that were affiliated with BHCs.
In   January   1998,   the   FRB   “formalized   its   long-standing   policy   of   ‘not   routinely  
conducting   consumer   compliance   examinations   of   nonbank   subsidiaries   of   [BHCs].’” 40
Some FRB officials and staff members subsequently tried to change this no-supervision
policy for mortgage lending subsidiaries after they saw growing evidence of mortgage
lending abuses.41 In  2000,   members  of  the  Fed’s  consumer  division  staff  proposed  that  
the FRB undertake a pilot program to investigate predatory lending practices at selected
nonbank subsidiaries of BHCs.42 Former FRB Governor Edward Gramlich, who served
on the Board of Governors between 1999 and 2005, urged FRB Chairman Greenspan to
implement the pilot program. 43 However, Chairman Greenspan rejected the proposal. 44
The FRB adhered to its no-supervision policy for nonbank mortgage lending
subsidiaries of BHCs despite two reports issued by the GAO in 1999 and 2004, which
criticized   the   FRB’s   “lack   of   regulatory   oversight”   over   such   entities. 45 Chairman
Greenspan   later   argued   that   the   FRB   “lacked   sufficient   resources”   to   regulate   the  
nonbank subsidiaries and claimed that inadequate FRB supervision would have given a
misleading  “Good  Housekeeping”  seal  of  approval  to  such  firms. 46 As a result of its nosupervision policy, the FRB failed to regulate BHC subsidiaries that were responsible for
38. Id. at 191; see also FCIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 94 (quoting reply by Chairman Bair). I served as a
consultant to the FCIC during 2010.
39. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(q)(D), 1843, 1844(c)(2)(B) (2006). Under a 1999 statute, the FRB was required
to defer to the primary regulators of functionally-regulated subsidiaries of BHCs, such as banks, securities
broker-dealers, and insurance companies. McCoy et al., supra note 36, at 1345–46. However, nonbank
mortgage lenders were not functionally-regulated subsidiaries and were therefore fully subject to the FRB's
supervisory and enforcement authority. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(q)(2)(F), 1818, 1843(c); see also ENGEL & MCCOY,
supra note 24,   at   199   (“It   doesn’t   appear   that   [the 1999   statute]   was   what   motivated   the   Fed’s   refusal   to  
examine   [BHC]   subsidiaries.   In   fact,   the   evidence   suggests   that   the   Fed’s   failure   to   conduct   routine  
examinations of subsidiaries during the subprime boom was a matter of discretion, not a dictate of the law.”).  
40. FCIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 77 (quoting FRB Division of Consumer and Community Affairs,
Consumer Affairs Letter CA 98-1, dated Jan. 20, 1998).
41. Id. at 94.
42. Id.
43. Greg Ip, Did Greenspan Add to Subprime Woes? Gramlich Says Ex-Colleague Blocked Crackdown on
Predatory Lenders Despite Growing Concerns, WALL ST. J., Jun. 9, 2007, at B1.
44. Id.; FCIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 94–95.
45. FCIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 77, 95.
46. Id. at 95 (summarizing Mr. Greenspan's interview with the FCIC); see also Binyamin Applebaum, Fed
Held Back as Evidence Mounted on Subprime Loan Abuses, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2009, at A1 (characterizing
the  FRB’s  approach  as  a  “hands-off  policy”);;  Edmund  L.  Andrews,  Fed and Regulators Shrugged as Subprime
Crisis Spread, N.Y. TIMES,  Dec.  18,  2007,  at  A1  (noting  Mr.  Greenspan’s  defense  of  his  actions).
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a substantial portion of subprime and Alt-A lending during the housing boom. 47
Between 1999 and 2007, several leading BHCs acquired nonprime mortgage lenders
and used those nonbank subsidiaries to establish leading positions in the subprime and
Alt-A mortgage markets. National City, a large Midwestern bank, purchased First
Franklin in 1999.48 Citigroup bought Associates First Capital in 200049 and Argent (an
affiliate of Ameriquest) in 2007.50 JP Morgan Chase acquired Advanta in 2001,51 and
HSBC purchased Household in 2002.52 Countrywide,   the   nation’s   largest   mortgage  
lender, acquired a national bank and became a BHC in 2001. 53 Countrywide also
established a securitization unit and expanded aggressively into subprime and Alt-A
lending.54 Despite the growing significance of nonprime lending by BHC subsidiaries,
the FRB took only one public enforcement action against a nonbank subsidiary of a
BHC.55 In a 2004 order, the FRB levied a fine of $70 million against CitiFinancial (the
subprime mortgage lending subsidiary of Citigroup) for numerous lending violations. 56
The FRB did not change its no-supervision policy for nonbank subsidiaries of BHCs
until July 2007, when it began a pilot program to examine subprime lending subsidiaries
of several BHCs.57 In September 2009, the FRB finally reversed its 1998 policy
statement and announced a new policy to examine all nonbank subsidiaries of BHCs for
compliance with consumer lending laws. 58 Again,  the  Fed’s  policy  change  came  far  too  
late to prevent the financial crisis.

C. Federal Banking Agencies Issued Weak and Inadequate Guidance on Nonprime
Mortgages
Instead of issuing binding rules to stop abusive nonprime lending, the FRB joined
with   other   federal   banking   agencies   in   issuing   statements   of   “guidance”   on   nonprime  
adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs). In October 2006, federal regulators issued guidance
on   “nontraditional”   mortgages,   including   “pick-a-pay”   option   ARMs   and   mortgages  
issued   with  little  or  no  documentation  of  the  borrowers’  income  or  assets. 59 Regulators
47. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 198–203   (noting   that   nonbank   subsidiaries   of   BHCs   “made  
17.7%—almost one-fifth—of higher-priced  [mortgage]  loans  in  2007”).
48. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 1018.
49. Id. at 1017.
50. Id. at 1018; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 170.
51. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 1017.
52. Id. at 1017–18.
53. Id. at 1018.
54. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 200–02; Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 1018; FCIC REPORT, supra
note 28, at 107–08.
55. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 198–203.
56. Id. at 202–03; see also Binyamin Appelbaum, As Subprime Lending Crisis Unfolded, Watchdog Fed
Didn’t   Bother   Barking, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2009, at A1 (reporting that the fine imposed on CitiFinancial
represented  “the  Fed’s  only  public  enforcement  action  against  a  lending  affiliate”).
57. FCIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 95.
58. R. Christian Bruce, Regulatory Reform: Fed to Broaden Consumer Protection Role Across Nonbank
Subsidiaries of Bank Firms, 93 BANKING REP. (BNA) 497 (Sept. 22, 2009) (citing FRB Letter CA 09-8, dated
Sept.  14,  2009,  issued  by  the  Fed’s Division of Consumer and Community Affairs).
59. Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risks, 71 Fed. Reg. 58,609, 58,609 (Oct. 4,
2006); see also FCIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 20–22, 172–73 (discussing issuance of federal guidance for
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issued the 2006 guidance after they discovered alarming concentrations of nontraditional
mortgages at major national banks and federal thrifts. 60
The federal banking agencies also issued  guidance  on  “hybrid”  subprime  ARMs  in  
July 2007.61 The 2006 and 2007 statements of guidance advised depository institutions
that they should (i) underwrite each nonprime ARM based on the fully-amortized rate
instead  of  the  introductory  “teaser”  rate, and  (ii)  verify  the  borrower’s  ability  to  repay  the  
loan from sources other than the foreclosure value   of   the   borrower’s   collateral.62
However, both statements of guidance were presented merely as advice on good
practices, were not directly enforceable by the agencies, and did not give injured
borrowers any right to file lawsuits if lenders failed to follow the guidance.63 For
example, when regulators issued the 2006 guidance, Comptroller of the Currency John
Dugan  emphasized  that  the  guidance  “is  not a ban on the use of nontraditional mortgage
products”  and  “does  not impose a limit on the number of nontraditional mortgages that an
institution  may  hold.”64
Federal regulators claimed that they enforced their statements of guidance and other
consumer   protection   laws   through   bank   examinations   and   “informal”   enforcement  
measures such as voluntary agreements with supervised institutions.65 For example, in
October 2006, OCC Chief Counsel Julie L. Williams told a financial services group that
the   OCC   “‘rarely’   brings   an   enforcement   case,   and   uses   prudential   regulation   almost  
exclusively.”66 In a subsequent interview,   Ms.   Williams   confirmed   that   the   OCC’s  
“nontraditional   mortgages”).   In   a   typical   "pick-a-pay" option ARM, the borrower was permitted, during an
introductory period of three to five years, to make either (i) interest-only monthly payments, or (ii) minimum
monthly payments that were even lower than the accrued interest, in which case the unpaid interest was added
to the loan balance. However, the borrower was normally required to make much higher monthly payments
when either (A) the introductory period ended, or (B) the loan balance increased to 110% of 120% of the
original principal amount. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 34; Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 1022 n.300.
60. FCIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 20 (stating that, during an interagency investigation in 2005,
regulators found that nontraditional loans accounted for 59% of mortgage originations at Countrywide, 58% at
Wells Fargo, 51% at National City, 31% at Washington Mutual, 26.5% at CitiFinancial, and 18.3% at Bank of
America).
61. Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,569, 37,569 (July 10, 2007). "Hybrid"
subprime ARMs were mortgages that allowed borrowers to pay a low "teaser" interest rate for an introductory
period of two or three years and then required borrowers to pay much higher interest rates in subsequent years.
ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 34; FCIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 104–06.
62. See Interagency Guidance on Nontraditional Mortgage Product Risk, 71 Fed. Reg. at 58,611;
Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. at 37,571–73.
63. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 165–66. A federal banking agency   “may”—but is not required
to—require   a   depository   institution   to   submit   an   “acceptable   plan”   if   the   institution   fails   to   comply   with  
guidance on lending practices. 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1(e)(1)(A)(ii) (2006). However, the federal agency may not
bring a formal  enforcement  proceeding  based  solely  on  an  institution’s  failure  to  comply  with  guidance.  ENGEL
& MCCOY, supra note 24, at 165–66.
64. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 165–66 (quoting speech by Mr. Dugan). For discussions of the
inadequacy of regulatory guidance, see McCoy et al., supra note 36, at 1346–47, 1350–56 (explaining that the
federal   agencies’   nonbinding   guidance   failed   to   persuade   leading  national   banks and federal thrifts to correct
unsound mortgage lending practices); Andrews, supra note 46, at A1 (noting that, by the time regulators
published  the  2007  guidance  for  subprime  lending,  “more  than  30  subprime  lenders  had  gone  out  of  business”).
65. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 164–65, 168–69.
66. Rachel McTague, Regulatory Reform: Pitt, Wilson: Unified Regulatory Structure Needed for U.S.
Financial Services Industries, 87 BANKING REP. (BNA) 682, 682–83 (Nov. 6, 2006) (summarizing comments
made by Ms. Williams at a meeting held by a commission on capital markets that was sponsored by the U.S.
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preferred  approach  for  protecting  consumers  was  “not  public,”  and  that  the  OCC  did not
“do  press  releases” for most of its consumer compliance efforts.67
Because   the   federal   agencies’ bank examinations and other informal supervisory
procedures were  “highly  confidential,”  the  public  could  not  determine  whether  regulated  
institutions actually complied with the 2006 and 2007 interagency statements of
guidance.68 As discussed below, several of the largest federally-chartered mortgage
lenders failed or received federal assistance after engaging in abusive and unsound
lending practices that violated both the 2006 and 2007 guidance. 69 The destructive
behavior of those institutions indicated that their managers viewed the interagency
statements  of  guidance  as  “mere  ‘suggestions’”  that  they  could  ignore. 70
D. Federal Regulators Failed to Stop Predatory Lending Because of Their Belief in
Deregulation  and  “Pushback”  from  the  Financial  Services  Industry
Two factors help to explain why federal regulators failed to stop predatory nonprime
lending practices. First, senior federal banking officials doubted the effectiveness of
regulation and strongly preferred market-based solutions. Second, financial institutions
strongly opposed any attempts by banking agencies to impose restrictions on high-risk
mortgage lending.
1. The FRB, the OTS and the OCC Followed Deregulatory Policies During the Nonprime
Lending Boom
As shown above, the FRB failed to take measures that could have stopped abusive
nonprime lending practices between 1994 and 2008.71 FRB Chairman Alan Greenspan,
who   led   the   FRB   from   1987   to   2006,   played   a   decisive   role   in   the   FRB’s   decisions   to  
refrain from adopting strong rules under HOEPA and to forbear from supervising
nonbank mortgage lending subsidiaries of BHCs. 72 In a 2002 speech, Chairman
Greenspan expressed his general view that regulators should seek to minimize any
interference with innovation and competition in the financial markets:
Competition, of course, is the facilitator of innovation. And creative
destruction, the process by which less-productive capital is displaced with
innovative cutting-edge technologies, is the driving force of wealth creation.
Chamber of Commerce).
67. Stephanie Mencimer, No  Account:  The  Nefarious  Bureaucrat  Who’s  Helping  Banks  Rip You Off, NEW
REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2007, at 14, available at http://www.tnr.com/article/no-account-O (quoting from interview
with Ms. Williams).
68. McCoy et al., supra note 36, at 1350–51; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Written Testimony on the Credit
Card Industry Before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the House Committee
on Financial Services 13–14 (George Washington Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Working Paper
No. 517, 2007) [hereinafter Wilmarth Written Testimony], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1729840.
69. McCoy et al., supra note 36, at 1351–56; see also infra Part II.E.5 (discussing failures or near failures
of large national banks and federal thrifts that engaged in reckless subprime and Alt-A lending).
70. McCoy et al., supra note 36, at 1346–47, 1355–57; see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 165
(contending that the 2006 and 2007 guidelines  “allowed  for  slack  regulation  and  permitted  lenders  to  argue  that  
compliance  was  optional”).
71. See supra Parts  II.A,  II.B,  II.C  (discussing  the  FRB’s  regulatory  failures).
72. See supra notes 28–58 and  accompanying  text  (discussing  the  FRB’s  policy  decisions).
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Thus, from the perspective of aggregate wealth creation, the more competition
the better.
....
While regulation must change as financial structures do, such regulatory
change must be kept to a minimum to avoid fostering uncertainty among
innovators and investors. Moreover, shifting regulatory schemes unavoidably
leave obsolescent regulations in their wake . . . .
. . . Those of us who support market capitalism in its more-competitive forms
might argue that unfettered markets create a degree of wealth that fosters a
more civilized existence. I have always found that insight compelling.73
Thus,   there   was   “no   truer   believer   in   the   ideology   of   free   markets,   financial  
innovation,   and   deregulation”   than   Mr.   Greenspan. 74 He doubted whether most
government   regulation   was   beneficial,   and   he   championed   Joseph   Schumpeter’s   view  
that market  innovation  generated  rising  standards  of  living  through  a  process  of  “creative  
destruction”  that  eliminated  obsolete  businesses  and  technologies. 75 In keeping with his
deregulatory philosophy, Mr. Greenspan maintained that market discipline and private
risk management produced better results than government regulation over the longer
term.76
FRB   officials   later   confirmed   that   Mr.   Greenspan’s   opposition   to   new   regulatory  
initiatives   reflected   a   broader   “mindset”   in   the   Federal   Reserve   System   that   favored
deregulation during the period leading up to the financial crisis. As FRB General Counsel
Scott  Alvarez  explained,  “The   mind-set was that there should be no regulation; that the
market should take care of policing, unless there already is an identified problem.”77
Similarly, in 2009, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York prepared  a  “lessons  learned”  
report, which acknowledged that federal regulators placed too much faith in the
assumption   that   “markets   will   always   self-correct.”78 The report also admitted that the
FRB’s   belief   in   “the   self-correcting property of markets inhibited supervisors from

73. Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., International Financial Risk Management Address
before the Council of Foreign Relations (Nov. 19, 2001), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/
speeches/2002/20021119/default.htm.
74. SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT
FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 100 (2010).
75. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 190–91.
76. Id. at 191–92. For  example,  Mr.  Greenspan  declared  in  1997  that  “the  real  question  is  not  whether  a  
market should be regulated. Rather the real question is whether government intervention strengthens or weakens
private   regulation.”   FCIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 53–54 (quoting speech by Mr. Greenspan on Feb. 21,
1997).  Similarly,  Mr.  Greenspan  proclaimed  in  2004  that  “regulations  that  are  inconsistent  with  market  realities  
cannot  be  sustained  indefinitely,”  and  he  praised  improvements  in  private  risk  management  as  “hold[ing]  out  
the   hope   of   a   safer   and   stronger   banking   system   contributing   to   a   more   stable   economy.”   Alan   Greenspan,  
Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Banking Address before the American Bankers Association Annual Convention
(Oct. 5, 2004), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/20041005/default.htm.
77. FCIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 96 (quoting FCIC interview with Mr. Alvarez); see also JOHNSON &
KWAK, supra note 74,   at   103   (stating   that   “Greenspan   dominated   the   Fed   during   his   tenure,   and   his   views  
became  close  to  dogma  on  the  Board  of  Governors”).
78. FCIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 171 (quoting FED. RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, DRAFT, REPORT
ON SYSTEMIC RISK AND SUPERVISION 2 (2009)).
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imposing  prescriptive  views  on  banks.” 79
Senior   officials   at   the   OTS   and   OCC   followed   a   similar   policy   of   “light   touch”  
regulation during the decade leading up to the financial crisis.80 The OTS followed a
policy of aggressive deregulation and enthusiastically supported the interests of federal
thrifts,   which   it   viewed   as   the   agency’s   clients.   In   2004,   OTS   Director   James   Gilleran  
affirmed   that   “[o]ur   goal   is   to   allow   thrifts to operate with a wide breadth of freedom
from  regulatory  intrusion.”81 John Reich, who succeeded Mr. Gilleran as OTS Director in
2005,  described  regulatory  relief  as  his  “favorite  topic”  and  “something  near  and  dear  to  
my  heart.”82
Eugene Ludwig, who served as Comptroller of the Currency from 1993 to 1998,
later  explained  that  the   OCC   and  other  federal  agencies  believed  that   “a  lighter  hand  at  
regulation   was   the   appropriate   way   to   regulate.” 83 In a speech delivered in May 2005,
Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Julie Williams, declared   that   the   OCC’s   officials  
were   “advocates  on  the   national  stage  [for]  measures  designed  to  make  regulation  more  
efficient, and less costly, less intrusive, less complex, and less demanding on [bankers]
and [their] resources.”84 She  added  that  the  OCC’s  approach  to  supervision  “is  a  spacious  
framework,  designed  to  accommodate  change.” 85 In September 2007, John Dugan, who
served as Comptroller from 2005 to 2010, testified at a congressional hearing that the
OCC was strongly opposed to legislative or regulatory restrictions on financial
“innovations”   because   “there   are   many   different   kinds   of   innovations   that   have   led   to  
positive things and sorting out which ones are the most positive and somewhat less
positive is generally not something  that  the  Federal  Government  is  good  at  doing.” 86
Consistent   with   the   OTS’s   deregulatory   philosophy,   the   OTS   did   not   issue   any  
formal regulations to stop predatory lending practices. 87 The OTS also opposed the
interagency guidance on nontraditional lending and delayed its adoption for almost a
year.88 When the guidance was finally issued in September 2006, OTS Director Reich
“described  the  guidance  as  ‘extremely  controversial’  and  not  something  that  OTS  ‘would  
have   issued   on   [its]   own.’”89 Moreover, the   OTS   brought   only   “five   to   six”   formal  
enforcement   actions   against   federal   thrifts   for   “unfair   and   deceptive   practices”   between  
79. Id.
80. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 173; McCoy et al., supra note 36, at 1353.
81. Binyamin Appelbaum & Ellen Nakashima, Banking Regulator Played Advocate Over Enforcer:
Agency Let Lenders Grow Out of Control, Then Fail, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2008, at A1.
82. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 176 (quoting from two speeches by Mr. Reich in 2006); see also
id. at  183  (stating  that  “[e]ven  in  spring  2007,  with  the  subprime  market  in  flames,  Reich  .  .  .  vowed  ‘to  pursue  
additional regulatory relief, to develop support for eliminating as many additional items of regulation as is
possible’” and  he  “went  so  far  as  to  call  greater  regulation  ‘extremist  behavior’”)  (quoting  speech  by  Mr.  Reich  
in 2007).
83. FCIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 171 (quoting from an interview with Mr. Ludwig).
84. Julie L. Williams, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks before an OCC Bankers Outreach
Meeting 3 (May 27, 2005), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2005/pub-speech2005-53.pdf.
85. Id. at 5.
86. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24,   at   173   (quoting   Mr.   Dugan’s   congressional   testimony   in   Sept.  
2007).
87. McCoy et al., supra note 36, at 1350.
88. FCIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 172–73; Appelbaum & Nakashima, supra note 81.
89. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 176 (quoting from speech by Mr. Reich in Oct. 2006).
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2000 and 2008.90
The   OCC’s   record   of   protecting   consumers   was   only   marginally   better   than   the  
OTS’s   lamentable performance. The OCC adopted just two substantive rules that were
aimed at predatory lending. The first rule prohibited national banks from committing
unfair and deceptive acts and practices in mortgage lending, 91 and the second rule barred
national banks from making mortgages  without  regard  to  the  borrower’s  ability  to  repay  
the loan.92 However, the OCC greatly weakened the impact of the first rule by stating
that it did not have authority to issue regulations proscribing specific practices as unfair
or deceptive.93 The OCC also watered down the second rule by stating that national
banks   could   use   “any   reasonable   method   to   determine   a   borrower’s   ability   to   repay,  
including . . .   credit   history,   or   other   relevant   factors.” 94 The   OCC’s   statement   that  
national   banks   could   use   “credit   history,   or   other   relevant   factors”   to   determine   a  
borrower’s   ability   to   pay   allowed   national   banks   to   use   “such   dubious   practices   as  
qualifying borrowers solely based on their credit scores for low-doc or no-doc  loans.”95
As   a   result,   “through   2007, large national banks continued to make large quantities of
low- and no-documentation loans and subprime ARMs that were solely underwritten to
the  introductory  [teaser]  rate.”96
Like the OTS, the OCC initiated only a small number of public enforcement actions
to protect consumers during the nonprime lending boom. Between 1995 and the outbreak
of the financial crisis in 2007, the OCC issued only 13 public enforcement orders against
national banks for violations of consumer protection laws. 97 Most   of   the   OCC’s orders
were issued against small national banks, and none of the orders were issued against the
top eight largest banks, even though large banks were the subject of most of the consumer
complaints filed with the OCC.98

90. Eric Nalder, Mortgage System Crumbled While Regulators Jousted, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Oct. 11, 2008, at A1.
91. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1916–17
(Jan. 13, 2004) (adopting prohibition codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008(c), 34.3(c) (2010)).
92. Id. (adopting prohibition codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008(b), 34.3(b) (2010)); see also ENGEL &
MCCOY, supra note 24,  at  168  (discussing  the  OCC’s  rules).
93. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1913 n.55
(stating  that  “we  lack  the  authority  .  .  .  to  specify  by  regulation  that  particular  practices,  such  as  loan  ‘flipping’  
or   ‘equity   stripping,’   are   unfair   or   deceptive.   .   .   .   [T]he   OCC does not have rulemaking authority to define
specific   practices   as   unfair   or   deceptive.”);;   see also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The   OCC’s   Preemption   Rules  
Exceed   the   Agency’s   Authority   and   Present   a   Serious   Threat   to   the   Dual   Banking   System   and   Consumer  
Protection, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 225,  307  (2004)  (contending  that  the  OCC’s  rule  was   “greatly  
weakened”   by   the   agency’s   disclaimer   of   any   authority   to   identify   specific   lending   practices   as   “unfair   or  
deceptive”).
94. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1916, 1917
(adopting 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4008(b), 34.3(b) (2010)).
95. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 168.
96. McCoy et al., supra note 36, at 1353.
97. Wilmarth Written Testimony, supra note 68, at 14–15; see also Mencimer, supra note 67 (reporting
that from 2000 to 2007 “the  OCC . . . brought  just  11  consumer  enforcement  actions”).
98. Wilmarth Written Testimony, supra note 68, at 14–15; see also id. at   18   (“During 2004, ten large
banks accounted for four-fifths  of  all  complaints  received  by  the  OCC’s  Consumer  Assistance  Group.”).
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2. The Financial Services Industry Strongly Resisted Efforts by Federal Regulators to
Restrict Nonprime Mortgage Lending
In addition to the self-imposed obstacles created by deregulatory policies, federal
banking regulators encountered intense resistance from the financial services industry
whenever they tried to persuade banks to reduce their involvement in high-risk lending.
During a congressional hearing in March 2008, FRB Vice Chairman Donald Kohn
acknowledged that advice offered by regulators in favor of more conservative lending
policies   was   “a   very   hard   sell   to   the   banks”   during   the   credit   boom   that   led   up   to   the  
financial crisis.99 Similarly,   Roger   Cole,   who   served   as   the   FRB’s   Director   of   Bank  
Supervision from 2006 to 2009, told the FCIC that FRB officials encountered significant
“pushback”   when   they   urged   bank   executives   to   follow   more   conservative   risk  
management policies.100
Banks, thrifts, and nonbank mortgage lenders strongly opposed even the weak and
nonbinding regulatory guidance that federal regulators issued in 2006 and 2007 with
regard to nontraditional mortgages and hybrid subprime ARMs. 101 When the FRB and
other federal regulators proposed the nontraditional guidance in late 2005, FRB officials
“got   tremendous   pushback   from   the   industry   as   well   as   Congress   as   well   as . . .
internally . . . [b]ecause it was stifling innovation, potentially, and it was denying the
American   dream   [of   homeownership]   to   many   people.” 102 The American Bankers
Association   (ABA)   asserted   that   the   proposed   guidance   “overstate[d]   the   risk   of  
nontraditional mortgages,”103 while the Financial Services Roundtable declared that it
was   “not   aware   of   any   empirical   evidence   that   supports   the   need   for   further   consumer  
protection   standards.”104 Similarly, when federal regulators proposed the guidance on
hybrid subprime ARMs in early 2007, trade associations representing banks, thrifts, and

99. Bank Supervision: Senators Grill Financial Regulators on Failure to Supervise Banks During
Mortgage Crisis, 90 BANKING REP. (BNA)   435   (Mar.   10,   2008)   (quoting   Mr.   Kohn’s   testimony   during   a  
hearing before the Senate Banking Committee on Mar. 4, 2008).
100. Mr. Cole noted that
[A] lot of that pushback was given credence . . . by the fact that [firms]—like Citigroup
were earning $4 to $5 billion per quarter . . . . When that kind of money is flowing [in]
quarter after quarter after quarter, and their capital ratios are way above the minimums,  it’s  
very hard to challenge.
FCIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 307 (quoting from interview with Mr. Cole). Similarly, Richard Spillenkothen,
who   served   as   the   FRB’s   Director   of   Bank   Supervision   between   1991   and   2006,   explained   that   the   FRB’s  
prevailing deregulatory philosophy made it very difficult for supervisory officials to impose limits on large
financial   institutions   until   they   began   to   report   losses:   “Supervisors   understood   that   forceful   and   proactive  
supervision, especially early intervention before management weaknesses were reflected in poor financial
performance, might be viewed as i) overly-intrusive, burdensome, and heavy-handed, ii) an undesirable
constraint on credit availability, or iii) inconsistent with the   Fed’s   public   posture.”   Id. at 54 (quoting
memorandum by Mr. Spillenkothen) (emphasis added).
101. See supra notes 59–70 and accompanying text (discussing 2006 and 2007 guidance).
102. FCIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 173 (quoting from interview with Richard Siddique, former head of
credit   risk   for   the   FRB’s   Division   of   Banking   Supervision   and   Regulation);;   see also id. at 21 (quoting from
interview with former FRB Governor   Susan   Bies,   and   also   quoting   Mr.   Siddique’s   statement   that   “[t]he  
ideological turf war lasted more than a year, while the number of nontraditional loans kept growing and
growing”).
103. Id. (quoting  the  ABA’s  letter  of  Mar.  29,  2006).
104. Id. (quoting the  Financial  Services  Roundtable’s  letter  of  Mar.  29,  2006).
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other  mortgage  lenders  argued  that  the  guidance  “may  restrict  credit  to  many  consumers  
in high-cost areas and deny credit to many deserving low-income, minority, and first-time
homebuyers.”105 The determined opposition of the financial services industry and the
deregulatory philosophy of senior regulatory officials combined to block federal banking
agencies from taking effective and timely action to stop unsound nonprime lending. 106
The inability of federal regulators to restrain nonprime lending during the housing
boom  was  part  of  a  larger  pattern  of  “regulatory  capture,”  which  caused  federal  agencies  
to subordinate consumer protection and other public interests to the overriding policy
goal of increasing the profits of major financial institutions: 107 As I pointed out in a
recent article:
[R]epeated   regulatory   failures   during   past   financial   crises   reflect   a   ‘political  
economy   of   regulation’   in   which   regulators   face   significant   political   and  
practical challenges that undermine their efforts to discipline [large, complex
financial institutions (LCFIs)]. . . . [A]nalysts have pointed to strong evidence
of  ‘capture’  of  financial  regulatory  agencies  by  LCFIs  during  the  two  decades  
leading up to the financial crisis, due to factors such as (1) large political
contributions made by LCFIs, (2) an intellectual and policy environment
favoring deregulation, and (3) a continuous interchange of senior personnel
between the largest financial institutions and the top echelons of the financial
regulatory agencies.108
Similarly,  Simon  Johnson  and  James  Kwak  have  observed  that  “regulatory  capture  
is most effective when regulators share the worldview and the preferences of the industry
they  supervise.”109 They contend that  “the  revolving  door”  for  officials  moving  between  
the   large   financial   institutions   and   top   government   positions   created   a   “confluence   of  
perspectives  and  opinions  between  Wall  Street  and  Washington,”  in  which  “Wall  Street’s  
positions became the conventional  wisdom  in  Washington.”110 They further maintain that
a symbiotic  relationship  between  financial  leaders  and  senior  regulators  produced  “groupthink,”   in   which   (i)   “the   federal   government   deferred   to   the   interests   of   Wall   Street  
repeatedly in the 1990s and  2000s,”  and  (ii)  any  officials  who  disagreed  with  Wall  Street  
“were   marginalized   as   people   who   simply   did   not   understand   the   bright   new   world   of  
modern  finance.”111
105. Joe Adler, Agencies Propose Hybrid Clampdown: Critics Fret over Credit Access, AM. BANKER, Mar.
5, 2007, at 1 (quoting press release from the Mortgage Bankers Association); see also Cheyenne Hopkins,
Bankers Find Plenty Not to Like in Loan Guidance, AM. BANKER, May 10, 2007, at 5 (quoting letter from the
ABA,  stating  that  the  proposed  guidance  could  restrict  “credit  options  to  creditworthy  borrowers  who  otherwise  
would benefit from the flexibility  afforded  by  our  banks  and  savings  associations”).  
106. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 74, at 121–50; FCIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 20–24, 93–96, 307–08.
107. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 74, at 82–109, 118–44, 147–50; Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 27, at
85–95; Levitin, supra note 17, at 148–61; S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 9–17 (2010).
108. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd–Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-toFail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951, 1011 (2011) (footnotes omitted).
109. JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 74, at 93.
110. Id. at 93–97 (quotes at 97).
111. Id. at 97; see also id. at 103 (describing how then-IMF  Chief  Economist  Raghuram  Rajan  “was  met  
with   a   torrent   of   attacks   by   Greenspan’s   defenders,”   including   then   FRB   Vice   Chairman   Donald   Kohn   and  
former   Treasury   Secretary   Lawrence   Summers,   when   “Rajan   presented a paper [in August 2005] asking in
prophetic tones about whether deregulation and innovation had increased rather than decreased risk in the
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E. The OTS and the OCC Preempted Initiatives by the States to Stop Predatory Lending,
Thereby Aggravating the Severity of the Financial Crisis
In contrast to the half-hearted measures taken by federal regulators, many states
passed laws and brought enforcement actions to combat predatory lending. However, the
OCC and the OTS responded to those   initiatives   by   preempting   the   states’   authority   to  
enforce state consumer protection laws against national banks, federal thrifts, and their
subsidiaries and agents. The preemption campaigns of the OCC and the OTS seriously
undermined   the   states’   efforts to protect consumers from abusive nonprime lending
practices.
1. Many States Adopted Laws and Brought Enforcement Actions to Stop Predatory
Lending
Many states responded to growing evidence of predatory lending by enacting antipredatory lending (APL) laws—often   called   “mini-HOEPA”   laws—and by taking
vigorous enforcement actions against subprime lenders.112 North Carolina passed the first
“mini-HOEPA”   law   in   1999.113 North   Carolina’s   statute   covered   a   much   broader  
spectrum  of  subprime  loans  than  the  FRB’s  rules under HOEPA.114 North  Carolina’s  law  
prohibited prepayment penalties for mortgage loans under $150,000, forbade patterns of
repeated  refinancing  known  as  loan  “flipping,”  and  barred  lenders  from  financing  singlepremium credit insurance as part of the mortgage.115 A number of other states soon
copied   North   Carolina’s   approach. By the end of 2007, 30 states and the District of
Columbia had adopted APL laws designed to combat various types of mortgage lending
abuses.116
Two recent studies determined that state APL laws were effective in reducing the
number of mortgage loans with predatory features. The first study found that state APL
laws significantly reduced the percentage of mortgages with prepayment penalties,
balloon payments, hybrid ARM terms, interest-only ARM terms, and reduceddocumentation requirements, all of which were associated with predatory or unsound

financial  system”);;  id. at 7–9, 135–36 (explaining that (i) Brooksley Born, then chair of the Commodity Futures
Trading  Commission  (CFTC),  “provoked  furious  opposition”  when  the  CFTC  issued  a  concept  paper  in  May  
1998, proposing a study of whether to strengthen the regulation of over-the-counter derivatives; and (ii) Ms.
Born’s   opponents—including FRB chairman Greenspan, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, Treasury Deputy
Secretary Lawrence Summers and SEC chairman Arthur Levitt—persuaded Congress to pass legislation barring
the CFTC from acting on its proposal).
112. FCIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 96–97; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Cuomo v. Clearing House: The
Supreme Court Responds to the Subprime Financial Crisis and Delivers a Major Victory for the Dual Banking
System and Consumer Protection 21–22 (George Washington Univ. Law Sch. Public Law & Legal Theory,
Working Paper No. 479, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1499216. I have served as a consultant to
state financial regulators over the past three decades.
113. FCIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 96.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Raphael W. Bostic et al., Mortgage Product Substitution and State Anti-Predatory Lending Laws:
Better Loans and Better Borrowers? 7 n.2 (Univ. Pa. Inst. & Econ., Research Paper No. 09-27, 2009), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1460871; Lei Ding et al., The Impact of State Anti-Predatory Lending Laws on the
Foreclosure Crisis 4 (June 30, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1632915.
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loans.117 The second study determined that borrowers in states with APL laws were
substantially less likely to receive mortgages with risky terms (including prepayment
penalties) and also had a significantly lower rate of default on their loans. 118 The authors
concluded   that   “[t]his   study   provides   strong   evidence   that   state   regulation   of   subprime  
mortgages can serve as an important tool in the landscape of mortgage market regulation
and  consumer  protection.”119
In addition to passing APL laws, states launched thousands of enforcement actions
against abusive lending practices, including more than 3600 enforcement actions in both
2003 and 2006.120 State enforcement efforts produced several consent orders that
required nonbank mortgage lenders to pay large penalties, including a settlement that
required Household to pay $484 million, an agreement that forced Ameriquest to pay
$325 million, a settlement that compelled First Alliance to pay more than $50 million,
and a consent order that required Countrywide to pay $150 million and provide more than
$8 billion in mortgage modifications to borrowers. 121 However, as discussed in the next
Part, state laws and state enforcement actions were not able to eradicate predatory lending
because  the  OTS  and  the  OCC  preempted  the  states’  ability  to  act  against  federal  thrifts,  
national banks, and their subsidiaries and agents.
2. The OTS and the OCC Preempted State APL Laws and State Enforcement Efforts
In 1996, the OTS issued a regulation governing the real estate lending activities of
federal thrifts.122 The   regulation  declared  that  “OTS  hereby  occupies  the  entire  field  of  
lending  regulation  for  federal  savings  associations.” 123 Thus, the regulation was designed
to preempt all state laws that affected the terms and conditions of real estate loans made
by federal thrifts.124 The OTS issued another regulation in 1996 that gave operating
subsidiaries of federal thrifts the same preemptive immunity from state laws as the parent
thrifts enjoyed under the OTS rules. 125 The 1996 rules enabled federal thrifts and their
subsidiaries to make residential mortgage loans without complying with state consumer
protection laws.126

117. Bostic et al., supra note 116, at 24.
118. Ding et al., supra note 116, at 18–20.
119. Id. at 14–20.
120. Wilmarth, supra note 93, at 316 (summarizing House of Representatives committee document
indicating that during 2003 state officials  “performed  more  than  20,000  investigations  in  response  to  consumer  
complaints about abusive lending practices, and those investigations produced more than 4000 enforcement
actions”);;  Nalder,  supra note 90 (reporting that state  officials  “took  3694  enforcement  actions  against  mortgage  
lenders  and  brokers  in  2006  alone”).  
121. Testimony of Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan before the FCIC, Jan. 14, 2010, at 4–6,
available at http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0114-Madigan.pdf [hereinafter Madigan FCIC
Testimony]; Wilmarth, supra note 93, at 316; Nalder, supra note 90.
122. Lending and Investment, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,951 (Sept. 30, 1996).
123. Id. at 50,972 (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2008)).
124. See Wilmarth, supra note 93, at 284–85 (discussing 12 C.F.R. § 560.2).
125. See WFS Fin., Inc. v. Dean, 79 F. Supp. 2d 1024, 1028 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (upholding 1996 OTS
regulation extending preemption to operating subsidiaries of federal thrifts).
126. McCoy et al., supra note 36, at 1348–49. The OTS regulation permitted certain state laws of general
applicability, including contract and tort laws, to apply to federal  thrifts  if  such  laws  had  only  an  “incidental”  
effect on the lending operations of federal thrifts. Wilmarth, supra note 93, at 285.
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After the states began to adopt APL laws, the OTS issued a series of orders
declaring that state APL laws were preempted by OTS regulations and, therefore, did not
apply to federal thrifts and their operating subsidiaries. For example, the OTS Chief
Counsel issued four opinion letters in 2003, declaring that OTS regulations preempted
mini-HOEPA laws passed by Georgia, New York, New Jersey, and New Mexico.127 In
the   New   Mexico   opinion,   the   OTS   Chief   Counsel   declared   that   the   OTS’s   regulations  
preempted numerous provisions of the New Mexico   statute,   including   New   Mexico’s  
prohibitions against balloon payments, negative amortization, prepayment penalties, loan
flipping,  and  lending  without  regard  to  the  borrower’s  ability  to  repay. 128 The OTS also
issued orders exempting agents of federal thrifts from their duty to comply with state
laws.129 Thus, the OTS shielded federal thrifts and their subsidiaries and agents from
complying with state APL laws.
The  OCC  soon  joined  the  OTS’s  efforts  to  bar  the  states  from  taking  any  action  to  
restrict nonprime lending by federally-chartered depository institutions. In August 2003,
the  OCC  issued  an  order  declaring  that  Georgia’s  mini-HOEPA statute, the Georgia Fair
Lending Act (GFLA) did not apply to national banks and their operating subsidiaries.130
At the same time, the OCC proposed sweeping preemption rules that would apply acrossthe-board to all state laws that interfered with or placed conditions on the ability of
national banks to exercise their federally-granted powers as defined by the OCC. 131 In
January 2004, the OCC adopted the proposed blanket preemption rules, which were
substantially  identical  to  the  OTS’s  1996  regulations. 132 Like  the  OTS’s  regulations,  the  
OCC’s   2004   preemptive   rules   shielded   both   national   banks   and   their   operating  
subsidiaries from the application of most state consumer protection laws. 133
Also in January 2004, the OCC adopted a separate but related preemption rule. That
127. Letter  from  Carolyn  J.  Buck,  Chief  Counsel,  Office  of  Thrift  Supervision,  Dep’t  of Treasury (Jan. 21,
2003), available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/_files/56301.pdf (concluding that federal law preempted the
Georgia  Fair  Lending  Act);;  Letter  from  Carolyn  J.  Buck,  Chief  Counsel,  Office  of  Thrift  Supervision,  Dep’t  of  
Treasury (Jan. 30, 2003), available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/_files/56302.pdf (concluding that federal law
preempted the New York Predatory Lending Law); Letter from Carolyn J. Buck, Chief Counsel, Office of
Thrift   Supervision,   Dep’t   of   Treasury   (July   22,   2003),   available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/_files/56305.pdf
(concluding that federal law preempted the New Jersey Predatory Lending Act); Letter from Carolyn J. Buck,
Chief   Counsel,   Office   of   Thrift   Supervision,   Dep’t   of   Treasury   (Sept.   2,   2003),   available at
http://www.ots.treas.gov/_files/56306.pdf (concluding that federal law preempted the New Mexico Home Loan
Protection Act).
128. Letter  from  Carolyn  J.  Buck,  Chief  Counsel,  Office  of  Thrift  Supervision,  Dep’t  of  Treasury  (Sept.  2,  
2003), available at http://www.ots.treas.gov/_files/56306.pdf  (noting  that  “[m]any  of  [New  Mexico’s  statutory  
provisions]  are  the  same  as,  or  similar  to,  provisions  of  these  other  states’  predatory  lending  laws”).
129. See State Farm Bank, FSB v. Reardon, 539 F.3d 336, 349 (6th Cir. 2008) (upholding an OTS order
that  permitted  agents   of  a   federal   thrift  to   offer   mortgage   loans   in   Ohio  without   complying   with   Ohio’s   laws  
governing mortgage brokers).
130. Preemption Determination and Order, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,264 (Aug. 5, 2003).
131. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,119 (Aug. 5,
2003) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7, 34).
132. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904 (Jan. 13,
2004). For a description of the  OCC’s  2004  rules  and  their  similarity  to  the  OTS’s  rules,  see  Wilmarth,   supra
note 93, at 227–36, 298–99.
133. See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 27, at 81–82,  92  (concluding  that  the  “regulation  cancels out much
state-level   consumer   protection   law”);;   McCoy   et   al.,   supra note 36, at 1349–50 (discussing the broad
preemptive impact of the OCC rule); Wilmarth, supra note 93, at 233–36 (same).
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rule preempted the authority of the states to bring any type of enforcement action
(whether administrative or judicial) against national banks, even with respect to state
laws that the OCC did not preempt. 134 In   combination,   the   OCC’s   2004   rules:   (i)  
exempted national banks from compliance with most state consumer protection laws, and
(ii) prevented the states from enforcing other state laws that still applied to national
banks.135 In   May   2004,   the   OCC   took   a   further   step   and   declared   that   the   GFLA’s  
regulation of mortgage brokers was preempted with respect to any brokers who arranged
loans that were funded at closing by national banks or their subsidiaries.136 That ruling
effectively   canceled   the   states’   ability   to   regulate   mortgage   brokers   who   worked   with  
national banks or their subsidiaries.
In addition to issuing its preemption rules, the OCC supported lawsuits brought by
national banks to preempt state laws and state enforcement actions. 137 For example,
during protracted litigation over the issue of whether national banks could charge late
payment fees on credit card loans extended to residents of other states, the OCC issued a
regulation in 1996 that authorized national banks to disregard conflicting state usury
laws.138 The  Court  granted  deference  to  the  OCC’s  regulation, 139 while noting that (i) the
regulation  was  “prompted  by  litigation,  including  this  very  suit,” 140 and (ii) the OCC also
“participated   as   an   amicus curiae on   the   side   of   the   banks.”141 During oral argument,
Chief Justice Rehnquist provoked laughter in the courtroom when he remarked to counsel
for  the  United  States  that  “I’ve  been  on  the  Court  23  or  24  years  and   heard a number of
these cases. And   I’ve   never   heard   of   a   case   in   which   the   [OCC]   ruled   against   the  
banks.”142

134. Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895 (Jan. 13, 2004) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 7).
For a description of this rule, see Wilmarth, supra note 93, at 228–29.
135. See McCoy et al., supra note 36, at 1349–50 (discussing impact of the preemptive rules issued by the
OTS and OCC); see also Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 27, at 81–82, 92 (same).
136. See Wilmarth, supra note 112, at 22 n.105 (citing OCC Interpretive Letter No. 1002, May 13, 2004,
from Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr. to Georgia Banking Commissioner David G. Sorrell).
137. See Wilmarth, supra note 93, at 289–92   (explaining   that   “the   OCC   and   national   banks   have   used   a  
coordinated  litigation  strategy  to  expand  the  preemptive  reach  of  the  [National  Bank  Act]”).  An  informal  survey  
determined that the OCC filed amicus briefs in sixty court cases between 1994 and 2006, and that the OCC
supported the positions taken by national banks in all but two of those cases. Mencimer, supra note 67
(describing results of survey).
138. Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 739–41   (1996)   (discussing   the   OCC’s  
adoption  of  12  C.F.R.  §  7.4001(a)).  Under  12  U.S.C.  §  85,  a  national  bank  that  is  “located”  in  one  state  may  
charge  “interest”  permitted  by  the  laws  of  that  state  on  loans  made  to  residents  of  other  states,  notwithstanding  
the  usury  laws  of  those  other  states.  The  OCC’s  regulation  at  issue  in  Smiley allowed national banks to treat late
payment  fees  and  certain  other  charges  as  “interest”  for  purposes  of  §  85.  Id. at 740; see also Wilmarth Written
Testimony, supra note 68, at 7–8  (discussing  the  ability  of  national  banks,  under  12  U.S.C.  §  85,  to  “export”  
interest rates on loans made to residents of other states).
139. Smiley, 517 U.S. at 739–47  (granting  deference  to  the  OCC’s  regulation  under  Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).
140. Id. at 741.
141. Id. at 740.
142. Transcript of Oral Argument at 16–17, Smiley v. Citibank, No.95-860, 1996 WL 220402 (U.S. Apr.
24, 1996). When Chief Justice Rehnquist asked counsel for the United States whether he knew of any rulings by
the  OCC  against  national  banks,  the  only  example  provided  by  counsel  was  that  the  OCC’s  regulation  at  issue  
in Smiley allowed national banks to treat some—but not all—loan-related fees and   charges   as   “interest”   that  
could   be   “exported”   to   borrowers   across   state   lines   under   12   U.S.C.   §   85.   Id. at 17 (response by Irving L.
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Subsequently, the OCC issued opinion letters and filed amicus briefs in support of
three large national banks—Wachovia, Wells Fargo, and National City—that filed
lawsuits to preempt efforts by several states to regulate the mortgage lending subsidiaries
of national banks.143 Those lawsuits produced court decisions upholding preemption of
the challenged state laws.144 However, as discussed below, Wachovia and National City
subsequently suffered heavy losses from their nonprime lending activities and both
institutions ultimately agreed to sell themselves to other banks in federally-assisted
transactions in order to avoid failure. 145
In June 2005, the OCC joined with the Clearing House Association (an association
of the largest national banks) in filing lawsuits to prevent New York Attorney General
Eliot  Spitzer  from  investigating  national  banks  for  alleged  violations  of  New  York’s  fair  
lending statute.146 The OCC  conceded  that  New  York’s  antidiscrimination  law  applied  to  
national banks, but the OCC claimed sole and exclusive authority to decide whether that
law should be enforced against national banks. 147 With  the  OCC’s  support,  the  national  
banks persuaded a federal   district   court   to   enjoin   Mr.   Spitzer’s   investigation   and   that  
injunction  was  not  lifted  until  the  U.S.  Supreme  Court  reversed  the  lower  court’s  decision  
in June 2009.148 Once  again,  the  OCC’s  preemptive  actions  frustrated  a  state’s  efforts  to  
protect its citizens from abusive lending practices.
A  2008  investigative  report  by  two  journalists  concluded  that  the  OCC’s  preemptive  
measures  contributed  to  the  severity  of  the  financial  crisis  by  “stifling . . . prescient state
enforcers   and   legislators”   who   tried to prevent irresponsible lending. 149 Another
journalist similarly observed:
For more than a decade, the O.C.C. has beaten back state attorney generals who
have tried to enforce state consumer laws against national banks, arguing that
federal laws pre-empt those of the states: the O.C.C. has stopped Georgia from
enforcing   predatory   lending   laws,   intervened   in   New   York’s   effort   to  
investigate discriminatory lending and opposed a campaign by New England
states to curb gift card fees.

Gornstein,  noting  that  “the  banks  would  like  to  have  all  of  [the  charges]  treated  as  interest  so  that  they  could  be  
exported”).  I  am  indebted  to  Alan  Morrison,  who  attended  the  oral  argument  in  Smiley, for alerting me to Chief
Justice  Rehnquist’s  remarks and the laughter in the courtroom that followed.
143. See Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007) (holding that federal law preempted the
application  of  state  mortgage  lending  laws  to  operating  subsidiaries  of  national  banks);;  Nat’l  City  Bank  of  Ind.  
v. Turnbaugh, 463 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 550 U.S. 913 (2007) (same); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
v. Bourtris, 419 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2005) (same); Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2005),
cert. denied, 550 U.S. 913 (2007) (same).
144. See supra note 143 (listing four preemption cases in which the OCC supported large national banks).
145. See infra notes 195–96 and accompanying text (referring to forced sales of Wachovia and National
City).
146. Wilmarth, supra note 112, at 4–5.
147. Id. at 5.
148. See id. at 5–6, 11–12 (describing   legal   and   factual   background   leading   to   the   Supreme   Court’s  
decision in Cuomo  v.  Clearing  House  Ass’n,  L.L.C., 129 S. Ct. 2710 (2009)).
149. Robert Berner & Brian Grow, They Warned Us: The Watchdogs Who Saw the Subprime Disaster
Coming—and How They Were Thwarted by the Banks and Washington, BUS. WEEK, Oct. 20, 2008, at 36, 38,
available at, http://legacy.sabrew.info/contest/2008/entries/5334END/The%20Watchdogs%20Who%20Warned
%20Us.pdf.
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...
CRITICS maintain that   the   O.C.C’s   campaign   against   the   states   weakened  
crucial consumer protections and ultimately exacerbated the impact of the
financial crisis.150
In written testimony presented to the FCIC in January 2010, Illinois Attorney
General Lisa Madigan maintained   that   “[s]tate   enforcement   efforts   have   been  
progressively hamstrung by the dual forces of federal preemption and a lack of oversight
at   the   federal   level.”151 Attorney General Madigan contended that OCC and OTS
preemption had three adverse effects on the states’  ability  to  enact  and  enforce  consumer  
protection   laws.   First,   “when   state   attorneys   general   come   upon   lending   abuses   by  
federally chartered lenders, we first have to determine whether we can afford to expend
our limited resources fighting a protracted   preemption   battle.”152 Second,   “most   of   the  
remaining mortgage lenders are now sheltering under the protections of federal
charters.”153 For example, Attorney General Madigan pointed out that Countrywide
moved all of its mortgage lending operations into its federal thrift subsidiary in 2007 in
order to obtain the protection of federal preemption against future state investigations and
enforcement proceedings.154 Third, federal preemption made it more difficult for states to
enact protective legislation, because  “[w]hen  we  introduced  legislation,  mortgage  brokers  
and  other  state   licensees   were  quick  to  respond   with  the  ‘level  playing  field’  argument,  
demanding  that  they  should  be  subject  to  the  same  lax  standards  as  federal  charters.” 155
The preemptive actions of the OCC and OTS prevented state officials from
responding to predatory lending problems with the same effectiveness they displayed in
exposing a series of scandals on Wall Street between 2002 and 2006. During those years,
state authorities took the lead in prosecuting securities firms (including securities
affiliates of major banks) for (i) pressuring their research analysts to produce biased
reports to investors, (ii) engaging in corrupt practices related to initial public offerings,
and (iii) permitting hedge funds to carry out abusive market timing and late trading
strategies that exploited mutual funds sponsored by securities firms. 156 After initial
resistance, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) eventually cooperated with

150. Andrew Martin, Does This Bank Watchdog Have a Bite?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2010, at BU.
151. Madigan FCIC Testimony, supra note 121, at 9.
152. Id. at 11.
153. Id.; see also infra note 183 and accompanying text (citing examples of nonbank subprime lenders that
sold themselves to national banks to gain preemptive immunity from state enforcement).
154. Madigan FCIC Testimony, supra note 121, at 6 (noting that, in 2008, Illinois and several other states
obtained a large settlement requiring Countrywide to take remedial actions for past violations of state consumer
protection   laws;;   however,   the   states   were   not   able   to   secure   “mandatory   injunctive   provisions   governing  
[Countrywide’s]  future  lending  practices”  because  Countrywide transferred its mortgage lending operations to
its subsidiary federal thrift).
155. Id. at 11; see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24,  at  162  (noting  that  “in  response  to  the  OCC  and  
OTS preemption rules, state banks and thrifts lobbied regulators for the same hands-off treatment so they would
have  competitive  parity  with  their  federally  chartered  counterparts”).
156. See Renee M. Jones, Dynamic Federalism: Competition, Cooperation and Securities Enforcement, 11
CONN. INS. L. J. 107, 117–21 (2005) (discussing recent scandals); Wilmarth, supra note 93, at 348–52;
Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 1000–02   (commenting   on   how   the   OCC’s   rules   undermine   the   enforcement   of  
consumer protection laws).
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the   states’   enforcement measures against Wall Street firms.157 In contrast, as shown
above, the determined preemption campaigns of the OTS and the OCC frustrated the
efforts of the states to combat abusive nonprime lending. 158
3. The Industry-Based Funding for the OTS and OCC Created a Conflict of Interest
Between Their Supervisory Duties and Their Budgetary Concerns
The preemption initiatives of the OTS and the OCC served the financial self-interest
of both agencies.159 The budgets of the OCC and the OTS were funded almost entirely
by assessments paid by national banks and federal thrifts. 160 Both agencies therefore had
powerful budgetary incentives to persuade depository institutions to operate under
national bank and federal thrift charters. 161
During the period leading up to the financial crisis, the OTS and the OCC actively
competed for chartering rights with state officials who regulated state-chartered banks
and state-chartered thrifts.162 In a newspaper interview in 2002, Comptroller of the
Currency John D. Hawke, Jr. acknowledged that  “the  potential  loss  of  regulatory  market  
share  [to  the  state  banking  system]  ‘was  a  matter  of  concern  to  us.’” 163 Similarly, in 2007
OTS Director John Reich described Washington Mutual, the largest thrift institution, as
“my  largest  constituent”  in  an  email message.164
Preemption  “gave  the  OCC  and  OTS  a  powerful  extra  lure  to  entice  lenders  to  their  
charters, in the form of relief from state anti-predatory   lending   laws.”165 The   OTS’s  
sweeping preemption rules, along with its nationwide branching regulations, persuaded
most state-chartered thrifts to convert to federal charters between 1975 and 2003. 166
Similarly,   the   OCC’s   preemption   initiatives   were   intended   to   induce   large,   multistate  

157. Jones, supra note 156, at 118–21; Stefania A. Di Trolio, Public Choice Theory, Federalism and the
Sunny Side to Blue Sky Laws, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1279, 1281, 1305–07; Wilmarth, supra note 93, at
348–52.
158. See supra notes 122–55 and   accompanying   text   (discussing   impact   of   the   OTS’s   and   OCC’s  
preemptive rules).
159. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 158–61.
160. The Dodd–Frank Act abolishes the OTS and transfers its functions to the other federal banking
regulators,   effective   on   July   21,   2011.   The   OCC   will   inherit   the   OTS’s   responsibility   for   regulating   federal  
thrifts, while the FDIC will assume responsibility for regulating state-chartered thrifts and the FRB will take
over responsibility for regulating thrift holding companies. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 866 (2010) (Conf.
Rep.), reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT111hrpt517/pdf/CRPT-111hrpt517.pdf; Cheyenne Hopkins, On Foreign Soil, Acting OTS Head Criticizes
Reform, AM. BANKER, Nov. 18, 2010, at 7; Cheyenne Hopkins, Under New Management, Thrifts Must Get in
Line, AM. BANKER, Feb. 4, 2011, at 1.
161. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 27, at 93–94; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 158–61; Wilmarth,
supra note 93, at 276–77; Wilmarth, supra note 112, at 20, 23.
162. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 158–61; Wilmarth, supra note 93, at 274–86.
163. Jess Bravin & Paul Beckett, Friendly Watchdog: Federal Regulator Often Helps Banks Fighting
Consumers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2002, at A1 (summarizing and quoting from an interview with Mr. Hawke).
164. Binyamin Appelbaum, Onetime Cop, Out of Business, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2010, at B1.
165. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 159.
166. Wilmarth, supra note 93, at 280–87  (contending  that  “[t]he  most  likely  reason  for  the  disintegration  of  
the state-chartered thrift system is the aggressive preemption campaign that the [Federal Home Loan Bank
Board   (FHLBB)]   began   in   the   late   1970s   and   the   OTS   continued   after   assuming   the   FHLBB’s   functions   in  
1989”).
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banks to convert from state charters to national bank charters. 167 In a 2002 speech,
Comptroller   Hawke   declared   that   “national   banks’   immunity   from   state   law   is   a  
significant benefit of the national charter—a benefit that the OCC has fought hard over
the   years   to   preserve.”168 He   further   claimed   that   “[t]he   ability   of   national   banks   to
conduct a multistate business subject to a single, uniform set of federal laws, under the
supervision of a single regulator, free from visitorial powers of various state authorities,
is  a  major  advantage  of  the  national  charter.” 169
The  OCC’s  subsequent  issuance of broad preemption rules in 2004 had the desired
effect. By 2005, three major banks with more than $1 trillion of assets had converted
from   state   charters   to   national   charters   to   take   advantage   of   the   OCC’s   rules. 170 Those
conversions provided a significant financial benefit to the OCC, as they produced a 15%
increase  in  the  OCC’s  annual  budget. 171 The OTS and OCC preemption rules continued
to encourage state thrift and state banks to convert to federal charters until the outbreak of
the financial crisis in 2007.172
4. OTS and OCC Preemption Helped Federal Thrifts and National Banks to Establish
Leading Positions as Subprime and Alt-A Mortgage Lenders
OTS preemption helped federal thrifts to establish a major presence in the subprime
and Alt-A mortgage markets during the late 1990s and early 2000s. In 1999, Washington
Mutual (WaMu), the largest federal thrift, acquired Long Beach, a major subprime
lender.173 Two other large federal thrifts, IndyMac and Downey Federal, also rapidly
expanded their nonprime lending operations.174 In addition, three major securities
firms—Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Morgan Stanley—each acquired a federal
thrift,175 as did AIG, a big insurance company, 176 and H&R Block, a large tax
preparation firm.177All eight of the foregoing companies were subject to OTS regulation

167. S. REP. NO. 111-176,  at  16  (2010)  (“At  a  hearing  on  the  OCC’s  preemption  rule,  Comptroller  Hawke  
acknowledged, in response to questioning from Senator Sarbanes, that one reason Hawke issued the preemption
rule was to attract additional charters, which helps to bolster the budget of the OCC.”);;   see also Wilmarth,
supra note 93, at 275 (observing  that  “the  OCC  evidently  concluded  that  an  aggressive  preemption  campaign—
promising freedom from state regulation— . . . will persuade large, multistate banks to operate under national
charters”).
168. John D. Hawke, Jr., Comptroller of the Currency, Remarks Before the Women in Housing and
Finance 2 (Feb. 12, 2002), available at http://www.occ.gov/static/news-issuances/speeches/2002/pub-speech2002-10.pdf.
169. Id. In   a   contemporaneous   interview,   Comptroller   Hawke   confirmed   that   preemption   “is   one   of the
advantages  of  the  national  charter,  and  I’m  not  the  least  bit  ashamed  to  promote  it.”  Bravin  &  Beckett,   supra
note 163 (quoting from interview with Mr. Hawke).
170. Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 27, at 81–83, 92–94 (describing conversions of JP Morgan Chase,
HSBC, and   Bank   of   Montreal   from   state   to   national   charters   in   response   to   the   OCC’s   adoption   of   its   2004  
preemption rules).
171. Id. at 94.
172. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 161.
173. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 1017.
174. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 176–80.
175. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 977–78.
176. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 221–23.
177. Id. at 26.
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due to their status as federal thrifts or owners of federal thrifts. 178 The OTS exercised
primary supervision over federal thrifts, and the OTS also exercised consolidated
supervision over all holding companies that owned federal thrifts, including financial
conglomerates whose principal subsidiaries were securities broker-dealers or insurance
companies.179
Similarly, large national banks expanded aggressively into subprime and Alt-A
lending and took full advantage of the preemptive shield offered by the OCC. Citigroup
acquired Associates First Capital in 2000 and purchased Argent (an affiliate of
Ameriquest) in 2007.180 Similarly, National City, a leading Midwestern bank, bought
First Franklin in 1999, while Chase purchased Advanta in 2001, and HSBC acquired
Household in 2002.181 In addition, Countrywide, the largest mortgage lender, acquired a
national bank in 2001 and operated as a bank holding company until it converted its bank
charter to a federal thrift charter in early 2007.182 In several instances, nonbank subprime
lenders sold themselves to national banks or federal thrifts, after they were sued by state
regulators,  in  order  to  obtain  the  immunity  from  state  regulation  offered  by  the  OCC’s  or  
OTS’s  preemptive  shield.183
The Center for Public Integrity (CPI) published a study in May 2009, which
compiled a list of the top 25 subprime lenders from 2005 through 2007. 184 CPI’s   data  
showed that the top 25 subprime lenders and their affiliates accounted for 72% of all
subprime loans made between 2005 and 2007.185
According  to  CPI’s  study,  at  the  peak  of  the  subprime  lending  boom  between  2005  
and 2007, the following 6 companies that owned federal thrifts ranked among the top 20
subprime lenders in the nation: Merrill Lynch, WaMu, H&R Block, Lehman Brothers,
178. FCIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 150–51, 178, 306, 350–51; McCoy et al., supra note 36, at 1352–53,
1365–66; Wilmarth, supra note 112, at 26–27.
179. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Financial Market Regulation: Agencies Engaged in
Consolidated Supervision Can Strengthen Performance Measurement and Collaboration, GAO-07-154 (Mar.
2007), at 9–14, 20–22, 25–29 [hereinafter GAO Consolidated Supervision Report (2007)].
180. FCIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 92, 164; Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 1017–18.
181. Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 1017–18.
182. Id. at 1018; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 200–02.
183. Wilmarth, supra note 112, at 22–23 (citing the sales of Household to HSBC, Ameriquest (Argent) to
Citigroup, and Okoboji Mortgage to Wells Fargo). In addition, Providian, a major subprime credit card lender,
sold most of its assets to JP Morgan Chase and WaMu after settling a state enforcement action. Dan Richman,
New Acquisition for WaMu: Providian Deal Aims   to   Speed   Firm’s   Credit   Card   Program, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, June 7, 2005, at C1; see also Madigan FCIC Testimony, supra note 121, at 6 (discussing
Countrywide’s   transfer   of   its   mortgage   lending   operations   to   its   federal thrift subsidiary in order to take
advantage  of  the  OTS’s  preemption  rules).
184. David Donald, Who’s  Behind  the  Financial  Meltdown?, Methodology, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY,
http://www.publicintegrity.org/investigations/economic_meltdown/about_this_project/methodology/
(last
visited   Apr.   13,   2011).   The   CPI’s   study   was   based   on   methodology   and   supporting   data   developed   by   Chris  
Mayer   of   the   Columbia  Business   School   and   Karen   Pence,   a   FRB   economist.   The   CPI’s   study   drew   on   data  
from (i) reports filed by banks, thrifts and other mortgage lenders under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(“HMDA”),  (ii)  data  on  subprime  lenders  compiled  by  HUD,  and  (iii)  data  collected  by  private-sector sources
for use in the real estate industry. Id.
185. Jonn Dunbar & David Donald, Who’s  Behind  the  Financial  Meltdown?, Article on The Roots of the
Financial Crisis: Who Is to Blame?, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, http://www.publicintegrity.org/
investigations/economic_meltdown/articles/entry/1286/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2011) (listing the top subprime
lenders  in  “The  Subprime  25”).
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IndyMac, and AIG.186 In   addition,   Countrywide,   the   nation’s   largest   subprime   lender,  
switched the charter of its subsidiary depository institution from a national bank to a
federal thrift in early 2007.187
Several major national banks were also affiliated with leading subprime lenders.
According  to  CPI’s  study,  during  the  peak  of  the  subprime  lending  boom  from  2005  to  
2007, 7 of   the   nation’s   top   20   subprime   lenders—Countrywide (until early 2007),
National City, Wells Fargo, HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, Citigroup, and Wachovia—were
companies that owned national banks.188
In  sum,  CPI’s  study  showed  that  12  of  the  20  largest  subprime  lenders  from  2005  to  
2007 were companies that owned either national banks or federal thrifts. 189 During the
same period, those 12 lenders accounted for almost 60% of the subprime loans made by
the top 25 subprime lenders and for more than 40% of the subprime loans made by all
subprime lenders.190 A second study, prepared by the National Consumer Law Center
(NCLC), found that national banks, federal thrifts, and their operating subsidiaries
originated 31.5% of all subprime mortgages, 40.1% of all Alt-A mortgages, and 51% of
all payment-option and interest-only ARMs in 2006, the high point of the housing
boom.191 Thus, national banks, federal thrifts, and their affiliates were responsible for a
large share of the nonprime lending that occurred during the housing boom.
5. The OTS, the OCC, and the FRB Failed to Prevent the Failures of Several Major
Financial Institutions That Were Heavily Engaged in Originating and Securitizing
Nonprime Mortgages
The failures and government bailouts of several major companies that owned
national banks or federal thrifts revealed (i) the deep involvement of large federal thrifts
and national banks in the origination and securitization of nonprime mortgages, and (ii)
serious regulatory failures by the OTS, the OCC and the FRB. The OTS committed
numerous regulatory lapses, and Congress ultimately decided, in enacting Dodd–Frank,
to abolish the OTS and transfer its functions to other federal regulators. 192 The   OTS’s  
regulatory failures contributed to (A) the failures of IndyMac, Lehman Brothers, and

186. Id.
187. Id.; see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 159–60, 201–02  (describing  Countrywide’s  status  as  
a top subprime lender and its charter conversion); FCIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 107–08, 172–74 (same).
188. Dunbar & Donald, supra note 185.
189. Id. While 14 owners of federally-chartered depository institutions were listed among the top subprime
lenders, there was an overlap in the case of two subprime lenders, because (i) Countrywide was a national bank
until early 2007 and a federal thrift thereafter, until it was acquired by Bank of America in early 2008, and (ii)
First Franklin was owned by National City until late 2006 and was then owned by Merrill Lynch until 2008. Id.
190. Id. (showing that lenders affiliated with national banks and federal thrifts accounted for $567 billion of
the $972 billion of subprime loans originated by the top 25 subprime lenders between 2005 and 2007; also
noting that the top 25 subprime lenders accounted for 72% of all subprime loans during that period).
191. Preemption   and   Regulatory   Reform:   Restore   the   States’   Traditional   Role   as   “First   Responder”,
NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. 11–13 (2009), available at http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/preemption/restore-therole-of-states-2009.pdf. The NCLC study was based on loan data provided by Inside Mortgage Finance, a
leading mortgage industry publication. Id. at 11–13 tbls. 1–3.
192. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 25–26 (2010); H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 866 (2010) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted
in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 723; see also supra note 160 (discussing Dodd–Frank’s   transfer   of   the   OTS’s  
responsibilities to the OCC, the FRB, and the FDIC).
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WaMu, (B) the collapse of AIG, which triggered a massive federal bailout, and (C) the
near-failure of Merrill Lynch, which resulted in an emergency takeover by Bank of
America—a transaction that in turn inflicted major losses on Bank of America and forced
that bank to obtain extraordinary assistance from the federal government. 193
The OCC, the FRB, and the OTS bore joint responsibility for the near-failure of
Countrywide, which sold itself in an emergency deal to Bank of America and
subsequently inflicted additional losses on its acquirer. 194 The FRB and the OCC were
also cited for failures of regulatory oversight that led to (i) the near-failure and costly
federal bailout of Citigroup, (ii) the failure and forced sale of Wachovia to Wells Fargo in
a federally-assisted transaction, and (iii) the near-collapse and forced sale of National
City to PNC in another federally-assisted deal.195 The failures and governmentallyassisted  rescues  of  the   foregoing  institutions   made  it  “painfully  obvious”  that  federallysupervised  thrifts  and  banks  “were  deeply  implicated  in  the  origination  and  securitization  
of bad mortgage loans, whether through the banks themselves or their nonbank
affiliates.”196
A recent study by Kathleen Engel and Patricia McCoy concluded that federal
preemption contributed to unsound lending and higher rates of mortgage defaults among
federally-chartered depository institutions.197 Their study analyzed delinquency rates on
residential mortgage loans made by four categories of depository institutions between
2006 and 2008.198 The authors found that loans made by federal thrifts had the highest
delinquency rate, while loans made by national banks had the second highest delinquency
rate.199 In contrast, loans made by state-chartered thrifts and state-chartered banks—
which were not protected by federal preemption—had substantially lower delinquency
rates (with state banks recording the lowest rates).200 The authors concluded: “Thus,  at  
least when we compare depository institutions, federal preemption was associated with
higher default rates, not lower ones, from 2006 through 2008. Those were the years when
loan underwriting was at  its  worst  and  the  credit  markets  experienced  a  meltdown.” 201

193. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 176–79, 222–23; Wilmarth, supra note 112, at 29–30; FCIC
REPORT, supra note 28, at 88, 151–52, 177–78, 200–04, 257–59, 305–06, 346, 350–51, 365–66, 382–85;
Appelbaum & Nakashima, supra note 81.
194. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 170, 200–02; FCIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 107–08, 173–74,
248–50; Steve Mufson, A Fateful Step for a Banking Giant, WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2010, at G1; James R.
Hagerty & Joann S. Lublin, Countrywide Deal Driven by Crackdown Fear, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2008, at A3.
195. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 169–71, 202–03; FCIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 195–200, 263,
302–05, 366–71, 379–82; Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 978–79, 984–85.
196. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 204; see also FCIC REPORT, supra note 28, at 308 (concluding
that   “the   banking   supervisors   failed   to   adequately   and   proactively   identify   and   police   the   weaknesses   of the
banks  and  thrifts,”  and  noting  that  “[l]arge  commercial  banks  and  thrifts,  such  as  Wachovia  and  IndyMac  .  .  .  
had  significant  exposure  to  risky  mortgage  assets”).
197. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 24, at 159–63.
198. Id. at 163.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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III. TITLE X OF DODD–FRANK GRANTS SUPPLEMENTAL LAWMAKING AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT POWERS TO THE STATES AND IMPOSES SIGNIFICANT RESTRICTIONS ON THE
OCC’S AUTHORITY TO PREEMPT STATE LAWS
Congress designated Title X of Dodd–Frank  as  the  “Consumer  Financial  Protection  
Act  of  2010”  (CFP  Act).202 As described in Part III.A, Title X authorizes CFPB to issue
regulations and to bring enforcement actions to protect consumers of financial services.
However, Title X does not give CFPB exclusive authority over the field of consumer
financial protection. Instead, as discussed in Parts III.B and III.C, the CFP Act empowers
the states to provide supplemental safeguards to consumers through both lawmaking and
law enforcement activities. Moreover, as explained in Part III.D, Title X imposes
significant  limitations  on  the  OCC’s  ability  to  preempt  the  application  of  state  consumer  
financial laws to national banks and federal thrifts.
A.  Title  X  Establishes  a  Federal  “Floor”  of  Protection  for  Consumers  of  Financial  
Services
Title X of Dodd–Frank  establishes  CFPB  as  an  “independent  bureau”  within  the  Fed  
and  assigns  to  CFPB  the  mission  of  “regulat[ing]  the  offering  and  provision  of  consumer  
financial services under the Federal  consumer  financial  laws.”203 CFPB is responsible for
implementing   and   enforcing   “federal   consumer   financial   laws,”   which   include   “nearly  
every existing federal consumer financial statute, as well as new consumer financial
protection mandates prescribed by the  [CFP]  Act.”204 Title X protects the independence
of  the  CFPB  by  (i)  prohibiting  the  Fed  from  interfering  with  CFPB’s  policymaking  and  
enforcement functions,205 and (ii) requiring the Fed to provide approximately $500
million  each  year  to  fund  CFPB’s  operations.206

202. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1001, 124
Stat. 1376, 1955 (2010).
203. Id. §  1011(a).  For  a  helpful  overview  of  CFPB’s  authority  under  Title  X,  see  Michael  B.  Mierzewski  et
al., The Dodd–Frank Act Establishes the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection as the Primary Regulator of
Consumer Financial Products and Services, 127 BANKING L.J. 722 (2010).
204. Mierzewski et al., supra note 203, at 724–25; see also Dodd–Frank  §  1021(a)  (providing  that  CFPB’s  
purpose  is  to  “implement  and,  where  applicable,  enforce  Federal  consumer  financial  law”  to  ensure  that  markets  
for   consumer   financial   products   and   services   are   accessible   to   consumers   and   are   also   “fair, transparent, and
competitive”);;  Id. §  1002(14)  (defining  “Federal  consumer  financial  law”  to  include  Title  X  of  Dodd–Frank, 18
federal consumer protection statutes that are enumerated in Section 1002(12), and certain other laws).
205. Dodd–Frank prohibits the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) from (i) intervening in any CFPB proceeding;
(ii) appointing, directing or removing any CFPB officer or employee; (iii) combining the CFPB or any of its
functions with any other unit of the FRB; or (iv) approving or reviewing any rule or order of the CFPB or any
legislative recommendation or testimony of the Director or any other officer of CFPB. Id. § 1012(c). Thus,
Dodd–Frank  “makes  clear  that  the  [CFPB]  is  to  function  without  any  interference  by  the  [FRB].”   S. REP. NO.
111-176,   at   161   (2010).   The   provisions   protecting   CFPB’s   independence   are   “modeled   on   similar   statutes  
governing  the  [OCC],”  an  autonomous  bureau  located  with  the  Treasury  Department.  Id.
206. Dodd–Frank requires the Fed to provide funds for CFPB’s   operations in an amount determined by
CFPB’s   Director   to   be   “reasonably   necessary”   to   carry   out   the   CFPB’s   authorities   in   view   of   other   funding  
available  to  the  CFPB,  up  to  the  following  maximum  limits:  (i)  10%  of  the  Fed’s  total  operating  expenses  in  
fiscal year 2011, (ii) 11% of such expenses in fiscal year 2012, and (iii) 12% of such expenses in each
subsequent fiscal year. Dodd–Frank   §   1017(a).   Congress   concluded   that   “the   assurance   of   adequate   funding  
[from the Fed], independent of the Congressional appropriations process, is absolutely essential to the
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The Director of CFPB is appointed by the President for a five-year term, with the
Senate’s  advice  and  consent,  and  is  removable  only  for  good  cause. 207 Title X authorizes
the  Director  to  issue  rules,  orders,  and  provide  guidance  “to  administer  and  carry out the
purposes and objectives of the Federal consumer financial laws, and to prevent evasions
thereof.”208 In particular, the Director may issue rules and bring enforcement proceedings
to  prevent  persons  subject  to  Title  X  from  engaging  in  “unfair,  deceptive, or abusive acts
or  practices  (UDAAP)  in  connection   with  consumer  financial  products  or  services.”   209
The   Director   may   also   issue   regulations   to   ensure   that   “the   features   of   any   consumer  
financial product or service . . . are fully, accurately, and, effectively disclosed to
consumers in a manner that permits consumers to understand the costs, benefits, and risks
associated   with   the   product   or   service.”210 CFPB’s   regulations   are   subject   to   potential  
override by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) if the FSOC determines
that any CFPB regulation threatens the safety and soundness of the U.S. banking system
or the stability of the U.S. financial system. 211 In addition to the prohibitions created by
CFPB’s  rules,  Section 1036 of Dodd–Frank imposes a general statutory ban on the use of
UDAAP by covered providers of financial products or services. 212
Title X authorizes CFPB to examine depository institutions with total assets of more
than $10 billion (as well as their affiliates) and all nondepository providers of consumer
financial services to determine their compliance with consumer financial protection
laws.213 Title X also enables CFPB to take a variety of actions to stop violations of (i) the
CFP   Act   and   the   CFPB’s   regulations   thereunder   (including   statutory and regulatory
prohibitions against UDAAP), or (ii) any of the 18 federal consumer financial laws

independent   operations   of   any   financial   regulator.”   S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 163 (2010). Dodd–Frank will
require the Fed to provide approximately $500 million of funding to CFPB in fiscal year 2013 and subsequent
years. Id. at 164 (graph).
207. Dodd–Frank § 1011(b)–(c).
208. Id. § 1022(b)(1).
209. Id. § 1031(a)–(b).   For   a   recent   analysis   of   the   potential   scope   of   CFPB’s   authority   to   adopt   rules  
prohibiting UDAAP, see Carey Alexander, Abusive: Dodd–Frank Section 1031 and the Continuing Struggle to
Protect Consumers 13–35   (St.   John’s   Leg.   Stud.   Res.   Paper   No.   10-193, Dec. 2010), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1719600.
210. Dodd–Frank § 1032(a).
211. The FSOC has authority to set aside any CFPB regulation if the FSOC determines by a vote of twothirds   of   its   members   that   the   regulation   would   “put   the   safety   and   soundness   of   the   United   States   banking  
system   or   the   stability   of   the   financial   system   of   the   United   States   at   risk.”   Id. § 1023(a). The FSOC has 10
voting members (including the heads of nine federal financial agencies and an independent member with
insurance experience) and five non-voting members. Id. §  111(b).  In  order  to  initiate  the  FSOC’s  review  of  a  
CFPB regulation, a member of the FSOC must petition the FSOC to set aside the regulation. Id. § 1023(a)–(b).
It is not clear whether a non-voting member of the FSOC is qualified to file or vote on such a petition.
212. Id. §  1036(a)(1)(B).  As  discussed  below,  Title  X’s  statutory  ban  on  UDAAP  may  be  enforced against
state-chartered or state-licensed providers of financial services by state attorneys general as well as the CFPB.
See infra notes 235–36 and accompanying text.
213. Depository institutions with total assets of $10 billion or less will be examined by federal banking
agencies to assess their compliance with consumer financial protection laws. Mierzewski et al., supra note 203,
at 731–32. CFPB has authority (i) to obtain reports from smaller depository institutions, (ii) to include one of
CFPB’s  examiners  on  the  examination  teams  for  such  depository  institutions,  and  (iii)  to  provide  input  to  the  
primary regulations of such institutions with regard to the scope and conduct of examinations, the contents of
examination reports and examination ratings. Dodd–Frank § 1026.
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enumerated in Section 1002(12) of Dodd–Frank.214 CFPB’s  powers  to  prevent  violations  
of such laws include (i) undertaking investigations and performing administrative
discovery, (ii) initiating administrative enforcement proceedings (including actions for
cease-and-desist orders), (iii) filing judicial enforcement actions, and (iv) making
referrals of criminal charges to the Department of Justice. 215 The CFPB may use
administrative or judicial enforcement proceedings to obtain a wide range of legal and
equitable remedies, including refunds, restitution, damages, civil money penalties and
injunctive relief.216
Thus, Title X vests CFPB with broadly-defined powers to regulate providers of
consumer financial products and services. 217 However, Title X does not authorize CFPB
to regulate persons engaged in insurance, securities or commodity trading activities. In
addition, sellers of nonfinancial goods and manufactured homes, real estate brokers, auto
dealers, attorneys, accountants, and   tax   preparers   are   exempted   from   the   CFPB’s  
jurisdiction unless they are significantly engaged in offering covered financial products
or services.218
B. Title X Empowers the States to Adopt Laws Providing Additional Protection to
Consumers of Financial Services
Notwithstanding the broad powers granted to the CFPB, Title X does not give the
federal government exclusive control over consumer financial protection. Instead, Title X
authorizes the states to provide supplemental safeguards to consumers through both
lawmaking (as described in this Part) and law enforcement (as discussed in the next Part).
Section  1041(a)(1)  provides  that  the  CFP  Act  does  not  preempt  state  law  “except  to  the  
extent that a state law is inconsistent with the provisions of [the CFP Act] and then only
to  the  extent  of  the  inconsistency.”219 Section  1041(a)(2)  explains  that  a  state  law  is  “not  
inconsistent”   with   the   CFP   Act—and therefore is not preempted—if the state law
provides   “greater”   protection   to   consumers   than   the   protection   provided   by   the   CFP  
Act.220 CPFB may determine whether any state law is preempted due to inconsistency

214. Dodd–Frank §§ 1002(12), 1031, 1036(a)(1)(B), 1052–55. Section 1031 of Dodd–Frank imposes strict
limits  on  CFPB’s  authority  to  adopt  rules  declaring  acts  or  practices  to  be   “unfair”  or  “abusive”  and  therefore  
unlawful   under   CFPB’s   UDAAP   authority.   Id. § 1031(c)–(e). In addition, CFPB may not bring an
administrative enforcement hearing to enforce an enumerated federal consumer financial law to the extent that
the law in question  specifically  limits  CFPB’s  authority  to  do  so.  Id. § 1053(a)(2).
215. Id. §§ 1052–56; see Mierzewski et al., supra note 203, at 732–35   (describing   CFPB’s   enforcement  
powers). CFPB has authority to represent itself in the Supreme Court if it submits a request to the Attorney
General and the Attorney General concurs or acquiesces in that request. Dodd–Frank § 1054(e).
216. Dodd–Frank §§ 1053–55. CFPB may not impose exemplary or punitive damages. Id. § 1055(a)(3).
217. See id. § 1002(5)–(6),  (26)  (defining  “consumer  financial  product  or  service,”  “covered  person,”  and  
“service  provider”);;  Mierzewski  et  al.,  supra note 203, at 726 (describing persons, products, and services that
are regulated under Title X).
218. See Dodd–Frank  §§  1027,  1029  (exempting  designated  industries  from  CFPB’s  jurisdiction);;  see also
H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 875 (2010) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 731 (discussing
statutory  exceptions  to  CFPB’s  jurisdiction); S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 160, 169–71 (2010) (same); Mierzewski et
al., supra note 203, at 727–28 (same).
219. Dodd–Frank § 1041(a)(1).
220. Id. § 1041(a)(2); See S. REP. NO. 111-176,  at  174  (2010)  (“Section  1041  confirms  that   the [Title X]
will  not  preempt  State  law  if  the  State  law  provides  greater  protection  for  consumers.”).
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with   the   CFP   Act   either   “on   its   own   motion   or   in   response   to   a   nonfrivolous   petition  
initiated  by  any  interested  person.”221
The general anti-preemption language contained in Section 1041 of Dodd–Frank
does not determine the question of whether state laws are subject to preemption under
either the National Bank Act (NBA) 222 or   the   Home   Owners’   Loan   Act (HOLA).223
Sections 1043–1048 of Dodd–Frank govern preemption issues under those two
statutes.224 As shown below in Part III.D, Dodd–Frank   significantly   limits   the   OCC’s  
authority to preempt the application of state consumer financial laws to national banks
and federal thrifts.
As explained above, the CFP Act preempts state laws only when they provide less
protection  than  the  CFP  Act  and  the  CFPB’s  regulations. 225 Consequently, the CFP Act
establishes  a  “floor”  and  not  a  “ceiling”  for  consumer  financial  protection.226 The limited
scope   of   preemption   under   the   CFP   Act   is   consistent   with   the   “floor”   preemption  
established by most federal laws that protect consumers of financial products, including
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA),
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), and the Truth in Lending Act
(TILA).227 In this regard, the Senate committee report on Dodd–Frank explained that
“Federal  consumer  financial  laws  have  historically  established  only  minimum  standards
[of consumer protection] and have not precluded the States from enacting more protective
standards.  [The  CFP  Act]  maintains  that  status  quo.”228
By giving the states a supplemental lawmaking role with regard to consumer
financial protection, Dodd–Frank encourages CFPB and the states to work together with
the goal of providing optimal protection to consumers. To advance that goal, section
1041(c) requires CFPB to conduct a rulemaking proceeding whenever a majority of the
states have adopted a resolution recommending that CFPB should establish or modify a
consumer protection regulation. 229 As noted in the Senate report, Section 1041(c) will
enhance   the   states’   ability   to   persuade   CFPB   to   “adjust   [federal   consumer   protection]  

221. Dodd–Frank § 1041(a)(2).
222. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1–216b (2006).
223. Id. §§ 1461–70.
224. See infra Part III.D (discussing Dodd–Frank’s   establishment   of  new   preemption standards under the
NBA and HOLA).
225. See infra notes 219–21 and accompanying text (describing the limited preemption of state laws under
Section 1041 of Dodd–Frank).
226. For an analysis of the important distinction—in terms of preemptive effect on the states—between
federal  statutes  that  establish  “floors”  and  those  that  create  “ceilings”  of  regulatory  standards,  see  Buzbee,  supra
note 16, at 1564–72 (describing the difference  between  (i)  federal  environmental  laws  that  establish  “regulatory  
floors”  and  allow  more  stringent  state  requirements  and  (ii)  federal  energy  and  hazardous  waste  laws  that  create  
“preemptive  ceilings”  and  prohibit  any  additional  regulation  by  the  states).
227. Like   the   CFP   Act,   ECOA,   EFTA,   and   FDCPA   provide   that   state   laws   are   not   “inconsistent”   with  
federal  law,  and  are  therefore  not  preempted,  if  state  laws  provide  “greater”  protection  to  consumers  than  the  
protection provided by federal law. 15 U.S.C. § 1692n (2006) (FDCPA); id. § 1693d(f) (ECOA); id. § 1693q
(EFTA).  Similarly,  courts  have  held  that  “states  remain  free  to  impose  greater  protections  for  borrowers”  than  
the safeguards created by TILA. Williams  v.  First  Gov’t  Mortg.  &  Investors  Corp., 176 F.3d 497, 500 (D.C. Cir.
1999); accord Black v. Financial Freedom Senior Funding Corp. 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 445, 461 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001).
228. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 174 (2010).
229. Dodd–Frank § 1041(c).
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standards  over  time.”230
C. Title X  Enables  State  Attorneys  General  to  Enforce  the  CFP  Act  and  the  CFPB’s  
Regulations
Section 1042 of Dodd–Frank authorizes state attorneys general (AGs) to enforce the
CFP  Act  or  CFPB’s  regulations  by  filing  actions  in  federal  or  state  courts  to  secure  civil
remedies under the CFP Act or under other applicable federal or state laws. 231 Section
1042  also  permits  state   AGs  to  enforce  the  CFP  Act  or  CFPB’s  regulations  by  bringing  
administrative   enforcement   proceedings   against   “any   entity   that   is   State-chartered,
incorporated,  licensed,  or  authorized  to  do  business  under  State  law.” 232 However, state
AGs may not bring administrative enforcement proceedings against national banks or
federal thrifts.233 State AGs may only file judicial enforcement actions against national
banks or federal thrifts under the CFP Act, and such actions must be based on alleged
violations of CFPB regulations.234 Thus, a state AG may not sue a national bank or
federal thrift to enforce any statutory provision of the CFP Act (unless that statutory
provision has been expressly incorporated in a CPFB regulation).
As a practical matter, the forgoing limitation means that state AGs are authorized to
enforce  only  CFPB’s  interpretations  of  the  CFP  Act  (as  embodied  in  CFPB  regulations)  
against national banks or federal thrifts and only by filing lawsuits. For example, state
AGs may not enforce Section  1036’s  general  statutory  ban  on  UDAAP  against  national  
banks or federal thrifts.235 In contrast, state AGs may enforce the statutory provisions of
the CFP Act,   including   the   “generic   UDAAP   ban,”   against   state-chartered or statelicensed entities through either administrative or judicial enforcement proceedings. 236
Section 1042(b)(1) requires a state AG to give CFPB a copy of each complaint that
the AG has filed in any administrative or judicial proceeding to enforce the CFP Act or
CFPB’s   regulations.237 Upon   receiving   the   AG’s   complaint,   CFPB   may   intervene   as   a  
party in the proceeding, may remove any state court action to federal district court, and
may appeal any order or judgment to the same extent as any other party in the
proceeding.238 Section 1042(b) ensures that CFPB will have the right to participate in all
enforcement   proceedings   brought   by   state   AGs   under   the   CFP   Act   or   CFPB’s  
regulations.
State AGs have authority under certain state and federal laws to enforce the CFP Act
and   CFPB’s   rules   against   certain   classes   of   persons   who   are   not   subject   to   CFPB’s  

230. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 175 (2010).
231. Dodd–Frank § 1042(a)(1).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. § 1042(a)(2).
235. Lauren Saunders, The Role of the States Under the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. 2–3 (Dec. 2010), http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/
legislation/dodd-frank-role-of-the-states.pdf (citing Dodd–Frank §§ 1036(a)(1)(B), 1042(a)(1)–(2)).
236. Id.
237. The   AG   is   required   to   give   CFPB   its   complaint   before   initiating   its   enforcement   action   or,   if   “prior  
notice is not practicable, . .  .  immediately  upon  instituting  the  action.”  Dodd–Frank § 1042(b)(1)(B).
238. Id. § 1042(b)(2).
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enforcement jurisdiction.239 For  example,  state  AGs  could  potentially  “use  CFPB  rules  as  
a basis for arguing that a merchant, retailer or seller has violated [a] state law ban on
unfair  or  deceptive  practices.”240 In addition, Section 1042(d) of Dodd–Frank stipulates
that the CFP Act may not be construed to limit (i) the authority of a state AG or other
responsible state official to initiate any enforcement action or other regulatory proceeding
based  “solely”  on  the  law  of  that  state,  or  (ii)  the  authority  of  state  insurance  or  securities  
officials or agencies to take enforcement or other regulatory actions authorized by state
securities laws or state insurance laws. 241 Thus, the CFP Act does not impair the
enforcement powers granted to state AGs or state securities or insurance officials by valid
state laws.
D. Dodd–Frank Limits the Preemptive Authority of the OCC with Respect to National
Banks and Federal Thrifts
Title X of Dodd–Frank establishes new preemption standards under the NBA and
HOLA. As  shown  below,  the  new  standards  impose  significant  limitations  on  the  OCC’s  
authority to preempt the application of state consumer financial laws to national banks
and federal thrifts. The new standards also require the OCC to make major changes in the
preemption rules that were issued by the OTS and the OCC between 1996 and 2004.242
The new standards do not address the applicability of general state laws to national banks
and federal thrifts. However,  I  argue  below  that  Title  X’s  silence  with  regard  to  general  
state laws should be construed to support the presumptive applicability of such laws to
national banks and federal thrifts.243
1. Dodd–Frank Establishes New Preemption Standards That Govern the Application of
State Consumer Financial Laws to National Banks and Federal Thrifts
Sections 1044 through 1047 of Dodd–Frank, which take effect on July 21, 2011,
adopt new preemption standards that govern the applicability of state consumer financial
laws to national banks and federal thrifts. 244 The revised national bank preemption rules
are contained in a new section (Section 5136C) of the NBA, 245 while the altered thrift
standards are set forth in a new provision (Section 6) of HOLA.246 The new preemption

239. Saunders, supra note 235, at 3–4 (describing the right of state AGs under certain state and federal laws
to enforce the CFP Act  or  CFPB’s  rules  against  smaller  banks,  thrifts,  and  credit  unions  (i.e.,  those  with  assets  
under $10 billion) and also against auto dealers and certain merchants, retailers, and sellers, notwithstanding
CFPB’s  lack  of  enforcement  jurisdiction  over  any  of those persons).
240. Id. at 3 (emphasis in original).
241. Dodd–Frank § 1042(d).
242. See supra Part II.E.2 (discussing the preemption rules adopted by the OTS and the OCC).
243. See infra Part III.D.8 (explaining why general state laws should presumptively apply to national banks
and federal thrifts).
244. Dodd–Frank §§ 1044, 1045, 1047(a) (enacting new preemption standards for national banks), id. §§
1046, 1047(b) (enacting new preemption standards for federal thrifts). The effective date for these provisions is
July  21,  2011,  which  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  has  established  as  the  “designated  transfer  date.”  Id. § 1048;
see 75 Fed. Reg. 57,252 (Sept. 20, 2010).
245. Dodd–Frank §§ 1044, 1045, 1047(a) (enacting new § 5136C of the NBA) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 25b).
246. Id. §§ 1046, 1047(b) (enacting new section 6 of HOLA (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1465)).

Wilmarth Post Macro

926

Do Not Delete

7/15/2011 2:11 PM

The Journal of Corporation Law

[Vol. 36:4

standards for federal thrifts are equivalent to those for national banks. 247
Dodd–Frank’s   revised   preemption   standards   apply   to   “state   consumer   financial  
laws,”  which  include  state  laws  that  (i)  do  not  “directly  or  indirectly  discriminate”  against  
federally-chartered depository institutions, and   (ii)   “directly   and   specifically”   regulate  
financial transactions involving consumers or their related accounts. 248 For example, a
state law that regulates the specific terms and conditions of a consumer loan (e.g., by
prohibiting or limiting certain types of fees or amortization terms) should be treated as a
state consumer financial law. In contrast, state laws that establish general requirements,
standards, or prohibitions with respect to the conduct of business by both financial and
nonfinancial firms—e.g., state laws prohibiting fraudulent or deceptive practices or
unconscionable contracts—should not be treated as state consumer financial laws for
purposes of Section 5136C of the NBA and Section 6 of HOLA. The statutory distinction
in Dodd–Frank  between  state  laws  that  “directly  and  specifically”  regulate  the  terms  and  
conditions of consumer financial transactions and other state laws that apply generally to
a broad range of business conduct is consistent with a series of recent cases decided
under both HOLA and the NBA. Those decisions have held that state laws of general
applicability are less likely to create conflicts with either HOLA or the NBA and,
therefore, are less likely to be preempted. 249
2. Dodd–Frank’s  New  Standards  Significantly  Limit  the  OCC’s  Authority  to  Preempt  
State Consumer Financial Laws
As shown below, Dodd–Frank’s   new   preemption   standards   impose   several  
important limitations on the   OCC’s  authority  to  preempt  state  consumer   financial  laws.
First, Dodd–Frank requires the OCC to apply conflict preemption principles and, in most
cases, to justify each preemption determination by showing that a state consumer
financial law prevents or significantly   interferes   with   a   national   bank’s   exercise   of   its  
federally-granted powers. Second, Dodd–Frank requires the OCC to make preemption
determinations on a case-by-case basis and to show that each determination is supported
by substantial evidence. Third, the OCC is entitled to receive only limited deference if its
preemption determination is reviewed by a court.

247. See id. § 1046 (enacting new section 6(a) of HOLA, which provides that any preemption
determinations made by a court or the responsible agency  under  HOLA  “shall  be  made  in  accordance  with  the  
laws  and  legal  standards  applicable  to  national  banks  regarding  the  preemption  of  State  law”).
248. Id. §§ 1044, 5136(c)(a)(2).
249. See, e.g., In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC Mortg. Servicing Litig., 491 F.3d 638, 643–46 (7th Cir.
2007) (affirming the applicability of general state laws to federal thrifts under HOLA); Martinez v. Wells Fargo
Home Mortg., Inc., 598 F.3d 549, 555–56 (9th Cir. 2010) (recognizing the applicability of general state laws to
national banks under the NBA); see also Jefferson v. Chase Home Fin., No. C 06-6510 TEH, 2008 WL
1883484, at *10–15 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2008); Mwantembe v. TD Bank, N.A., 669 F. Supp. 2d 545, 553–54
(E.D. Pa. 2009); Young v. Wells Fargo & Co., 671 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1018–22 (S.D. Iowa 2009); Augustin v.
PNC Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1092–97 (D. Hawaii 2010); Guttierez v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1130–33 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (each holding that general state laws applied to national
banks and were not preempted by the NBA).

Wilmarth Post Macro

2011]

Do Not Delete

7/15/2011 2:11 PM

The Dodd–Frank  Act’s  Expansion  of  State  Authority

927

a. Under Dodd–Frank, the OCC May Preempt a State Consumer Financial Law Only If
That Law Prevents or Significantly Interferes With a National  Bank’s  Exercise  of  Its  
Powers
Paragraph (b)(1) of Section 5136C establishes three new tests for determining
whether the NBA preempts a state consumer financial law. 250 Under paragraph (b)(1),
“State   consumer   financial   laws   are   preempted,   only   if”   (A) application of the state law
has  a  “discriminatory  effect  on  national  banks”  in  comparison  with  state  banks;;  (B)  if  the  
state  law  is  preempted  under  the  “legal standard  for  preemption”  set  forth  in  Barnett Bank
of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson,251 as discussed below;252 or (C) if the state law is
preempted by a federal law other than a statute defining the powers of national banks. 253
The first preemption test of nondiscrimination is straightforward and should not require
great difficulty in application. If a state law discriminates against national banks either on
its face or in its practical application, it will be preempted. 254
The second preemption test, set forth in subparagraph (b)(1)(B), provides that a
“state  consumer  financial  law”  will  be  preempted  “in  accordance with the legal standard
for preemption in the decision of the Supreme Court . . . in Barnett Bank of Marion
County, N.A. v. Nelson . . .  517  U.S.  25  (1996),”255 if  the  particular  state  law  “prevents  
or significantly interferes with the exercise by the  national  bank  of  its  powers.”256 Thus,
subparagraph  (b)(1)(B)  expressly  adopts  the  “prevent  or  significantly  interferes  with”  test  
in Barnett Bank as the governing standard for determining whether state consumer
financial laws apply to national banks. 257 In addition, the relevant inquiry under Barnett
Bank is   to   determine   whether   a   challenged   state   law   actually   “prevents   or   significantly  
interferes  with”  the  “exercise”  of  “powers”  by  a  national  bank. 258
In Section 104(d)(2)(A) of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act,259 enacted in 1999,
Congress   incorporated   the   “prevent   or   significantly   interfere   with”   standard   of   Barnett
Bank as the governing rule for determining whether state laws regulating sales of
insurance by depository institutions are preempted by federal law. 260 Thus, Congress
expressed its clear understanding in 1999 that the applicable preemption standard under
Barnett Bank is   the   “prevent   or   significantly   interfere   with”   test. 261 Similarly, the

250. Dodd–Frank § 1044 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(A)).
251. Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996).
252. Id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B)); see infra notes 255–70 and accompanying text
(discussing the Barnett Bank standard for preemption).
253. Dodd–Frank § 1044 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25(b)(1)(C)). See infra notes 275–82 and
accompanying text (discussing the types of federal laws that are likely to be included under the third category).
254. Cf. McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1896) (holding that national banks were required to
comply  with  a  “general  and  undiscriminating  law”  enacted by Massachusetts to prevent insolvent debtors from
providing preferences to creditors).
255. Dodd–Frank § 1044 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B)).
256. Id.; see Barnett Bank,  517  U.S.  at  33  (upholding  the  states’  authority  “to  regulate  national banks where
.  .  .  doing  so  does  not  prevent  or  significantly  interfere  with  the  national  bank’s  exercise  of  its  powers”).
257. Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33.
258. Id.
259. Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 104(d)(2)(A), 113 Stat. 1341, 1353 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 6701(d)(2)(A) (2006)).
260. Id.
261. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-434, at 156–57 (1999) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1999 U.S.C.C.A.N. 245, 251
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conference committee report and the Senate committee report on Dodd–Frank confirm
that   Congress   once   again   specifically   endorsed   the   “prevent   or   significantly   interferes  
with”   standard   of   Barnett Bank as the controlling rule for determining whether state
consumer financial laws are preempted under Section 5136C(b)(1)(B).262
The Supreme Court has not precisely defined the degree of interference that is
required   to   invalidate   a   state   law   under   the   “significantly   interferes   with”   standard   set  
forth in Barnett Bank. A   recent   appellate   court   opinion   concluded   that   “the   level   of  
‘interference’   that   gives   rise   to   preemption   under   [Barnett Bank] is   not   very   high.”263
However, as shown below, there are good reasons to believe that the Supreme Court
would   view   that   question   differently,   given   the   Court’s   discussion   of   preemption   in  
Barnett Bank and   its   interpretation   of   the   meaning   of   the   term   “significant”   in   other  
federal statutes.
In Barnett Bank, the Court struck down a Florida statute, which prohibited national
banks that were subsidiaries of BHCs from exercising a power granted by Congress
(namely, the right to sell insurance in towns with 5000 or fewer inhabitants). 264 The
Court  held  that  Florida  could  not  “condition”  a  congressional  grant  of  federal  power  by  
requiring   “a   grant  of  state  permission”   to  exercise  that  power. 265 Thus, the Florida law
ran  afoul  of  the  “prevent”  prong  of  the  Barnett Bank standard because it prohibited most
national banks from exercising an express power granted by Congress in a federal
statute.266
The Court in Barnett Bank also pointed to the state law that it found to be preempted
in Franklin National Bank v. New York.267 In Franklin, a New York statute prohibited
national  banks  and  state  commercial  banks  from  using  the  word  “savings”  in  advertising  
for deposits and reserved that advertising privilege solely for state savings banks.268 The
Court pointed out in Franklin that a provision of the Federal Reserve Act specifically
authorized national banks to accept savings deposits, while the NBA also granted a
general power to accept deposits. 269 The Court made clear in Franklin that it viewed
New   York’s   prohibition   on   advertising   for   savings   deposits   as   a   very   prejudicial  
interference with the federally-granted power of national banks to accept savings
deposits:
Modern competition for business finds advertising one of the most usual and
useful of weapons. We cannot believe that the incidental powers granted to
national banks should be construed so narrowly as to preclude the use of
advertising in any branch of their authorized business. It would require some
(explaining   that   under   the   1999   statute,   “[w]ith   respect   to   insurance   sales,   solicitations,   and   cross-marketing,
States may not prevent or significantly interfere with the activities of depository institutions or their affiliates, as
set forth in Barnett Bank of Marion County N.A. v. Nelson,  517  U.S.  25  (1996)”).
262. See H. R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 875 (2010), reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 731; S. REP. NO.
111-176, at 175–76 (2010).
263. Monroe Retail, Inc. v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 589 F.3d 274, 283 (6th Cir. 2009).
264. Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 28–38 (1996).
265. Id. at 34–35.
266. Id. at 31–35.
267. Franklin   Nat’l   Bank   v.   New   York,   347   U.S.   373   (1954).   See also Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33
(referring to Franklin as  “a  case  quite  similar  to  this  one”).
268. Franklin, 347 U.S. at 374.
269. Id. at 375–76.
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affirmative indication to justify an interpretation that would permit a national
bank to engage in a business but gave no right to let the public know about it.
. . .   [National   banks]   do   accept   and   pay   interest   on   time   deposits   of   people’s  
savings, and they must be deemed to have the right to advertise that fact by
using the commonly understood description that Congress has specifically
selected.270
The  Court’s  analysis  of  the  preempted  New  York  statute  in  Franklin suggests that a
state law must create a substantial impediment to the exercise of a national bank power
before  the  state  law  will  be  preempted  under  the  “significantly  interferes  with”  prong  of  
the Barnett Bank standard. This view finds further support, at least by analogy, in
Supreme Court decisions construing Sections 10(b) and 14(a) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (1934 Act).271 In those decisions, the Supreme Court indicated that the terms
“significantly”  and  “materially”  are  essentially  synonyms,  and  the  Court  also  held  that  a  
“material”   fact   is   one   that   a   “reasonable   investor”   would   be   likely   to   view   as  
“important.”272
The  Court  expressed  a  similar  view  of  the  connotation  of  the  word  “significant”  in  a  
decision that considered the duty of a federal agency to prepare an environmental impact
statement (EIS) under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) for a proposed
course   of   action   that   had   “significant   environmental   impacts.” 273 In explaining why
NEPA   requires   the   filing   of   an   EIS   for   a   proposal   with   “significant”   environmental  
consequences, the Court  observed  that  “NEPA  ensures  that  important effects will not be
overlooked or underestimated only to be discovered later after resources have been
committed   or   the   die   otherwise   cast.” 274 Accordingly, in order to conclude a state law
“significantly   interferes   with”   a   national   bank’s   exercise   of   its   powers,   and   is   thereby  
preempted under Section 5136C(b)(1)(B), I believe that the courts or the OCC must find
270. Id. at 377–78.
271. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78n(a).
272. In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, the Court adopted, for purposes of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, a
“materiality”  standard  that  requires  a  plaintiff  shareholder  to  show  “a  substantial  likelihood  that  the  disclosure  
of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered  the  ‘total  
mix’  of  information  made  available.”  Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (emphasis added)
(quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (adopting same materiality standard under
Section  14(a)).  The  Court  also  held  that  “[a]n  omitted  fact  is  material  if  there  is  a  substantial  likelihood  that  a  
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in   deciding   how   to   vote.”   Id. at 231 (emphasis added)
(quoting TSC, 426 U.S. at 449).
Similarly, in Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,  the  Court  held  that  “liability  under  [Section]  14(a)  
must rest not only on deceptiveness but on materiality as well (i.e., it has to be significant enough to be
important to   a   reasonable   investor   deciding   how   to   vote.”   Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S.
1083, 1097 (1991) (emphasis added). The Court concluded that a misleading statement in shareholder proxy
documents concerning the reasons  why  a  corporation’s  board  of  directors  supported  a  proposed  merger  satisfied  
the test of materiality under Section 14(a). Id. at 1097–98.  The  Court  explained  that  a  “shareowner  faced  with  a  
proxy request will think it important to  know  the  directors’  beliefs about the course they recommend and their
specific  reasons  for  urging  the  stockholders  to  embrace  it.”  Id. at 1091 (emphasis added).
273. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989). As the Court pointed out in
Robertson, NEPA requires a federal agency to prepare an environmental impact statement with respect to any
“major”  proposal  “significantly affecting  the  quality  of  the  human  environment.”   Id. at 348 (emphasis added)
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)).
274. Id. at 349.
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that the challenged state law has an important (i.e., substantial) and adverse impact on the
bank’s  ability to exercise those powers.
An additional interpretive question is raised by the third test in Section
5136C(b)(1)(C), which provides that a State consumer financial law can be preempted by
“a  provision  of  Federal  law  other  than  this  title.”275 In my view, a federal law is covered
by the third test only if it is a law of general application—e.g., a federal criminal law,
employment law or tax law—that does not grant a power to national banks, and the
preemptive effect of those general laws should be determined in accordance with the
particular provisions of those laws. In contrast, a federal statute or regulation granting
any type of power to national banks should be subject to the Barnett Bank preemption
standard described above, not the third test.
Barnett Bank dealt with a provision of the Federal Reserve Act that granted a power
to national banks,276 and the same was true in Franklin.277 Similarly, the new
preemption standards in Section 5136C refer in several places to Section 24 of the
Federal Reserve Act,278 which authorizes national banks to make real estate loans.
Congress identified the failure of federal regulators to stop abusive and unsound real
estate lending as a leading cause of the financial crisis. 279 The preemptive mortgage
lending regulations issued by the OCC and the OTS were singled out for special criticism
because they undermined efforts by many states to combat predatory lending. 280 Because
Section 5136C(b)(1)(B) specifically incorporates the Barnett Bank preemption standard,
that statute should be interpreted as embodying the holding in Barnett Bank that the
“prevent  or  significantly  interferes  with”  standard  is  the  governing  test  to  be  applied  “[i]n  
defining the pre-emptive scope of statutes and regulations granting a power to national
banks.”281 Accordingly, the Barnett Bank standard in Section 5136C(b)(1)(B) should be
applied in any case that involves an alleged conflict between a state consumer financial
law  and  a  federal  law  that  grants  any  “power”  to  a  national  bank,  whether  that  federal  law
is codified in the NBA or in another federal statute such as the Federal Reserve Act. 282

275. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1044, 124
Stat. 1376, 2015 (2010) (enacting § 5136C(b)(1)(C) of the NBA).
276. Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996) (discussing 12 U.S.C. § 92, which
gives national banks the power to sell insurance in small towns); see also U.S.  Nat’l  Bank  of  Or.  v.  Indep.  Ins.  
Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455–63 (1993) (holding that Section 92 was originally enacted in 1916 as
part of the Federal Reserve Act, not the NBA).
277. See Franklin   Nat’l   Bank   v.   New   York,   347   U.S.   373,   375–77 (1954) (discussing a provision of the
Federal Reserve Act that authorized national banks to accept savings deposits).
278. Act of Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, § 24 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 371). For references to Section
24 in Dodd–Frank, see Dodd–Frank Section 1044 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 25(b)(2), (b)(5)), and Section
1045 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b(h)(2)).
279. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 15–17 (2010); see also supra Part II (describing how regulatory failures by
federal banking agencies contributed to the severity of the financial crisis).
280. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 16–17; see also supra Part   II.E.1,   II.E.2   (discussing   how   the   OTS’s   and  
OCC’s  preemptive  regulations  interfered  with  the  states’  ability  to  stop  predatory  mortgage  lending).
281. Barnett Bank,   517   U.S.   at   33.   To   make   clear   its   deliberate   choice   of   the   “prevent   or   significantly  
interferes  with”  preemption  standard  for  any  case  involving  an  alleged  conflict between state law and a federal
law conferring national bank powers, the Court restated the same standard in synonymous terms in the same
paragraph of its opinion. Id. The   Court   said   that   “normally   Congress   would   not   want   States   to   forbid, or to
impair significantly,  the  exercise  of  a  power  that  Congress  explicitly  granted.”  Id. (emphasis added).
282. The conference and Senate committee reports on Dodd–Frank confirm that the Barnett Bank standard
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b. Dodd–Frank Requires the OCC to Act on a Case-by-Case Basis, to Show Substantial
Evidence for Its Preemptive Determinations, and to Publish and Review Its
Determinations Periodically
Section 5136C(b)(1)(B) of Dodd–Frank  requires  the  OCC  to  make  any  “preemption  
determination . . .   by   regulation   or   order.”283 Thus, the OCC must issue each
determination that federal law preempts a state consumer financial law in the form of a
regulation or order, and the OCC may not make any preemption determination by issuing
an opinion letter, court brief or informal guidance. This requirement should increase the
formality and visibility to the public of OCC preemption determinations. 284
In addition,   the   OCC   must   determine   “on   a   case-by-case   basis”   whether   particular  
state consumer financial laws are subject to preemption by federal law. 285 The  “case-bycase”  requirement  means  that  a  preemption  determination  by  the  OCC  will  override  only  
the particular state consumer financial law under consideration and other state laws that
have   “substantively  equivalent  terms.” 286 Moreover, the OCC must consult with CFPB,
and  must  take  CFPB’s  views  into  account,  in  determining  whether  other  state  consumer  
financial  laws  have  “substantively  equivalent  terms”  to  the  particular  law  that  the  OCC  is  
preempting.287 The  requirement  for  a  “case-by-case”  determination  plainly  bars  the  OCC  
from adopting blanket rules that preempt broad classes or categories of state law.
Section 5136C(c) provides that an OCC preemption determination will not be given
preemptive   effect   “unless   substantial   evidence,   made   on   the   record   of   the   proceeding,  
supports the specific finding regarding the preemption of [the State consumer financial
law] in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court . . . in [Barnett Bank].”288
Section 5136C(g) requires the OCC to publish, and update at least quarterly, a list of all
OCC  preemption  determinations  in  effect.  The  required  list  must  identify  “the  activities
and practices covered by each determination and the requirements and constraints
is the governing test in all cases where it is alleged that  state  consumer  financial  laws  “prevent  or  significantly  
interfere   with  national   banks’   exercise   of   their   powers.”   H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 875 (2010) (Conf. Rep.),
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 731; see also S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 175–76 (2010).
283. Dodd–Frank § 1044. Section 5136C (b)(6) requires that each preemption determination issued by the
OCC must be made by the Comptroller of the Currency and may not be delegated to any other officer or
employee of the agency. Id. (enacting § 5136C(b)(6)).
284. Under a 1994 statute, the OCC is required to follow notice-and-comment procedures before issuing
any interpretive rule or opinion letter concluding that federal law preempts state law in the areas of community
reinvestment, consumer protection, fair lending or intrastate branching. 12 U.S.C. § 43(a) (1994). The OCC is
also required to publish the final interpretive rule or opinion letter in the Federal Register. Id. § 43(b). Noticeand-comment procedures are not required, however, if the OCC or the courts have previously decided
preemption issues that are essentially identical to those covered in the interpretive rule or opinion letter. Id. §
43(c).
The OCC will be required to comply with the requirements of Section 43 when it issues preemption
determinations that are subject to Dodd–Frank and also cover one of the four subject areas enumerated in
Section 43. However, any OCC preemption determination that is subject to Dodd–Frank must be issued in the
form of a regulation or order, notwithstanding the permissibility of opinion letters under Section 43. See Dodd–
Frank § 1044 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B))  (requiring  that  “any  preemption  determination  [by  the  
OCC]  under  this  subparagraph”  must  be  made  “by  regulation  or  order”).
285. Dodd–Frank § 1044 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25(b)(1)(B)).
286. Id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(3)(A)).
287. Id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25(b)(3)(B)).
288. Id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b(c)).
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determined  to  be  preempted.”289
Section  5136C(d)  requires  the  OCC  to  conduct  a  review  every  five  years,  “through  
notice and public comment, of each determination that a provision of Federal law
preempts  a  State  consumer  financial  law.” 290 After completing each quinquennial review,
the OCC must either (i) publicly announce its decision to maintain or rescind each
existing preemption determination, or (ii) publish proposals to modify particular
preemption determinations.291 Each proposal to amend a preemption determination must
comply with the notice-and-comment procedures set forth in 12 U.S.C. § 43.292 In
addition, the OCC must submit a report of each quinquennial review of preemption
determinations to the House and Senate committees responsible for banking matters. 293
The quinquennial review process will facilitate a periodic public and congressional
evaluation  of  the  OCC’s  preemption  determinations.
c. Dodd–Frank Confirms that the NBA Is Governed by Conflict Preemption Rules, and
that OCC Preemption Determinations Are Not Entitled to Chevron Deference
Section  5136C(b)(4)  declares  that  the  NBA  “does  not  occupy  the  field  in any area of
State  law.”294 Thus, Dodd–Frank affirms that conflict preemption principles, instead of
field preemption principles, govern NBA preemption issues. That affirmation is
consistent with Barnett Bank, which held that conflict preemption rules govern the
determination of whether a state law is preempted by the NBA.295
Under Section 5136C(b)(5)(A), courts reviewing preemption determinations by the
OCC  must  “assess  the  validity  of  such  determinations,  depending  upon  the  thoroughness  
evident in the consideration of the agency, the validity of the reasoning of the agency, the
consistency with other valid determinations made by the agency, and other factors which
the   court   finds   persuasive   and   relevant   to   its   decision.” 296 This standard for judicial
review of OCC preemption determinations is essentially the same as Skidmore deference,
which was defined by the Supreme Court in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.297 Under Skidmore
deference,   an   agency’s   ruling   “is   eligible   to   claim   respect   according   to   its  
persuasiveness.”298 The   weight   to   be   given   by   a   court   to   the   agency’s   ruling   under
Skidmore depends  on  “all  those  factors  which  give  it  power  to  persuade,  if  lacking  power  
to  control.”299 In contrast, the much stronger principle of Chevron deference, established
in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,300 requires a
289. Id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b(g)).
290. Dodd–Frank § 1044 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b(d)(1)).
291. Id.
292. Id.; see also supra note 284 (discussing 12 U.S.C. § 43).
293. Dodd–Frank § 1044 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b(d)(2)).
294. Id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25(b)(4)).
295. See Barnett  Bank  of  Marion  Cnty.,  N.A.  v.  Nelson,  517  U.S.  25,  31  (1988)  (stating  that  “[i]n  this  case  
we  must  ask  whether  or  not  the  Federal  and  State  Statutes  are  in  ‘irreconcilable  conflict’”).  
296. Dodd–Frank § 1044 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(5)(A)).
297. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). See Saunders, supra note 235, at 6 (explaining that
Dodd–Frank requires courts reviewing challenges to OCC preemption determinations to   apply   “the   less
deferential Skidmore standard”)  (emphasis  in  original;;  footnote  omitted).
298. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001).
299. Id. at 228 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
300. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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reviewing  court  “to  accept  the  agency’s  position  if  Congress  has  not  previously  spoken  to  
the  point  at  issue  and  the  agency’s  interpretation  is  reasonable.” 301
Section 5136C(b)(5)(A) is one of the most important provisions of Dodd–Frank
from the perspective of the states because it ensures that reviewing courts will evaluate
the   OCC’s   preemption   determinations   without   giving   strong   deference   to   the   OCC’s  
interpretations
of the NBA. Skidmore deference will not allow the OCC to claim
that each alleged instance of statutory silence or ambiguity in the NBA creates a
legislative   “gap”   that   the   OCC   has   authority   to   fill   by   issuing   preemptive   rulings   that  
displace state law. Unlike Chevron, Skidmore’s  more  demanding  standard  of  review  will  
compel the OCC to bear the burden of persuading the courts that its preemption
determinations are valid.
I   have   previously   argued   that   when   a   court   reviews   a   federal   agency’s   claim   of  
preemption   based   on   an   ambiguous   federal   statute,   the   court   should   require   a   “plain  
statement”   of   congressional   intent   to   delegate   preemptive   authority   to   the   agency. 302
Such   an   approach   would   be   consistent   with   “the   federalism-based canons articulated in
Gregory [v. Ashcroft303].”304 As I explained:
Gregory held that the courts may not conclude that a [federal]  statute  alters  ‘the  
state-federal  balance’  in  the  absence  of  a   ‘plain statement’ of  Congress’  intent  
to change that balance. The [Supreme] Court explained that this ‘plain
statement rule’ helps to ensure that ‘the political process’ has given appropriate
consideration   to   the   states’   interest   in   being   protected   ‘against intrusive
exercises  of  Congress’  Commerce  Clause  powers.’
....
To preserve our federal structure, Gregory’s   ban   on   judicial   inference   of  
preemptive intent from ambiguous statutes should apply with at least equal
force when federal agencies claim to speak for Congress in asserting
preemption based on statutory ambiguity. Unlike Congress, federal agencies
are  less  vulnerable  to  discipline  from  ‘the  political  process’  and  do  not  provide
the states with any constitutionally-guaranteed structure of representation that
would  promote  a  vigorous  and  thorough  discussion  of  the  states’  interests  and  
concerns before a preemptive regulation is adopted. 305
As I pointed out, granting Chevron deference to agency preemptive rulings conflicts
with Gregory because   it   gives   agencies   “a   far-reaching power to override state law,
except in those rare situations where Congress has unambiguously barred an agency from
acting.”306 For example, a highly deferential Chevron-based approach, which was
advocated by Justice Thomas in his dissenting opinion in Cuomo,  “would  have  created  a  
virtually  conclusive   presumption  in   favor  of  the   OCC’s  authority  to  preempt  the  states’  
sovereign law enforcement powers, even though the OCC was relying on an admittedly

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.

Mead, 533 U.S. at 229.
Wilmarth, supra note 112, at 38–39 (footnote omitted).
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
Wilmarth, supra note 112, at 39.
Id. at 38–39.
Id. at 37.

Wilmarth Post Macro

934

Do Not Delete

7/15/2011 2:11 PM

The Journal of Corporation Law

[Vol. 36:4

ambiguous   statute.”307 Fortunately, a majority of the Supreme Court rejected that
approach in Cuomo.308
Section 5136C(b)(5)(A) makes clear that the OCC may not obtain Chevron
deference for its future preemption determinations.309 Dodd–Frank’s   endorsement   of  
Skidmore deference will force the OCC to bear the burden of persuading the courts that
its preemption determinations are correct. In addition, Skidmore deference will encourage
the   courts   to   resolve   the   OCC’s   preemption claims   “in   a   manner   that   gives   appropriate  
weight to the interests of state autonomy within  our  federal  system.”310
d. Dodd–Frank Denies Preemptive Immunity to Most Subsidiaries, Affiliates and Agents
of National Banks
Section 5136C contains three overlapping provisions that affirm the applicability of
state laws to subsidiaries, affiliates and agents of national banks. First, Section
5136C(b)(2)   declares   that   the   NBA’s   provisions   “do   not   preempt,   annul,   or   affect   the  
applicability of any State law to any subsidiary or affiliate of a national bank (other than a
subsidiary   or   affiliate   that   is   chartered   as   a   national   bank).” 311 Thus, paragraph (b)(2)
establishes that the NBA does not preempt the application of state laws to any non-bank
subsidiary or affiliate of a national bank. That provision effectively overrules Watters v.
Wachovia Bank, N.A.,312 which held that state mortgage lending laws did not apply to a
state-chartered operating subsidiary of a national bank as long as the NBA preempted
such laws from applying to the parent bank.313 Thus, the holding in Watters will no
longer be valid after Title X of Dodd–Frank becomes effective on July 21, 2011.314
Second, Section 5136C(e) provides that:
[N]otwithstanding any provision of [the NBA], a State consumer financial law
shall apply to a subsidiary or affiliate of a national bank (other than a subsidiary
307. Id. See Cuomo  v.  Clearing  House  Ass’n,  LLC,  129  S.  Ct.  2710,  2733  (2009)  (Thomas,  J.,  dissenting  in  
part) (stating that, under Chevron,  the   Supreme   Court   was   required   “only   to   decide   whether   the   construction  
adopted  by  the  [OCC]  is  unambiguously  foreclosed  by  the  statute’s  text”).  
308. Wilmarth, supra note 112, at 1, 6–12, 16–19, 44–46 (explaining the reasons why the majority in
Cuomo refused to defer to the OCC under Chevron and instead  struck  down  the  OCC’s  preemptive  regulation).
309. Section  5136C(b)(5)(B)   provides   that,   except   with   regard   to   preemption  determinations,   “nothing   in  
this section shall affect the deference that a court may afford to the [OCC] in making determinations regarding
the   meaning   or   interpretation   of   [the   NBA]   or   other   Federal   laws.”   Dodd–Frank § 1044 (enacting §
5136C(b)(5)(B) of the NBA). Thus, the OCC remains free to invoke Chevron in support of its rulings that do
not involve preemption determinations. Id.
310. Wilmarth, supra note 112, at 40; see also id. at 35–36 (suggesting that Skidmore deference is
consistent  with  “the  judiciary’s  responsibility  to  ensure  that  preemption  issues  are  resolved  in  accordance  with  
constitutional and  statutory  limits  on  federal  power”).
311. Id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(2)).
312. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
313. Id. at 15–21. For authorities concluding that Dodd–Frank overrules the holding in Watters, see
Saunders, supra note 235, at 5; Nancy L. Perkins & Beth S. DeSimone, Has Financial Regulatory Reform
Materially Altered the Preemption Landscape for Federally Chartered Institutions?, 127 BANKING L.J. 759,
761 (2010). See also supra note 244 (explaining that Title X of Dodd–Frank takes effect on July 21, 2011).
314. Saunders, supra note 235, at 5; Perkins & DeSimone, supra note 313, at 761; see also Cuomo v.
Clearing   House   Ass’n,   129   S.   Ct.   2710,   2717   (2009)   (explaining   that   “the   sole   question   [in   Watters] was
whether operating subsidiaries of national banks enjoyed [preemptive] immunity from state visitation. The
opinion addresses and answers  no  other  question.”).
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or affiliate that is chartered as a national bank) to the same extent that the State
consumer financial law applies to any person, corporation, or other entity
subject to such State law.315
Subsection (e) covers much of the same ground as paragraph (b)(2), except that
subsection (e) focuses on nondiscrimination (i.e., the equal application of state laws to all
affected  persons)  and  applies  only  to  “State  consumer  financial  laws”  instead  of  all  state  
laws.316 If a state consumer financial law applies on a nondiscriminatory basis to any
person, corporation, or other entity, then the same law applies equally to a non-bank
subsidiary or affiliate of a national bank.
Third, Section   5136C(h)   provides   that   “[n]o   provision   of   [the   NBA]   shall   be  
construed as preempting, annulling, altering or affecting the applicability of State law to
any subsidiary, other affiliate, or agent of a national bank (other than a subsidiary,
affiliate,  or  agent  that  is  chartered  as  a  national  bank).” 317 The non-preemptive language
of subsection (h) closely resembles the text of paragraph (b)(2). However, subsection (h)
has a broader scope because it declares that the NBA does not preempt the application of
state law to agents of national banks. Subsection (h) thereby effectively overrules past
lower court decisions holding that agents of national banks were entitled to a preemptive
immunity from state laws comparable to that granted to operating subsidiaries by the
Supreme Court in Watters.318
3. Dodd–Frank Requires the OCC to Rescind or Modify Its Existing Preemption Rules
Except  for  the  Regulation  Governing  the  Charging  of  “Interest”  under  12  U.S.C.  § 85
Section 5136C of the NBA, as enacted by Dodd–Frank, directly conflicts with the
blanket preemption regulations that the OCC adopted in 2004 with regard to real estate
loans, deposits, non-real   estate   loans,   and   other   “operations”   of   national   banks. 319 The
OCC’s  regulations  mandate  an  across-the-board preemption  of  state  laws  that  “obstruct,  
impair,  or  condition  a  national  bank’s  ability  to  fully  exercise”  its  powers  in  four  broadlydefined areas of the banking business: (i) real estate lending, (ii) other types of lending,
(iii) deposit-taking, and (iv) other “activities”  authorized  for  national  banks  under  federal  
law.320 As  shown  below,  the  OCC’s  2004  preemption  rules  conflict  with  Section 5136C
in three major respects.
First, Dodd–Frank   overrides   the   “obstruct,   impair,   or   condition”   preemption   test  
contained in   the   OCC’s   2004   preemption   rules.   Second,   the   OCC’s   blanket   preemption  
rules contravene Dodd–Frank’s   requirements   for   individualized,   “case-by-case”  
preemption  determinations  that  are  supported  by  “substantial  evidence.”  Third,  in  view  of  
Dodd–Frank’s  provisions upholding the application of state law to non-bank subsidiaries,
315. Dodd–Frank § 1044 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b(e)).
316. Compare id. with Dodd–Frank § 1044 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(2)).
317. Id. § 1045 (enacting § 5136(h) of the NBA).
318. See, e.g., Pacific Capital Bank, N.A. v. Connecticut, 542 F.3d 341, 353 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that the
NBA preempted the application of a state law to an agent of a national bank); SPGGC, L.L.C. v. Ayotte, 488
F.3d 525, 536 (1st Cir. 2007) (same).
319. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 34.4, 7.4007, 7.4008, 7.4009 (2010).  For  a  detailed  description  of  the  OCC’s  2004  
preemption rules, see Wilmarth, supra note 93, at 227–28, 233–36, 298–99, 316–17.
320. Id. at  233  (describing  the  OCC’s  2004  rules  and  quoting  Bank  Activities  and Operations; Real Estate
Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1916–17 (Jan. 13, 2004)).
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affiliates, and agents of national banks, the OCC must rescind its preemptive regulation
for operating subsidiaries.
a.  The  OCC’s  Preemption  Test  Conflicts  with  the  Barnett  Bank  Preemption Standard
Incorporated by Dodd–Frank
The   “obstruct,   impair,   or   condition”   preemption   test   contained   in   the   OCC’s  
regulations  has  a  much  broader  scope  than  the  “prevents  or  significantly  interferes  with”  
standard set forth in Section 5136C(b)(1)(B). In fact, when the OCC adopted its
preemption rules in 2004, it specifically declined to   adopt   the   “prevent   or   significantly  
interfere  with”  standard  that  was  articulated  in  Barnett Bank.321 The OCC argued that the
“variety   of   [preemption]   formulations”   that it abstracted from Supreme Court cases
“defeats   any   suggestion   that   any   one   phrase   constitutes   the   exclusive   standard   for  
preemption.”322 The  OCC  also  asserted  that  its  “obstruct,  impair,  or  condition”  test  was  
“a  distillation  of  the  various  preemption  constructs  articulated  by  the  Supreme  Court”  but  
was  not  “in  any  way  inconsistent”  with  Barnett Bank.323
Notwithstanding  the  OCC’s  claims,  its  2004  preemption  test  is  plainly  incompatible  
with the preemption standard adopted by Congress in Section 5136C(b)(1)(B). The
OCC’s  test  omits  the  word  “significantly,”  and  it  thereby  contemplates  the  preemption  of  
state laws that only modestly or even trivially burden the exercise of national bank
powers.324 Moreover,   the   OCC’s   preemption   rules   provide   that   even   general   state laws
(e.g., laws dealing with contracts, crimes, real property, torts, and zoning) are subject to
preemption   if   they   more   than   “incidentally   affect”   the   exercise   of   national   bank  
powers.325 The OCC asserted in its 2004 rulemaking that state laws apply to national
banks only to the extent that such laws make it possible for national banks to exercise
their   powers:   “In   general,   [non-preempted state laws] do not attempt to regulate the
manner   or   content   of   national   banks’   [powers]   but   instead   form   the   legal   infrastructure
that   makes   it   practicable   to   exercise   a   permissible   Federal   power.” 326 Thus, the   OCC’s  
“legal   infrastructure”   theory   contemplates   a   preemption   regime   that   would   override   all  
state laws except for those that support the exercise of national bank powers.327 In other

321. See Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1910
(quoting Barnett Bank’s  adoption  of  the  “prevent  or  significantly  interfere  with”  standard,  but  asserting  that  the  
OCC’s  “obstruct,  impair,  or  condition”  would  “better  convey  the  range  of  effects  on  national  bank  powers  that  
the  [Supreme]  Court  has  found  to  be  impermissible”).  
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Wilmarth, supra note 93, at 233–36, 316–17.
325. 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007(c), 7.4008(e), 7.4009(c)(2), 34.4(b) (2010).
326. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1912; see also
id. at  1913  (reiterating  the  “legal  infrastructure”  theory  of  preemption).  The  OCC  relied  on  the  same  theory  in  a  
parallel  rulemaking  that  preempted  state  officials  from  exercising  “visitorial  powers”  over  national  banks.  The  
OCC identified non-preempted state laws as those establishing “the   legal   infrastructure   that   surrounds   and  
supports the ability of national banks—and others—to  do  business.”  Bank  Activities  and  Operations,  69  Fed.  
Reg. 1896   (Jan.   13,   2004).   The   OCC   further   declared,   “[T]hese   [non-preempted] state laws provide a
framework  for  a  national  bank’s  ability  to  exercise  powers  granted  under  Federal  law;;  they  do  not  obstruct  or  
condition  a  national  bank’s  exercise  of  those  powers.”  Id.
327. See Wilmarth, supra note 93, at 235–36, 316–17 (describing the sweeping preemptive claims asserted
by the OCC in the preamble to its 2004 preemption rules).

Wilmarth Post Macro

2011]

Do Not Delete

7/15/2011 2:11 PM

The Dodd–Frank  Act’s  Expansion  of  State  Authority

937

words,   as   I   pointed   out   in   2004,   the   OCC’s   theory   allows   “only   helpful state   laws”   to  
apply  to  national  banks,  thereby  creating  “a  regime  of  field  preemption  in  everything  but  
name.”328
The   Supreme   Court   strongly   criticized   the   OCC’s   “legal   infrastructure”   theory   in  
Cuomo.329 The  Court  declared  that  the  OCC’s  theory  “does  not  comport  with  the  [NBA]”  
because  the  theory  “attempts  to  do  what  Congress  declined  to  do:  exempt  national  banks  
from all state banking laws, or at least state enforcement of  those  laws.”330 Thus, Cuomo
severely  undermined  the  theoretical  justification  underlying  the  OCC’s  2004  preemption  
rules.
In addition, the Senate committee report and the conference report on Dodd–Frank
confirm that the Barnett Bank standard incorporated in Section 5136C(b)(1)(B) overrides
the  OCC’s  preemption  test  and  allows  a  wider  range  of  state  consumer  financial  laws  to  
apply to national banks. The Senate committee report explains:
Section 1044 [of Dodd–Frank] amends the National Bank Act to clarify the
preemption standard relating to State consumer financial laws as applied to
national banks . . . . The standard for preempting State consumer financial law
would return to what it had been for decades, those recognized by the Supreme
Court in Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996), undoing broader
standards adopted by rules, orders, and interpretations issued by the OCC in
2004.331
Similarly, the conference report affirms that Dodd–Frank   “revises the standard the
OCC will use to preempt state consumer protection laws. It codifies the standard in the
1996 Supreme Court case of [Barnett Bank].”332 Therefore, notwithstanding recent
statements by lawyers representing national banks, 333 the   OCC’s   2004   preemption   test  
will not be valid when Section 5136C(b)(1)(B) becomes effective on July 21, 2011.334

328. Id. at 236, 317.
329. Cuomo  v.  Clearing  House  Ass’n,  129  S.  Ct.  2710  (2009).
330. Id. at 2719–20. In Cuomo the   Supreme   Court   rejected   the   OCC’s   invocation   of   its   “legal  
infrastructure”   doctrine   in   support   of   another   preemption   rule,   which   attempted   to   bar   state   officials   from  
bringing any actions to enforce state laws against national banks. See id. at 2719–20 (quoting and discussing
Bank Activities and Operations, 69 Fed. Reg. 1895, 1896 (2004)). The Court held that the OCC lacked authority
to prevent state attorneys general from bringing judicial proceedings to enforce non-preempted state laws
against national banks. Id. at 2720–22.
331. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 175 (2010) (emphasis added).
332. H.R. REP. NO. 111-517, at 875 (2010) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2010 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 731
(emphasis added).
333. Cheyenne Hopkins, Preemption After Dodd–Frank May Not Be As Weak As You Heard, AM. BANKER,
Mar. 15, 2011,  at  1  (quoting  (i)  comment  by  Robert  Cook  that  “[t]he  substance  of  federal  preemption  analysis  
hasn’t  changed  at  all,”  and  (ii)  statement  by  Howard  Cayne  that  “Congress  made  no  change  to  preemption  as  it  
applies  to  national  banks”).
334. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (explaining that Title X of Dodd–Frank takes effect on July
21, 2011).
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b.  The  OCC’s  Blanket  Preemption  Rules  Are  No  Longer  Valid  in  View  of  Dodd–Frank’s  
Mandate  for  “Case-by-Case”  Determinations  Supported  by  “Substantial  Evidence”
As discussed above, Section 5136C(b) requires the OCC (i) to make each
preemption   determination   on   a   “case-by-case   basis,”   and   (ii)   to   consult   with   the   CFPB  
before deciding that additional state laws are subject to preemption because their terms
are   “substantively   equivalent”   to   a   particular   law   that   the   OCC   has preempted.335 In
addition, under Section 5136C(c), the OCC must demonstrate that each of its preemption
determinations   is   justified   by   “substantial   evidence,   made   on   the   record   of   the  
proceeding,”  which  “supports  the  specific  finding  regarding  the  preemption of such [state
law] in accordance with the legal standard of [Barnett Bank].”336 The   OCC’s   2004  
preemption rules do not satisfy any of these requirements.
The   OCC’s   preemption   rules   violate   Dodd–Frank’s   “case-by-case”   requirement  
because (i) they preempt broad categories of state law and do not contain any
individualized analysis of why particular state laws violate the Barnett Bank standard,
and (ii) the OCC did not consult with the CFPB before adopting its categorical
preemptions of multiple state laws.337 Indeed, the OCC acknowledged when it issued its
rules   that   it   was   “identifying   [preempted]   state   laws   in   a   more   generic   way.” 338 The
OCC’s   2004   rulemaking   also   did   not   contain   Dodd–Frank’s   required   demonstration   of  
“substantial  evidence”   to  justify  each   OCC determination that a particular state law ran
afoul of the Barnett Bank standard.339 Rather, the OCC gave only scattered examples of
state  laws  that  allegedly  “created  higher  costs  and  increased  operational  challenges”  for  
national banks, and the OCC justified its across-the-board preemption rules by declaring
that national banks should be free to operate  under  “uniform,  consistent,  and  predictable  
standards . . . without interference from inconsistent state laws, consistent with the
national character of the  national  banking  system.”340 That generalized assertion cannot
be squared with Dodd–Frank’s  adoption  of  the  Barnett Bank preemption standard or with
Dodd–Frank’s  mandate that the OCC must make preemption  determinations  on  a  “caseby-case”   basis   and   with support   from   “substantial   evidence” in the record. Hence, the
OCC’s   2004   preemption   rules   must   be   rescinded   in   their   entirety,   and   any   replacement  
rules must comply fully with Dodd–Frank’s  requirements.
c.  The  OCC’s  Preemptive  Rule  for  Operating  Subsidiaries Conflicts with Dodd–Frank
As described above, Section 5136C contains three provisions that affirm the
applicability of state laws to non-bank subsidiaries, affiliates, or agents of national
banks.341 Those provisions require the OCC to rescind a preemptive regulation issued in
335. Dodd–Frank § 1044 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 25b(b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(B), (b)(3)).
336. Id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b(c)).
337. Compare id. (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B), (b)(3)) (establishing new preemption
standards under the NBA) with 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007(b), 7.4008(d), 7.4009(b), 34.4(a) (2010) (OCC regulations
declaring broad preemptions of general categories of state laws instead of providing an individualized list of
state statutes and regulations to be preempted).
338. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1911 (Jan. 13,
2004).
339. Dodd–Frank § 1044 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b(c)).
340. Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1908.
341. See supra Part III.D.2.d (discussing §§ 5136C(b)(2), (e), (h)).
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2001, which declared that operating subsidiaries are entitled to the same preemptive
immunity from state laws as their parent national banks enjoy under the NBA. 342 The
Supreme Court upheld that regulation in its 2007 decision in Watters.343 However,
Dodd–Frank   overrules   the   Court’s   decision   and   mandates   that   non-bank subsidiaries,
affiliates, and agents of national banks must comply with applicable state laws. 344
d.  The  OCC’s  Existing Preemption Rules Must Conform to Dodd–Frank by July 21, 2011
Some commentators have suggested that the preemption provisions of Dodd–
Frank  apply  only   to  “future   [OCC  preemption]  determinations,  and  [therefore]  previous  
agency  rulings  still  stand.”345 However, four provisions of Dodd–Frank make clear that
all but  one  of  the  OCC’s  existing  preemption  rules  will  be  invalid  unless  they  are  brought  
into conformity with Dodd–Frank’s  new  preemption  standards  by  July  21,  2011.  
First, Section   5136C(b)(1)   provides   that   “State   consumer   financial   laws   are  
preempted, only if”  such  laws  violate  one  of  the  three  preemption  standards  contained  in  
that paragraph.346 The   “only   if”   language   makes   clear   that   Dodd–Frank’s   new  
preemption standards establish the controlling and exclusive requirements for justifying
any preemption of state consumer financial laws.347 Second, Section 1048 of Dodd–
Frank provides that the new preemption standards for the NBA and HOLA established by
Sections   1044   through   1047   “shall   become   effective   on   the   designated   transfer   date”  
(viz., July 21, 2011).348 Subject to two special carve-outs described below, Section 1048
requires  the  OCC’s  to  comply  fully  with  the  new  preemption  standards  on  and  after  July  
21, 2011.
Third, Section 5136C(f) expressly preserves the existing authority of each national
bank, under 12 U.S.C. § 85,   to   charge   interest   “at   the   rate   allowed   by   the   laws   of   the  
State . . .   where   the   bank   is   located.”349 Subsection   (f)   also   preserves   “the   meaning   of  
‘interest’  under  [12 U.S.C.  §  85].”350 The Senate committee report explains that Dodd–
Frank  “does not alter or affect existing laws regarding the charging of interest by national
banks.”351 Thus, Subsection   (f)   preserves   the   OCC’s   existing   preemptive   regulation  
342. See Investment Securities: Bank Activities and Operations; Leasing, 66 Fed. Reg. 34,784–34,790 (July
2, 2001) (adopting 12 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2008)).
343. Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
344. Saunders, supra note 235,   at   5   (explaining   that   “Dodd–Frank ends preemption for bank operating
subsidiaries by reversing Watters v. Wachovia Bank and the regulation Watters upheld”)   (footnote   omitted);;  
Perkins & DeSimone, supra note 313, at 761 (agreeing that Dodd–Frank   “effectively   reverses the holding of
Watters”);;  see also S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 176 (2010) (explaining that, under Dodd–Frank,  “State  law  applies  
to State-chartered nondepository institution subsidiaries, affiliates, and agents of national banks, other than
entities that are  themselves  chartered  as  national  banks”).  
345. Hopkins, supra note 333 (summarizing  comments  by  unnamed  “preemption  advocates”).
346. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1044, 124
Stat. 1376, 2015 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)) (emphasis added).
347. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at  175  (2010)  (explaining  that  “Section  1044  amends  the  [NBA]  to  clarify  
the preemption standard relating to State consumer financial laws as applied   to   national   banks,”   and   “this  
section  sets  out  three  circumstances  under  which  a  State  consumer  financial  law  can  be  preempted”).
348. Dodd–Frank § 1048; see also supra note 244 (explaining that the effective date for Dodd–Frank’s  
new preemption standards is July 21, 2011).
349. Dodd–Frank § 1044 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b(f)).
350. Id.
351. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 176.
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defining  the   meaning  of   “interest”  under   Section 85, as well as interpretive rulings and
court   decisions   that   have   given   national   banks   “most   favored   lender”   status   and   an  
expansive  power  to  “export”  interest  rates  across  state  lines  under  Section 85.352
Section 5136C(f)’s   explicit   preservation   of   the   OCC’s   existing   preemption  
regulation under 12 U.S.C. § 85  provides  strong  evidence  of  Congress’s  intent—as also
manifested in Section 1048—that   the   OCC’s   preemption   rules   in   other areas must be
brought into compliance with Title X of Dodd–Frank by July 21, 2011.353 This
congressional understanding is confirmed by the fourth relevant provision of Dodd–
Frank—Section 1043. Section 1043 provides that Title X of Dodd–Frank   and   CFPB’s  
regulations and orders thereunder:
shall not be construed to affect the applicability of any rule, order, guidance or
interpretation by the OCC or OTS regarding the preemption of State law by a
Federal banking law to any contract entered into by banks, thrifts, or affiliates
and subsidiaries thereof, prior to the date of enactment of the CFP Act. 354
As explained in the Senate committee report, Section  1043  is  intended  to  “provide  
stability   to   existing   contracts”   by   preserving   the   applicability   of   OCC   and   OTS  
preemptive rulings to contracts that were made before the enactment date of Dodd–
Frank.355 There would have been no reason for Congress to enact Section 1043 if
Congress had intended to allow existing OCC and OTS preemption rules to apply to new
consumer financial agreements that are made after July 21, 2010.
Thus, apart from Dodd–Frank’s  two  special  carve-outs  for  (i)  the  OCC’s  preemptive
regulation  governing  the  charging  of  “interest,”  and  (ii)  the  continued  application  of  the  
OCC’s  existing  preemption  rules  to  contracts  made  by  national  banks  and  federal  thrifts  
before  July  22,  2010,  the  OCC’s  preemption  rules  will   not be valid after July 21, 2011,
unless they are brought into full compliance with the new preemption standards and
requirements established by Section 5136C.356 Remarkably, as of March 2011—eight
352. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001 (2010)  (defining  the  meaning  of  “interest”  for  purposes of 12 U.S.C. § 85 and
the   authority   of   each   national   bank   to   charge   “interest”   based   on   the   law   of   the   state   where   the   bank   is  
“located”).  Because  the  term  “interest”  is  not  defined  in  12  U.S.C.  § 85,  section  5136(f)’s  explicit  preservation  
of  the  “meaning  of  ‘interest’”  is  obviously  intended  to  preserve  the  validity  of  the  OCC’s  definition  of  “interest”  
in 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(a). See generally Elizabeth R. Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding
Exportation Doctrine and Its Effect on Predatory Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518 (2004) (providing
a  comprehensive  analysis  of  the  “most  favored  lender”  and  “exportation”  doctrines  under  12  U.S.C.  § 85).
353. See infra note 356 (describing two canons of statutory construction that support the foregoing
conclusion).
354. Dodd–Frank § 1043 (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5553).
355. S. REP. NO. 111-176,  at  175  (2010)  (emphasis  added).  The  scope  of  §  1043’s  grandfather  clause  is  not  
entirely clear. For example, it is not clear whether a pre-2010 contract made by a national bank would continue
to  receive  grandfathered  treatment  under  Section  1043  (and  would  continue  to  be  governed  by  the  OCC’s  2004  
preemption rules) if that contract is modified in any way after July 21, 2010.
356. As shown above, Dodd–Frank’s   carve-outs permit the   OCC’s   existing   preemption   rules to have
continued application under two narrowly limited circumstances. In view of those carve-outs, the canon of
statutory construction known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius supports the conclusion that Congress did
not intend   to   preserve   the   OCC’s   existing   preemption   rules   in   any   other   area   unless those rules conform to
Dodd–Frank’s  new  preemption  standards.    See First  Nat’l  Bank  in  St.  Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 657-58
(1924) (holding, in view of federal statutes granting branching permission to national banks only in carefully
limited circumstances, that national banks did not have authority to establish branches under any other
circumstances); Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc. v. Hawke, 211 F.3d 638, 644–45 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding,
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months after Dodd–Frank’s  enactment  and  only  four  months  before  the  effective date of
Section 5136C—the OCC had not issued any public notice indicating how it intended to
respond to the new standards and requirements of Section 5136C.357 Indeed, the OCC
had not yet modified its visitorial powers regulation, even though the Supreme Court’s  
2009 decision in Cuomo invalidated a portion of that regulation.358
4. Dodd–Frank Affirms the Authority of State AGs to Enforce Applicable Laws Against
National Banks
Section 1047(a) of Dodd–Frank enacts a new section 5136C(i) of the NBA. 359
Section 5136C(i) provides:
In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court . . . in [Cuomo], no
provision of [the NBA] which relates to visitorial powers or otherwise limits or
restricts the visitorial authority to which any national bank is subject shall be
construed as limiting or restricting the authority of any attorney general (or
other chief law enforcement officer) of any State to bring an action against a
national bank in a court of appropriate jurisdiction to enforce an applicable law
and to seek relief as authorized by such law.360
Thus, Subsection  (i)  expressly  endorses  the  Supreme  Court’s  decision  in  Cuomo,361
which held that the NBA does not preempt the authority of a state attorney general (AG)
to seek judicial enforcement of non-preempted state laws against national banks.362
Subsection (i) also evidently upholds the right of a state AGs to seek judicial enforcement
of  any  applicable  federal  law  “as  authorized  by  such  law,”  because   Subsection (i) refers
to  the  enforcement  of  “applicable  law”  rather  than  “applicable  State  law.”363
based in part on the expressio unius canon, that a federal statute allowing national banks to sell insurance in
towns under 5000 provided compelling evidence   of   Congress’   intent   not   to   allow   national   banks   to   sell  
insurance at other locations). The   canon   against   “surplusage”   leads   to   the   same   conclusion.   The   two   special  
carve-outs in Dodd–Frank   would   be   rendered   “meaningless,”   in   violation   of   that   canon,   if   the OCC were
allowed to retain all of its existing preemption rules despite their nonconformity with Dodd–Frank’s   new  
preemption standards. Hawke, 211 F.3d at 643–45; see also Arkansas  Best  Corp.  v.  Comm’r,  485 U.S. 212, 218
(1988) (refusing to interpret a federal  tax  statute  “in  a  manner  that  makes  surplusage  of  [five  special]  statutory  
exclusions”).
357. Hopkins, supra note 333.
358. In Cuomo v. Clearing House Association, the Court invalidated 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 to the extent that
the regulation barred state officials from seeking judicial enforcement of non-preempted state laws against
national banks. Cuomo   v.   Clearing   House   Ass’n,   129   S.   Ct.  2710,  2721–22 (2009). As of April 5, 2011, the
Government Printing Office website showed that the OCC had not amended 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 since January
13, 2004, and that subsections (a)(iv) and (b)(2) of that regulation remained in force. The OCC relied on those
subsections in Cuomo to support its claim that state officials were prohibited from suing national banks to
enforce non-preempted state laws. The Supreme Court held that the OCC lacked authority to adopt such a
prohibition. See Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2714–15, 2721–22; id. at 2722 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also
Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/textidx?c=ecfr&sid=d7126a89d8938f9481bc8ea5e8083dca&rgn=div8&view=text&node=12:1.0.1.1.7.4.4.1&idno=
12 (last visited June 29, 2011) (reprinting 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000 as in effect on April 5, 2011).
359. Dodd–Frank § 1047(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b(i)).
360. Id.
361. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2710 (2009).
362. Saunders, supra note 235, at 9; Wilmarth, supra note 112, at 1–12, 16–19.
363. Dodd–Frank § 1047(a) (enacting § 5136C(i) of the NBA).
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Interpreting Subsection  (i)  to  permit  state  AGs  to  enforce  applicable  federal  law  “as  
authorized   by   such   law”   would   be   consistent   with   the   Supreme   Court’s   reasoning   in  
Cuomo. In Cuomo,  the   Court  held  that  “ordinary  enforcement  of the  law”  by  state  AGs  
through   the   courts   does   not   represent   a   prohibited   exercise   of   “visitorial   powers”   over  
national banks.364 Moreover, the NBA itself indicates that state officials may exercise
“visitorial  powers”  over  national  banks  to  the  extent  “authorized  by  Federal  law.”365
Dodd–Frank’s  explicit  incorporation  of  Cuomo provides a significant benefit to the
states because it effectively removes the possibility that Cuomo (a 5–4 decision) might
have been overruled by a subsequent decision of the Supreme Court. Without Dodd–
Frank’s  affirmation  of   Cuomo, such a possibility would have been a matter of potential
concern to the states, in view of the fact that two members of the majority in Cuomo
(Justices Souter and Stevens) have subsequently retired from the Court.
5. Dodd–Frank Establishes Preemption Standards under HOLA That Are Equivalent to
Those Embodied in the NBA
Dodd–Frank enacts a new Section 6 of HOLA.366 Section 6(a) provides that every
preemption   determination   made   by   a   court   or   agency   under   HOLA   “shall be made in
accordance with the laws and legal standards applicable to national banks regarding the
preemption   of   State   law.”367 Thus, Dodd–Frank establishes new preemption standards
for state consumer financial laws under HOLA that are equivalent to the new preemption
standards created under Section 5136C of the NBA for national banks.368 This outcome
appears to create a significant change in existing law. Before Dodd–Frank was enacted,
several lower courts concluded that the OTS had a broader power to preempt state law
under HOLA than the OCC possessed under the NBA. 369
Section   6(b)   declares   that   HOLA   “does   not   occupy   the   field   in   any   area   of   State  
law.”370 Thus, future preemption determinations under HOLA must be based on conflict
preemption principles. In addition, Section 6(c) provides that the authority of state AGs
to   seek   judicial   enforcement   of   “applicable   law”   against   national   banks   under   section  
5136C(i)  “shall  apply  to  Federal  savings  associations,  and  any  subsidiary  thereof,  to  the  
same extent and in the same manner, as if such savings associations, or subsidiaries
thereof,   were   national   banks   or   subsidiaries   of   national   banks,   respectively.” 371 Thus,
Section 6(c) incorporates Section 5136c(i) and its affirmation of the right of state officials
to seek judicial enforcement of applicable laws against federally-chartered depository
364. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2715, 2721–22.
365. 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2006).
366. Dodd–Frank §§ 1046, 1047(b) (enacting § 6 of HOLA).
367. Id. § 1046 (enacting § 6(a) of HOLA).
368. See S. REP. NO. 111-176,   at   176   (2010)   (“Section   1046   amends   [HOLA]   to   clarify   that   State   law  
preemption standards for Federal savings associations and their subsidiaries shall be made in accordance with
the  standards  applicable  to  national  banks.”).  
369. See, e.g., Bank of Am. v. City of San Francisco, 309 F.3d 551, 558–64 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
538 U.S. 1069 (2003) (holding that HOLA established a regime of field preemption while preemption issues
under the NBA should be determined based on conflict preemption principles). See also Wilmarth, supra note
93, at 321–24 (discussing other lower court decisions indicating that the OTS possessed a broader authority
under HOLA to adopt rules preempting state laws than the OCC was granted under the NBA).
370. Dodd–Frank § 1046 (enacting § 6(b) of HOLA).
371. Id. § 1047(b) (enacting § 6(c) of HOLA).

Wilmarth Post Macro

2011]

Do Not Delete

7/15/2011 2:11 PM

The Dodd–Frank  Act’s  Expansion  of  State  Authority

943

institutions.372
Dodd–Frank’s   denial   of   field   preemption   under   HOLA   will   require   the   OCC   to  
rescind,   or   fundamentally   rewrite,   three   of   the   OTS’s   preemptive   regulations. 373 Those
regulations purport to occupy the field with respect to the deposit-taking, lending, and
other   “operations”   of   federal   thrifts   and   are   therefore   incompatible   with   Section   6(b)’s  
conflict preemption regime. Similarly, the new preemption standards for national banks
contained in Section 5136C of the NBA—which will apply to federal thrifts under
Section 6(a) of HOLA after July 21, 2011—will require the rescission or modification of
many   of   the   provisions   contained   in   the   OTS’s   preemptive   regulations   with   respect to
deposit-taking,  lending  and  other  “operations.”374 Those OTS regulations are similar to
the  OCC’s  2004  blanket  preemption  rules,  discussed  above,  and  therefore  do  not  comply  
with the requirements of Section   5136C   for   (i)   application   of   the   “prevents   or
significantly   interferes   with”   preemption   standard,   (ii)   “case-by-case”   preemption  
determinations   instead   of   broad   categorical   rules,   and   (iii)   a   showing   of   “substantial  
evidence”  supporting  each  preemption  determination. 375
In addition, Section   6(a)’s   incorporation of Section 5136C(b)(2), (e), and (h)
mandates the application of state laws to subsidiaries, affiliates, and agents of federal
thrifts.376 As discussed above, Section 5136C(b)(2), (e), and (h) effectively overrule the
preemptive immunity that operating subsidiaries and agents of national banks were
granted by an OCC regulation and court decisions.377 Consequently, Section 6(a) will
require rescission of (i) an OTS preemptive regulation that purports to give operating
subsidiaries a general immunity from state laws,378 and (ii) an OTS preemptive ruling
that provided a comparable immunity to agents of federal thrifts. 379
Like the new Section 5136C of the NBA, the new section 6 of HOLA does not
establish an explicit preemption standard for state laws of general applicability because
those   laws   do   not   fall   within   the   definition   of   “State   consumer   financial   laws.” 380
However, Section   6(a)   provides   that   any   preemption   determination   “regarding   the  
relation  of  State  law  to  a   provision  of  [HOLA]”   must  be  “made  in  accordance with the
laws and legal standards applicable to national banks regarding the preemption of State
law.”381 As shown in the next Part, Supreme Court decisions indicate that general state

372. See supra Part III.D.4 (discussing § 5136C(i) of the NBA).
373. 12 C.F.R. §§ 557.11(b), 560.2(a), 545.2 (2010). As of July 21,  2011  (the  “designated  transfer  date”),  
the  OCC  will  assume  responsibility  for  administering  and  enforcing  the  OTS’s  regulations  governing  federallychartered thrifts. See supra notes 160, 192, 244 and accompanying text.
374. Id.
375. See supra Parts III.D.3.a, III.D.3.b  (explaining  why  the  OCC’s  2004  preemption  rules  do  not  comply  
with the requirements of § 5136C); Wilmarth, supra note 93, at 228, 233–35 (describing the close similarity
between  the  OCC’s  and  the  OTS’s  preemption  rules).
376. See supra Parts III.D.2.d, III.D.3.c (discussing Sections 5136C(b)(2), (e), (h) of the NBA).
377. See id. (discussing court decisions overruled by Sections 5136C(b)(2), (e) and (h)).
378. See 12 C.F.R. § 559.3(n) (declaring that state laws are preempted from applying to operating
subsidiaries to the same extent that such laws are preempted with respect to the parent thrifts).
379. See State Farm Bank, F.S.B. v. Reardon, 539 F.3d 336 (6th Cir. 2008) (upholding OTS ruling
declaring that agents of a federal thrift did not have to comply with state laws regulating mortgage brokers).
380. See supra note 248 and accompanying text (discussing Dodd–Frank’s   definition   of   “State   consumer  
financial  laws”).  
381. Dodd–Frank § 1046 (enacting § 6(a) of HOLA).
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laws presumptively apply to national banks. 382 Section 6(a) will require the courts and
federal agencies to apply the same standard in determining the application of general
state laws to federal thrifts.
6. Dodd–Frank Does Not Address State Laws of General Application, But Those Laws
Should Presumptively Apply to National Banks under Existing Judicial Precedents
As explained above, Dodd–Frank establishes a new preemption standard for national
banks and federal thrifts that refers  only  to  “State  consumer  financial  laws”  and  does  not  
mention state laws of general application.383 Accordingly, Dodd–Frank’s   new  
preemption standards and requirements do not alter the applicability of general state laws
to national banks and federal thrifts. 384 In these circumstances, two background
assumptions support the presumptive application of state laws to national banks.
First,   when   construing   a   “federal   statutory   scheme   that   is   comprehensive   and  
detailed”  the  Supreme  Court  has  opined  that  “matters  left  unaddressed  in  such  a  scheme  
are presumably left subject to the disposition provided by state   law.”385 Accordingly,
Dodd–Frank’s   silence   with   regard   to   preemption   of   general   state   laws   should   raise   an  
inference that Congress contemplated the presumptive application of such laws to
national banks.386 Second,   the   Court   has   explained   that   “Congress   is   presumed to be
aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that
interpretation when it re-enacts   a   statute   without   change.”387 Consequently, Section
5136C should be construed in harmony with Supreme Court decisions that predated
Dodd–Frank and defined the applicability of general state laws to national banks. As
shown below, those decisions support a presumption in favor of applying state laws of
general application to national banks.
In its 2009 decision in Cuomo,388 the Supreme Court declared that: “States . . . have
always enforced their general laws against national banks—and have enforced their
banking-related laws against national banks for at least 85 years, as evidenced by [First
National Bank in] St. Louis [v. Missouri],389 in which we upheld enforcement of a state

382. Part III.D.6, infra.
383. See supra notes 248–49 and accompanying text (discussing the fact that Dodd–Frank’s   new  
preemption  standards  apply  only  to  “State  consumer  financial  laws”  and  do  not  apply  to  general  state  laws).
384. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 175 (2010) (stating that Dodd–Frank’s   new   preemption   standard   for  
national  banks  and  federal  thrifts  “does  not  alter  the preemption standards for State laws of general applicability
to  business  conduct”).
385. O’Melveny  &  Myers  v.  FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 85 (1994).
386. Similarly, the House-Senate conference report on a 1994 interstate banking statute expressed the
conferees’  agreement with the general application of state laws to national banks. The conferees explained that
“[u]nder   well-established judicial principles, national banks are subject to State law in many significant
respects. . . . Courts generally use a rule of construction  that  avoids   finding   a   conflict   where   possible.”   H.R.
REP. NO. 103-651 at 53 (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2068, 2074. The conferees added that the
1994  legislation  “does  not  change  these  judicially-established  principles.”  Id.; see also Wilmarth, supra note 93,
at 208–09   (contending   that   the   conference   report   supports   the   view   that   “Congress   strongly   reaffirmed   its  
support for the general application of state laws to national banks when it passed the [1994  legislation]”).  
387. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2492 (2009) (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S.
575, 580 (1978)).
388. Cuomo  v.  Clearing  House  Ass’n,  129  S.  Ct.  2710  (2009).
389. First  Nat’l  Bank  in  St.  Louis  v.  Missouri,  263  U.S. 640, 656 (1924).
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anti-bank-branching  law.”390
Thus, Cuomo affirmed   the   applicability   of   “general   [state]   laws”   to   national  
banks.391 When Congress passed Dodd–Frank,   it   was   plainly   aware   of   the   Court’s  
opinion in Cuomo because, as discussed above, Congress expressly adopted Cuomo as
the   governing   standard   for   defining   the   states’   judicial   enforcement   authority   against  
national banks under Section 5136C(i).392
Moreover, the St. Louis decision—which Cuomo explicitly endorsed—supports the
view that a presumption against preemption should be applied in determining whether
general state laws apply to national banks. St. Louis held  that,  under  the  NBA,  “the  rule  
[is] the operation of general state laws upon the dealings and contracts of national  banks,”  
while  preemption  is  an  “exception”  that  applies  only  when  state  laws  “expressly  conflict  
with the laws of the United States or frustrate the purpose for which national banks were
created, or impair their efficiency to discharge the duties imposed upon them by the law
of  the  United  States.”393 Thus,  the  presumptive  “rule”  under  St. Louis is the applicability
of  “general  state  laws”  to  the  business  operations  of  national  banks. 394
Cuomo and St. Louis are consistent with Atherton v. FDIC,395 which declared that
“federally   chartered   banks   are   subject   to   state   law.” 396 As support for that principle,
Atherton quoted prior Supreme Court decisions reaching back to National Bank v.
Commonwealth397—issued   only   six   years   after   the   NBA’s   enactment—where the
Supreme Court held that national banks
[a]re subject to the laws of the State, and are governed in their daily course of
business far more by the laws of the State than of the nation. All their contracts
are governed and construed by State laws. Their acquisition and transfer of
property, their right to collect their debts, and their liability to be sued for debts,
are all based on State law. It is only when State law incapacitates the [national]
banks from discharging their duties to the [federal] government that it becomes
unconstitutional.398
Thus, Commonwealth upheld the applicability of general state laws to national banks
unless   such   laws   “incapacitate[d]”   national   banks   from   fulfilling   their   “duties”   to   the  
United States. Under the NBA as originally enacted in 1863 and amended in 1864, the
duties of national banks were (i) to issue a national currency in the form of national bank
notes, and (ii) to purchase and deposit Treasury bonds with the United States Treasury to
ensure the payment of those notes. 399 The foregoing duties were phased out following

390. Cuomo, 129 S. Ct. at 2720.
391. Id.
392. See supra Part III.D.4 (discussing the incorporation of Cuomo in section 5136C(i) of the NBA).
393. St. Louis, 263 U.S. at 656 (quoting McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 357 (1896)).
394. Id.
395. Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213 (1997).
396. Id. at 222.
397. National Bank v. Commonwealth, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353 (1870).
398. Atherton, 519 U.S. at 222–23 (quoting Commonwealth, 76 U.S. at 362).
399. Levitin, supra note 17, at 174–75; Wilmarth, supra note 93, at 241, 241–42 n.60; see also Tiffany v.
Nat’l   Bank   of   Missouri,   85   U.S.   409,   413   (1874)   (observing   that   national   banks   were   “established   for   the  
purpose, in part, of providing a currency for the whole country, and in part to create a market for the loans of
the  General  government”).
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enactment of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913, and national banks stopped issuing bank
notes by 1935.400 Accordingly,  the  “duties”  referred  to  in   Commonwealth are no longer
relevant, and general state laws therefore apply to national banks in the absence of a
direct and irreconcilable conflict with federal law. 401
Commonwealth’s  affirmation  that  state  law  generally  controls  the  “right  [of  national  
banks]   to   collect   their   debts”   as   well   as   “their   contracts”   and   “[t]heir   acquisition and
transfer  of  property”   was  quoted  with  approval  in   McClellan v. Chipman.402 McClellan
held that a national bank was required to comply with a Massachusetts statute that
prohibited   any   transfer   of   property   by   an   insolvent   debtor   “with   a   view   to   give a
preference  to  a  creditor  or  person  who  has  a  claim  against  him.” 403 McClellan upheld the
applicability of the Massachusetts statute even though the state law imposed a limitation
on the express power of national banks to accept transfers of real property in satisfaction
of debts previously contracted under 12 U.S.C. § 29. The Supreme Court explained:
No function of such [national] banks is destroyed or hampered by allowing the
banks to exercise the power to take real estate, provided only they do so under
the same conditions and restrictions to which all the other citizens of the State
are subjected, one of which limitations arises from the provisions of the state
law which in case of insolvency seeks to forbid preferences between
creditors.404
Thus, McClellan found   “no   conflict   between   the   special   power   conferred   by  
Congress upon national banks to take real estate for certain purposes, and the general and
undiscriminating law of the State of Massachusetts subjecting the taking of real estate to
certain restrictions,  in  order  to  prevent  preferences  in  cases  of  insolvency.” 405
Similarly, in Anderson National Bank v. Luckett406 the Court held that national
banks were required to comply with a Kentucky statute that required all banks to transfer
dormant deposit accounts to state authorities for a determination of whether such
accounts had been abandoned and should be escheated to the state. 407 A national bank,
supported by the OCC as amicus curiae, challenged the Kentucky statute on grounds of
preemption.408 The Supreme   Court  rejected  the  bank’s  preemption  claim,  declaring  that  
“the  mere  fact  that  the  depositor’s  account  is  in  a  national  bank  does  not  render  it  immune  
to   attachment   by   creditors   of   the   depositor,   as   authorized   by   state   law.” 409 The Court
further explained that:
[A] bank account is . . . part of the mass of property within the state whose
transfer and devolution is subject to state control . . . . It has never been
suggested that non-discriminatory [state] laws of this type are so burdensome

400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.

Levitin, supra note 17, at 175.
Id.; Wilmarth, supra note 93, at 241–46.
McClellan v. Chipman, 164 U.S. 347, 357 (1896).
Id. at 348 (quoting 157 Mass. Pub. Stat. § 96 (1882)).
Id. at 358.
Id. at 359, 361.
Anderson  Nat’l  Bank  v.  Luckett,  321  U.S.  233  (1948).  
Id. at 247.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 248.
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as to be inapplicable to the accounts of depositors in national banks. 410
Luckett thereby confirmed that the power of national banks to accept deposits is
subject  to  nondiscriminatory,  general  state  laws  establishing  contract  rights  and  creditors’  
rights with respect to personal property, including deposit accounts. In this regard, the
Supreme Court held that:
[A]n  inseparable  incident  of  a  national  bank’s  privilege  of  receiving  deposits  is  
its obligation to pay them to the persons entitled to demand payment according
to the law of the state where it does business. A demand for payment of an
account by one entitled to make the demand does not infringe or interfere with
any authorized function of the bank. 411
As noted above, courts generally follow a canon of statutory construction that
Congress is presumed to approve judicial interpretations of portions of a statute that
Congress reenacts without change. 412 Because the NBA, as amended by Section 5136C,
does not mention any preemption of general state laws, 413 courts should construe the
NBA in harmony with Cuomo, Commonwealth, McClellan, Luckett, and Atherton, all of
which support the presumptive application of general state laws to national banks. Thus,
Section 5136C should be deemed to leave undisturbed existing Supreme Court
precedents governing the application of general state laws to national banks.
The  Supreme  Court’s  decision  in  Wyeth v. Levine414 provides further support for the
conclusion that state laws of general application presumptively apply to national banks.
In Wyeth, the Supreme Court held that provisions of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA) governing the approval of drug labels by the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) did not preempt failure-to-warn claims under state tort law. 415 In
reaching that conclusion, the Court noted that Congress had expressly preempted state
common-law  claims  with  respect  to  “medical  devices”  but  had  not  passed  any  similar  law  
with respect to drug labeling. 416 Moreover, Congress was aware of the existence of state
common-law remedies when it enacted and amended the FDCA. 417 The Court held that
[Congress’]   silence   on   this   issue,   coupled   with   its   certain   awareness   of   the  
prevalence of state tort litigation, is powerful evidence that Congress did not
intend FDA oversight to be the exclusive means of ensuring drug safety and
effectiveness.   As   Justice   O’Connor   explained   in   her   opinion   for   a   unanimous  
Court:  ‘The   case   for  federal  pre-emption is particularly weak where Congress
has indicated its awareness of the operation of state law in a field of federal
interest, and has nonetheless decided to stand by both concepts and to tolerate

410. Id. (citations omitted).
411. Anderson, 321 U.S. at 248–49.
412. See supra note 387 and accompanying text (citing and quoting Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S.
Ct. 2484, 2492 (2009)).
413. See supra notes 248–49 and accompanying text (explaining that the new preemption standards in
Section   5136C   refer   only   to   “State   consumer   financial   laws”   and   do   not   mention   state   laws   of   general  
application).
414. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
415. Id. at 1204.
416. Id. at 1200.
417. Id. at 1199 n.7, 1199–1200.
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whatever  tension  there  [is]  between  them.’418
The   Court’s   reasoning   in   Wyeth strongly supports the presumptive application of
general state laws to national banks.419 With respect to national banks, Dodd–Frank has
established   an   express   preemption   regime   for   “State   consumer   financial   laws,”   whose  
contours are carefully defined by Section 5136C, in the same manner that the FDCA
prescribes an express preemption regime for   “medical   devices.”420 However, Dodd–
Frank does not establish any system of express preemption for national banks with regard
to state laws of general application (including state common-law rules governing
contracts, property rights, and torts) in the same way that the FDCA does not prescribe a
system of express preemption for drug labels. Under these circumstances, Wyeth held that
the  courts  should  apply  a  “presumption  against  pre-emption”  of  general  state  laws  despite  
the  federal  government’s  regulatory presence in the field.421 Wyeth explained:
We rely on the presumption [against preemption] because respect for the States
as   ‘independent   sovereigns   in   our   federal   system’   leads   us   to   assume   that  
‘Congress  does  not  cavalierly  pre-empt state-law causes of action,’  Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996). The presumption thus accounts for the
historic presence of state law but does not rely on the absence of federal
regulation.422
In Cuomo, the Court indicated that the reasoning of Wyeth also applies to the NBA,
because the Court cited Wyeth to illustrate its observation that the simultaneous
application   of   federal   and   state   laws   to   national   banks   “echoes   many   other   mixed  
state/federal regimes in which the Federal Government exercises general oversight while
leaving   state   substantive   law   in   place.”423 As   shown   above,   several   of   the   Court’s  
decisions under the NBA provide additional support for the conclusion that general state
laws presumptively apply to national banks. 424
IV. TITLE X OF DODD–FRANK CREATES A REGIME OF INTERACTIVE FEDERALISM THAT
WILL PROVIDE BETTER SAFEGUARDS FOR CONSUMERS OF FINANCIAL SERVICES
Title X of Dodd–Frank  establishes  a  regime  of  “interactive  federalism”  by  granting
overlapping powers to CFPB and state officials to adopt and enforce consumer financial
protection laws.425 The interactive regime created by Title X is likely to produce
418. Id. at 1200 (quoting Bonita Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166–67 (1989)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
419. See Smith v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, No. 2110-w-00364, 2011 WL 843937, at *4, *11 (S.D.
W. Va. Mar. 11, 2011) (holding, in view of Wyeth, that a presumption against preemption should be applied in
determining the applicability of state laws of general application to national banks).
420. See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1200 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 360(k)(a)).
421. Id. at 1195, 1195 n.3.
422. Id. at 1195 n.3. See also id. at   1200  (indicating   that   Congress’s   decision  not  to   establish   an   express  
preemption  regime  for  drug  labeling  supported  the  application  of  “the  presumption against pre-emption”).
423. Cuomo  v.  Clearing  House  Ass’n,  L.L.C.,  129  S.  Ct.  2710,  2718  (2009)  (citing  Wyeth).
424. See supra notes 388–411 and accompanying text (discussing Commonwealth, McClellan, St. Louis,
Anderson, and Cuomo).
425. See supra Part III.A–C (discussing the concurrent authority of CFPB and the states to adopt and
enforce   consumer   financial   protection   laws).   For   discussions   of   “interactive   federalism,”   a   concept   used   to  
describe the legal, political and social effects of overlapping federal and state regulatory roles in various fields
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significant public benefits by promoting both cooperation and competition among federal
and state officials. First, as shown in Part IV.A, Title X will encourage experimentation,
innovation, and continuous reform as federal and state officials consult with each other
and also compete with each other to provide optimal consumer financial protection.
Second, as shown in Part IV.B, Title X will enable state legislatures and state AGs to
assist CFPB in counteracting political influence exerted by the financial services industry.
A. Title X Will Promote Beneficial Cooperation, Competition, and Innovation by CFPB
and State Officials
Title   X’s   regime   of   interactive   federalism   will   encourage   a   “dynamic   interaction”  
among federal and state officials as they exercise their concurrent authorities over the
field of consumer financial protection.426 The interplay among federal and state
authorities under Title X will benefit the public in at least four ways. First, federal and
state officials will take different approaches in addressing the challenge of protecting
consumers of financial services, and the resulting alternative strategies will produce
fruitful experimentation and innovation.427 For   example,   the   “dual   banking   system”  
consisting of federally-chartered and state-chartered  banks  has  “permitted  states  to  act  as  
‘laboratories’   in   experimenting   with   new   banking   products,   structures,   and   supervisory  
approaches, and Congress  has  subsequently   incorporated  many  of  the  states’   successful  
innovations   into   federal   legislation.”428 Similarly, concurrent enforcement of a wide
range of federal regulatory statutes by federal and state officials has encouraged
experimentation and innovation in enforcement approaches.429
Second, dual regulation promotes dialogue among federal and state officials, which
in turn facilitates learning and regulatory improvement. 430 For example, in the field of
environmental protection, most federal statutes—like Title X of Dodd–Frank—establish
minimum   “floor”   requirements   and   permit   states   to   adopt   supplemental   safeguards. 431
Such  statutes  create   “many  venues  in   which  policy  choices  are  explored”  and  stimulate  
extensive  “interaction  among  federal  and  state  regulators,  as  well  as  other  stakeholders,”  
thereby   encouraging   “more   rigorous   regulatory   analysis”   that   will   “challenge   the   status  
quo.”432
Third,   overlapping   federal   and   state   authorities   offer   “alternative   forms   of   relief”  
of economic and social policy, see Robert Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863, 881–82
(2006); Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 248–49, 252–54
(2005).
426. Schapiro, supra note 425, at 249.
427. Ahdieh, supra note 425, at 883, 891–92; Schapiro, supra note 425, at 288.
428. Wilmarth, supra note 93, at 259–65. See also Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Expansion of State Bank
Powers, the Federal Response, and the Case for Preserving the Dual Banking System, 58 FORDHAM L. REV.
1133, 1157 (1990) (observing that “the  dual  banking  system  has  enabled  the  states  to  act  as  ‘laborator[ies]’  for  
‘experimentation’  in  the  manner  envisioned  by  Justice  Brandeis  in  .  .  .  New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann.”);;  New  
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
429. Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law 29–32, 26–27 (Cardozo Legal Stud. Working
Paper No. 313, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1685458.
430. Schapiro, supra note 425, at 288; see also Ahdieh, supra note 425,  at  889  (observing  that  “recurrently  
interacting [federal and  state]  agencies”  may  benefit  through  “adaptive  learning  from  one  another”).
431. Buzbee, supra note 16, at 1564–68.
432. Id. at 1588.
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and   thereby   provide   “an   additional source of protection if one or the other government
should   fail   to   offer   adequate   protection.”433 Enforcement actions by state officials to
combat  securities  abuses  between  2002  and  2006  provide  a  vivid  illustration  of  the  “failsafe   function”   that   state   officials can perform when federal regulators do not provide
adequate protection to consumers and investors.434 As discussed above, New York
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Massachusetts Secretary of State William Galvin, and
other state regulators brought numerous enforcement proceedings against major securities
firms after the SEC failed to act, and those state proceedings ultimately persuaded the
SEC to take similar steps.435 Similarly, state enforcement initiatives in other fields
(including antitrust, environmental protection, and regulation of tobacco and other
dangerous products) have spurred beneficial changes in national policy. 436 In contrast, as
discussed   above,   the   OCC’s   and   OTS’s   preemptive   regulations   largely   undermined  
states’   efforts   to   combat   predatory lending during the housing bubble that led to the
financial crisis.437
Fourth, overlapping federal and state lawmaking and enforcement roles can promote
beneficial   “regulatory   competition.”438 Although it is possible for federal–state
competition to produce   “over-regulation,”   the   growing   power   of   large   financial  
conglomerates, the globalization of financial markets, and the magnitude of the recent
financial  crisis  indicate  that   “under-regulation  and  regulatory  gaps”  pose  greater   threats  
to the welfare of consumers and investors.439 Regulatory regimes that create overlapping
federal   and   state   responsibilities   are   likely   to   reduce   the   risk   of   “under-regulation,”  
particularly   when   regulators   at   either   level   of   government   are   vulnerable   to   “regulatory  
capture.”440 In this regard, Gillian Metzger has suggested that Cuomo, Wyeth, and other
recent  Supreme  Court  decisions  reflect  the  Court’s  “concern  that  federal  agencies  may  be  
systematically   failing   to   meet   their   statutory   responsibilities”   as   well   as   the   Court’s  
appreciation   for   “the   role   of   state   law   and   state   enforcement   in   improving   federal  
433. Schapiro, supra note 425, at 289–90; see also Ahdieh, supra note 425, at 883.
434. Ahdieh, supra note 425, at 885–88; see also Jones, supra note 156, at 114–26. In addition to the
supplemental protection provided by state enforcement actions, private litigants can use state tort laws and other
state   laws   of   general   application   to   “ferret   out   error   or   misdeeds,   and   prompt   change   despite   uninterested  
regulators,  possibly  ignorant  public  interest  groups,  and  resistant  industry.”  Buzbee,  supra note 16, at 1589; see
also supra Part III.D.6 (discussing the applicability of general state laws to national banks).
435. Ahdieh, supra note 425, at 885–88, 891; Jones, supra note 156, at 14–26; see also supra notes 156–57
and accompanying text (discussing state enforcement actions to stop abusive practices by securities firms).
436. See Buzbee, supra note 16, at 1564–68, 1586–89; Lemos, supra note 429, at 21–32.
437. See supra Part II.E.2 (describing preemption of state anti-predatory lending laws by the OCC and
OTS).
438. Ahdieh, supra note 425, at 889–90; see also Jones, supra note 156, at 121–24 (describing how
“vertical  competition”  between  state  AGs  and  the  SEC  produced  stronger  investor  protection).
439. Ahdieh, supra note 425, at 889–90; see also Schapiro, supra note 425, at 290–91 (acknowledging that
regulatory  “[o]verlap  has  its  costs”  resulting  from  a  lack  of  “uniformity”  between  federal  and  state  laws);;  supra
Parts II.E.4, II.E.5 (contending that federal preemption played an important role in enabling large financial
institutions to become more heavily engaged in risky nonprime lending, thereby aggravating the financial crisis
and requiring costly federal bailouts of failing institutions); Wilmarth, supra note 19, at 1008–24, 1043–46
(same).
440. Ahdieh, supra note 425, at 887 n.136, 888; see also Jones, supra note 156, at 123–25 (contending that
“[m]aintaining  multiple  levels  of  regulation  provides  an  antidote  to  regulatory  capture”  and  also  “maximize[es]  
scarce  government  resources”  by  making  it  possible  for  federal  and  state  officials  to  share  “the costs of complex
investigations”).
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regulatory  performance.”441
B. Title X Reduces the Risk that CFPB Might Be Captured by the Financial Services
Industry
Avoiding  “capture”  by  regulated  firms  is  a  perennial  challenge for most regulatory
agencies.442 Congress designed CFPB to be especially resistant to capture by the
financial services industry, because members of Congress and analysts agreed that the
industry had exercised excessive influence over bank regulators during the period leading
up to the financial crisis.443 To  strengthen  CFPB’s  defenses  against  political or regulatory
capture (i) Congress gave CFPB substantial independence in making policies, issuing
regulations and bringing enforcement proceedings, and (ii) Congress provided CFPB
with an independent source of funding that does not depend on either congressional
appropriations or industry-paid assessments.444
Nevertheless, CFPB continues to face daunting political challenges due to the
determined and well-funded opposition of major financial institutions and their trade
associations and political allies. During the debates over Dodd–Frank, big banks and their
allies lobbied vigorously to keep consumer protection functions within the traditional
banking agencies and to prevent the creation of any independent consumer financial
protection agency.445 After Republicans took control of the House of Representatives in
January 2011, they introduced bills to weaken CFPB   by   (i)   removing   CFPB’s  
independent funding and making its budget subject to annual congressional
appropriations, (ii)   replacing   CFPB’s   Director   with   a   five-person commission, (iii)
enhancing   FSOC’s   ability   to   veto   CFPB’s   regulations,   and   (iv)   preventing   CFPB   from  
exercising its authorities until the Senate confirms the first CFPB Director.446 House

441. Gillian E. Metzger, Federalism and Federal Agency Reform, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (2011); see
also id. at  37  (observing  that  recent  Supreme  Court  decisions  “could  signal  that  the  Court  has  adopted  a  new  
understanding of federal-state relations under which the states have a special role in monitoring and improving
federal  administration”).  
442. Barkow, supra note 7, at 17–18, 21–24 (discussing problem of regulatory capture); Buzbee, supra note
16, at 1594–95, 1609–10 (same); Levitin, supra note 17, at 159–61 (same).
443. See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 9–11, 15–21, 161–64 (2010) (discussing need for a strong and
independent CFPB in view of past failures by federal banking agencies); Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 27, at
90–95 (describing influence wielded by large financial institutions and other reasons why federal banking
agencies failed to protect consumers from abusive financial practices); Levitin, supra note 17, at 152-61 (same);
McCoy et al., supra note 36, at 1343–66 (same); Wilmarth, supra note 112, at 19–31 (same).
444. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 11, 161–67, 172–73, 177 (2010); see also Barkow, supra note 7, at 74–75, 77
(describing  how   CFPB’s   organization   and   funding   are   designed   to  protect   CFPB   against  the   risk   of   capture);;  
supra Part  III.A  (discussing  CFPB’s  organization  and  funding).
445. Barkow, supra note 7, at 73; see also Joe Adler, Birth of a New Kind of Regulator, AM. BANKER,
Dec.  2,  2010,  at  12A  (“While  the  [banking]  industry  had  several  problems  with  Dodd–Frank, and many opposed
it outright,  it  was  the  consumer  agency  that  generated  the  most  heartache  during  debate.”);;  Paul  Wiseman  et  al.,  
Big Job Looms for New Consumer Protection Agency, USA TODAY,  June  24,  2010,  at  1B  (“Financial  industry  
lobbyists have fought the new agency through  every  step  of  the   legislative  process.   And  they  aren’t  likely  to  
give  up  once  it  is  up  and  running.”);;  Robert  G.  Kaiser,  The CFPA: How a crusade to protect consumers lost its
steam, WASH. POST,   Jan.   31,   2010,   at   G01   (“Business   groups—most vociferously the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce and the American Bankers Association—have campaigned fiercely against what they describe as an
unneeded,  intrusive  new  agency  that  would  increase  the  cost  of  doing  business.”).
446. Mike Ferrulo, Regulatory Reform: Neugebarger Bill Would Allow Congress to Control Purse Strings
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Republican leaders have acted in lockstep with major banks and their trade associations,
which   continue   to   express   vehement   opposition   to   the   implementation   of   CFPB’s  
mandate.447
In addition, commentators have noted that regulated industries ultimately succeeded
in weakening and dominating the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), despite
CPSC’s   original   goal   of   protecting   consumers   against   hazardous   products. 448 Although
CPSC bears a surface resemblance to CFPB, an   important   distinction   is   that   CPSC’s  
product-safety   rules   completely   preempt   the   states’   ability   to   adopt   additional  
requirements,  and  state   AGs  lacked  authority   to  enforce  CSPC’s  rules  until  2008. 449 In
contrast, as discussed above, (i) the CFP Act and CFPB regulations establish only
minimum requirements and allow the states to adopt supplemental consumer safeguards,
and (ii) Title X of Dodd–Frank authorizes state AGs to enforce the CFP Act (except
against national banks and federal thrifts) and to enforce CFPB regulations against all
providers of consumer financial services. 450 Thus, while state legislatures and state AGs
have been largely powerless to assist CPSC, they are potentially influential partners who
can help CFPB to mobilize public support and resist capture by industry forces.451
State AGs have political motivations that make them more resistant to regulatory
capture than federal agency officials. Most state AGs are elected rather than appointed,
and they typically aspire to become governors or Senators.452 The political ambitions of
state AGs give them strong incentives to appeal to citizen electors by bringing public
enforcement actions to protect consumers and investors. 453 Thus, state AGs are less
susceptible to industry influence than federal financial regulators because (i) state AGs
aim to attract the votes of ordinary citizens in future elections, while financial regulators
often hope to obtain future employment with large financial institutions or their service
providers, and (ii) the offices of state AGs are funded by taxpayer revenues, while most
federal financial regulatory agencies are funded directly or indirectly by industry-paid

of Consumer Agency, 96 BANKING REP. (BNA) 285 (Feb. 15, 2011); Phil Mattingly & Carter Dougherty, U.S.
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2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-15/house-republicans-target-consumer-protection-bureaufunding-in-budget-bill.html; Cheyenne Hopkins, Political Sniping Dominates House Hearing on the CFPB,
AM. BANKER, Apr. 7, 2011, at 3; Jennifer Liberto, Republicans Aim to Weaken Consumer Bureau,
CNNMONEY.COM (Apr. 6, 2011), http://money.cnn.com/2011/04/06/news/economy/republicans_consumer_
bureau/index.htm. As explained above, Dodd–Frank authorizes FSOC to override a CFPB regulation if twothirds  of  FSOC’s  voting  members determine that the regulation would threaten the safety and soundness of the
United States banking system or the financial stability of the United States. See supra note 211 and
accompanying text (discussing   FSOC’s   authority   to   veto   CFPB’s   regulations).   A   bill   proposed   by   Rep.   Sean  
Duffy (R-Wis.)  would  allow  a  majority  of  FSOC’s  voting  members  to  reject  a  CFPB rule if the rule threatened
the safety and soundness of the United States banking system. Hopkins, supra.
447. Joe Nocera, Talking Business: An Advocate Who Scares Republicans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2011, at
B1; New Consumer Agency Under Fire From GOP, Banks, ASSOC. PRESS FIN. WIRE, Mar. 16, 2011.
448. Barkow, supra note 7, at 65–72; Levitin, supra note 17, at 162.
449. Barkow, supra note 7, at 69–72.
450. Id. at 75–76; see supra Parts   III.B,   III.C   (describing   the   states’   supplemental   lawmaking   and   law  
enforcement powers under Title X of Dodd–Frank).
451. Barkow, supra note 7, at 69–72, 75–76.
452. Levitin, supra note 17, at 199–203.  As  Adam  Levitin  observes,  “the  National  Association  of  Attorneys  
General is often jocularly referred to as the National  Association  of  Aspiring  Governors.”  Id. at 200 n.278.
453. Id. at 199–203; Barkow, supra note 7, at 56–57; Lemos, supra note 429, at 19–27, 33–34, 43.
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assessments.454
Moreover, it is far more difficult for the financial services industry to capture 50
state AGs than it is to dominate a single federal agency. 455 Even a few state officials can
act  as  influential  public  “entrepreneurs”  in  exposing  serious  abuses  that  federal  agencies  
have neglected.456 Eliot Spitzer and William Galvin showed the ability of state enforcers
to   capture   the   public’s   attention   and   to   influence   national   policy   when   they   uncovered  
multiple securities scandals that the SEC had overlooked; indeed, their enforcement
actions ultimately persuaded the SEC to take its own remedial steps.457
During the debates on Dodd–Frank, state AGs were among the strongest supporters
of an independent federal consumer financial protection agency. 458 After Dodd–Frank
was enacted, Elizabeth Warren—who   first   proposed   the   agency’s   creation   and   was  
appointed to oversee CFPB’s   organization—declared that state AGs were CFPB’s  
“natural  partners”  and  asked  for  their  help.459 CFPB appointed former Ohio AG Richard
Cordray  as  the  first  director  of  CFPB’s  enforcement  division, 460 and CFPB subsequently
entered into cooperative agreements with state banking commissioners and state AGs.461
Thus, it appears that state officials—empowered by Title X of Dodd–Frank—will be
CFPB’s  staunchest  regulatory  and  political  allies  as  CFPB  seeks  to  implement  its  mission  
of protecting consumers from unfair, deceptive and abusive financial products.
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Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 15–
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V. CONCLUSION
Congress decided to establish CFPB after concluding that federal bank regulators
had repeatedly failed to provide effective safeguards for consumers during the credit
boom leading up to the financial crisis. Congress determined that federal banking
agencies accommodated the desires of large financial institutions for immediate shortterm   profits,   overlooked   concerns   about   those   institutions’   long-term safety and
soundness, and disregarded the dangers posed to consumers by predatory lending
practices. In addition, Congress criticized the OCC and the OTS for preempting the
efforts of many states to combat predatory practices.
In   view   of   the   federal   regulators’   systematic   failures   to   protect   consumers   of  
financial services, Congress enacted Title X of Dodd–Frank. Title X removes consumer
financial protection responsibilities from the federal banking agencies and centralizes
those tasks within CFPB. Title   X   promotes   CFPB’s   independence   by   granting   CFPB  
autonomy in its policymaking, rulemaking and enforcement functions, and by giving
CFPB an independent source of funding. In order to supplement the protections provided
by CFPB’s   regulations,   Title  X   authorizes   the   states   to   adopt   laws   providing   additional  
safeguards for consumers of financial services. In order to increase the effectiveness of
CFPB’s   enforcement   efforts,   Title   X   empowers   state   AGs   to   bring   administrative   and  
judicial   proceedings   to   enforce   Title   X’s   statutory   provisions   and   CFPB’s   regulations.
Title   X   also   imposes   significant   limitations   on   the   OCC’s   ability   to   preempt   the  
application of state laws to national banks and federal thrifts.
By encouraging both cooperation and competition among CFPB and state officials,
Title X will promote experimentation, innovation, and continuous reform in consumer
financial protection. Moreover, state legislatures and state AGs could play crucial roles in
resisting  efforts  by  major  financial  institutions  and  their  political  allies  to  weaken  CPFB’s  
independence and undermine its effectiveness. In view of the formidable political clout
wielded  by  large  financial  conglomerates,  Title  X’s  grants  of  enhanced  authority  to  state  
legislators and state AGs could prove to be vital safeguards for consumers of financial
services.

